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Abstract 
The differences caused by the Apartheid system have set its mark on the South African 
society and are still very evident through the separation of society according to colour, the 
uneven distribution of resources, but also through the extensive lack of trust in society in 
general. During Apartheid the white areas developed and had much of the resources, 
knowledge, corporations and property. The rural areas and the Homelands were poor and to a 
large degree dependent on employment from the white landowners and companies. Hence, 
one part of the population has well-established markets and organisations, while the former 
Homelands and rural areas are in need of assistance through grants, financing, education, 
training and so on. In 1994 the newly elected ANC government gave promise of 30 percent 
land redistributed back to the dispossessed in 5 years through an extensive Land and Agrarian 
Land Reform Programme. In 2005, 3 percent of the land had been redistributed (Gran 2006: 
192).  
 
It is against this context of persistent poverty among the previously oppressed in the rural 
areas and a clear failure of the land reform to perform as supposed at the outset, that this 
thesis sets out to explore communal problem-solving through the theories of nodal 
governance and social capital.  
 
The primary research techniques applied in order to investigate this has been document 
analysis and qualitative interviews with a couple of main informants. Subsequently there has 
been conducted two case studies of land reform projects in South Africa; the Goodhouse 
community in the Northern Cape Province, and the Vuki Farm in the Western Cape Province. 
By use of the variables trust, networks and character of authority intervention, the thesis has 
attempted to identify characteristics of opportunities and challenges for these groups of land 
reform beneficiaries. The sole focus has been to investigate the possibilities to improve the 
delivery of land reform in the deprived rural areas of South Africa by focussing on the case 
studies and their relations towards the governance networks connected to agriculture in the 
New South Africa.   
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In SA, and across the African continent, land and resource rights of the rural poor are 
endangered by “inappropriate policies and institutions (including global treaties), unequal 
social, political and economic relations, the actions of powerful vested interests (wealthy 
national and local elites, international aid organisations, and multinational corporations), 
and the weakness of grassroots organisations (Saruchera and Odhiambo 2004:2). 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Agricultural reforms and transformations has been the focus of several researches, especially 
when it comes to some European countries during the industrialisation. One subject of 
investigation has been related to why the north of Europe experienced more success in this 
transformation-period than the south, although both parts had more or less the same basis for 
development. Dieter Senghaas explained these differences with socio-structural and 
institutional prerequisites; although the industrialisation promoted development in Europe, a 
number of other factors within the distinct countries accelerated or prevented development in 
the agricultural sector (Senghaas 1985: 90). Some of the prerequisites Senghaas identify as 
decisive are: “an agrarian structure that did not impede agricultural development (few large 
estates, prevalence of medium sized farms open to innovation, eradication of village penury, 
openness of landowners and tenants toward institutional reforms and technical 
innovation)”(ibid: 90). Further, Senghaas recognize moderate inequality in distribution of 
resources, a high level of education, private enterprises willing to invest, politically organised 
peasantry, spread of technically innovation in all sectors, stable political framework, well-
developed infrastructure and a distribution of income which facilitate macro-economically 
relevant saving directed towards productive investment, as important in successful 
development (ibid: 90). How countries approach these different issues will to a large degree 
determine how or if the country will develop when it comes to agriculture and distribution of 
land. 
 
Land and agrarian reforms have generally been coloured by dramatic and sometimes violent 
adjustments. South Africa has made an effort to create a negotiated move from the previous 
Apartheid-regime to democracy. The Freedom Charter of 1994 states that “The land shall be 
shared among those who work it!” Hence, it comprised the previously oppressed and landless, 
but also the existing landowners of European inheritance (Hall 2004: 60). The ANC 
government further decided to impose a market-based redistribution of land; the “willing 
seller, willing buyer” (WSWB) principle. This standard has thus dominated the discourse on 
land reform since the first democratic election, and according to Edward Lahiff (2005) “it can 
be described as one of the defining characteristics of the programme, distinguishing if from 
most other land reforms around the world” (Lahiff 2005: 1). Consequently, the state does not 
actively identify land for redistribution or select the beneficiaries; the approach is demand-led. 
Those who want land have to identify themselves and apply to the state for grants (Hall 2004: 
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6). The process of redistributing land has been moving very slowly, some scholars argue that 
this is due to the very notion of the WSWB approach (Gran 1997: 16). Recognising the 
problem of slow redistribution and also in order to enable the land claimers to use their land 
profitably, there have been many attempts to initiate programmes to support the new 
landowners. Some programmes have contributed and others have failed, but none of them can 
be said to entirely have solved the problems facing the rural poor and landless in the rural 
areas of South Africa.  
Consequently, the mentioned prerequisites identified by Senghaas as vital for effective for 
agricultural development and land reform, seems to be some of the main challenges in the 
South Africa. All though the new governments after 1994 have done several moves in order to 
support the poor rural citizens, South Africa is still a highly unequal country. Some research 
even finds that the differences within South Africa have increased since the first democratic 
election in 1994 (Webster & von Holdt 2005). I will in this document investigate the 
performance of land reform in South Africa by studying two land reform projects and through 
this try to identify challenges and opportunities in the South African land and agrarian reform 
programme. 
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Chapter 2: The New South Africa  
2.1 Introduction 
 
 
The Dutch East India Company first landed its settlers in South Africa, more precisely Cape 
of Good Hope, in 1652. These were the first European settlers in the country, most of them of 
Dutch origin. The settlers got known as Boers or Afrikaners, and as early as 1795 they tried to 
establish an independent republic. The British came to the country around 1815. As a result of 
their arrival and moreover their infiltration in the government systems and freeing of slaves in 
1833, several Afrikaners made the “great trek” north and east, areas later known as the 
Transvaal and the Orange Free State. The discovery of diamonds and gold in the 1860s and 
1870s resulted in increased immigration, which in turn led Prime Minister Cecil Rhodes to 
plan a takeover. His plan misfired in 1895, something that caused his resignation. On October 
11th, 1899 a war broke out between the Afrikaners and the British; “the Boer Wars”. The 
Afrikaners’ victory in 1902 led to the transformation from a Boer republic to a British 
Colony, and the establishment of The Union of South Africa in 1910, where Louis Botha 
became the first Prime Minister. The African National Congress (ANC) was established in 
1912, and was the first organised political activity among the Africans1. Following Bothas’ 
death in 1919, Jan Christiaan Smuts took over as Prime Minister. Smuts was one of the 
framers of the League of Nations Charter in the post World War Ι era, and “the very image of 
an enlightened leader” (Mamdani 1996: 4). He supported the principles of the French 
Revolution but opposed the application of these principles in an African context. He 
suggested that the Africans “was of a race so unique that nothing could be worse for Africa 
than the application of a policy that would de-Africanize the African and turn him either into 
a beast of the field or into a pseudo-European” (J.C. Smuts cited in Mamdani 1996: 5). 
Because of this, Smuts decided there should be an institutional segregation between the 
Africans and the European settlers. In his new policy he postulated that “The British Empire 
does not stand for the assimilation of its peoples into a common type, it does not stand for 
standardization, but for the fullest freest development of its peoples along their own specific 
lines” (J.C. Smuts cited in Mamdani 1996: 5). In order to achieve this “fullest freest 
development” Smuts also saw territorial segregation, or racial segregation, as a necessary 
move in order to preserve the institutional segregation. Because of the growing economy 
                                                 
1 http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0107983.html 
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following industrialisation of the country, Smuts thought migrant labour to be a suitable way 
to preserve native institutions and to meet the labour demands at the same time. However, 
Smuts meant it was too late to implement this new policy in South Africa, because the 
urbanisation had gone too far. “The Broederbond”, an Afrikaner supremacist brotherhood, on 
the other hand, disagreed.  This brotherhood argued that a stabilisation of the system of racial 
domination was urgent, and what Smuts had labelled institutional segregation, they named 
Apartheid.  
 
Because of the already far proceeded urbanisation in South Africa, the segregation was 
particularly violent, and led to forced removals of those considered unproductive, and a 
forced migration between workplace and homeland for those labelled productive. This form 
of institutional segregation or Apartheid, where the natives were to rule through their own 
institutions in their own areas, had earlier been named “indirect rule” by the British.  
Mamdani, however, finds “decentralised despotism” to be more suitable (Mamdani 1996). In 
practise this form of segregation meant that the native South Africans were forced into “tribal 
areas” with “traditional leaders”. Moreover, the traditional leaders were either “selectively 
reconstituted as the hierarchy of the local state or freshly imposed where none had 
existed“(Mamdani 1996: 17). Besides governmental laws, there were also implemented a 
customary law that was to control and regulate the non-market relations, in families, in land 
and in community affairs. The territories in the homelands remained in communal or 
“customary” possession. Because the state was organised differently in rural and urban areas, 
the state may be called bifurcated or Janus-faced; it had two distinct forms of power but was 
gathered under a single hegemonic authority. The vision may be summed up in Cecil Rhodes’ 
famous words: “Equal rights for all civilized men” (cited in Mamdani 1996).  The forced 
removals under the “Group Areas Act” in 1950 and 1986 further reinforced the segregation.  
 
From the 1960s of, the black opposition to Apartheid intensified, and became stronger and 
more violent. In 1960 the biggest anti-Apartheid organisation ANC was banned, and four 
years later their leader, Nelson Mandela, was imprisoned for life. In 1976 a student-uprising 
in the Soweto-township outside Johannesburg spread to several other townships in the area 
and resulted in 600 people dying, many of them very young. Subsequently, the United 
Nations imposed sanctions and several countries boycotted South Africa due to their racialist 
Government. In 1989 F.W. de Klerk took over following P.W. Botha as president of South 
Africa. He removed the ban on the ANC and released their leader after 27 years in prison. In 
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1994 South Africa held their first democratic election which resulted in a massive victory for 
Nelson Mandela and the ANC2. In their election programme, the Redistribution and 
Development Programme (RDP) the new ANC government promised 30 percent land 
redistributed back to the dispossessed in 5 years.  In 2005, 3 percent of the land had been 
redistributed (Gran 2006: 192).  
2.2 Promises of Land Reform  
When the ANC negotiated with the Apartheid government in the late 1980s, the redistribution 
of land was one of the areas discussed. They agreed that the land should be restored to the 
dispossessed, but there were ambiguity about whether it should apply from the arrival of 
Dutch settlers in 1652, the Natives Land Act in 1913 or the start of National Party rule, or 
Apartheid Rule, in 1948. They finally agreed on 1913, which meant that the people that were 
evicted from their land due to the Natives Act now could apply to get their land restored. For 
decades millions of black South Africans had been forcibly removed from their homes, in 
urban areas in terms of the Group Areas Act, and in the rural areas of the country in terms of 
the Natives Land and Trust Act in 1913 and 1936, in addition to the forced move of black 
people into the Bantustans or Homelands (Hall 2004: 1). The forced removal of South 
Africans from their homes and land went on for decades, and at the end of the Apartheid-rule 
almost 86 percent of the agricultural land were in the hands of about 60.000 white farmers, 
while over 13 million Africans remained in the deprived Homelands (Lahiff 2007: 1). The 
Land Reform in South Africa was meant to improve the situation especially for the rural poor 
by giving them access to land, and hence giving them the opportunity to enjoy benefits of 
agricultural growth.  
 
With the transition to democracy with the ANC-led government in 1994, expectations were 
high that they would “effect a fundamental transformation of property rights that would 
address the history of dispossessions and lay the foundations for the social and economic 
upliftment of the rural and urban poor” (Lahiff 2001: 1). These hopes where further nourished 
by the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) in 1994, which amongst other 
things promised to redistribute 30 percent of arable land within five years, and also make 
Land Reform the ‘central and driving force of a programme of rural development’ (ibid: 1). It 
                                                 
2 http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0107983.html 
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soon became evident that the redistribution promise, and the time-limit the ANC set, was far 
out of reach.  
2.3 Issues of trust in ‘The New South Africa’ 
In the past decades there has been an extensive loss of trust in governments and bureaucracies 
across the world. The trend has been decentralisation of decision making “downward” to the 
local governments and “outward” to NGOs and private organisations (Briggs 2008: 10). With 
the WSWB-approach to redistribution of land and with the local municipalities and provincial 
governments as distributors of the reform, this is also evident in the land reform programme 
in South Africa. Xavier de Souza Briggs postulates that “trust is hard won and easily lost, 
especially where a history of inequality and resentments across ethnic or other social borders 
cast a shadow” (ibid: 11). There are apparent issues of trust between the different ethnic 
groups in the country after years of segregation both prior to and after the Apartheid-regime. 
A report from the Surplus Peoples Project (SPP) finds that racism and distrust within groups 
of white commercial farmers is one of the main reasons for the slow redistribution of land in 
the country. One farmer in Northern Cape expressed it quite clearly; “Not today, not 
tomorrow, never will I sell to non-whites!”3 Another group identified in the report by SPP is 
the white commercial farmers that are supportive to land reform but do not trust The 
Department of Land Affairs (DLA) and the emerging farmers. Moreover, talking to Mr. van 
Jaarsveld with the Ministry of Agriculture in the Western Cape, the issue of trust was 
discussed. He told me what he found to be main reasons for projects failing and he mentioned 
distrust as one of the factors; “I think one of the other things is that sometimes there’s a little 
bit of distrust because a lot of the officials are white officials. And you know, the question 
might arise, do these people really have our interest at heart” (Interview Mr. van Jaarsveld 
17.07.2008).  
 
For decades the poor rural areas were cut off any form of rights and development, social, civil 
and economical. The consequence in the South African society after years of suppression, 
besides the highly unequal share of resources4, are high levels of distrust, and trust is crucial 
in building social and economic growth in a country (Askvik et al 2005: 1). With previously 
                                                 
3 Why do the landless remain landless? SPP 2002 www.spp.org.za  
4 South Africa has, alongside Brazil, one of the most unequal distributions of income in the world with a Gini-
coefficient score of about 0.6  
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high segregation based on ethnicity, the issue of trust is exceedingly relevant, in society in 
general, but also towards the formerly oppressive state institutions. Piotr Sztompka suggests 
several reasons why states going through modernisation processes, like South Africa, 
increasingly have to rely on trust. One of his arguments is that the modernised states have to 
rely on human actors, not fate, in the development of the country. This means that politicians 
have to trust each other and the policies they put forward, and the public need to trust their 
representatives in the government structures. This has been a difficult matter in South Africa, 
with several charges of corruption among the politicians and other important actors in the 
state system. Moreover, Thorvald Gran found that there are low levels of trust between the 
officials and politicians connected to land reform in provincial governments. His research 
applies to the Western and Northern Cape Provinces where he found that “the members of the 
main political parties were more enemies than legitimate players in a democratic process” 
(Gran 2008: 1).  
 
Secondly, modernisation brings increased division of labour and a differentiation of roles 
which causes a high interdependence between and within societies. This necessitates 
cooperation between groups of people, which in turn demands trust. Dependencies towards 
new and unknown actors may cause uncertainties in the communities. In South Africa, this is 
a highly important issue, as different ethnic groups that have been separated for years, now 
have to try to live and function together as one group. Moreover, the separation between 
ethnicities in the South African societies are still evident, as people still to a large degree 
reside in different areas based on the “colour-system” of blacks, whites and coloureds. 
However, in areas where the different groups of people now have to cooperate and work 
together, like in land reform, several issues arise.  
 
Thirdly, the greater the complexity of modernised societies, the more unpredictable the action 
of the people in office seems amongst the citizens. Less predictability means increased need 
for trust in the society. Gran’s previous mentioned research found that the provincial 
politicians and bureaucrats engaged in land reform does not trust the modern economy, as the 
international donors and the modern economy institutions were looked upon as the least 
supportive of land reform (Gran 2008: 1). Finally, in modern societies there are several “black 
boxes” that seem unclear and incomprehensible to most members. This may be the 
bureaucracy in the government institutions, the markets etc. In order to act, one must work up 
some sort of trust towards the experts and specialists in the system. There have been charges 
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of misconduct by politicians and officials in several areas of government. My main 
impression after studying the field of land reform and having talked to South Africans about 
land reform and the South African government in general is that there is a high distrust among 
people towards the government’s capability to solve the country’s problems. As many of 
these points show, the less we know about someone or something, the higher is the need for 
trust (Askvik et al 2005: 3). This is a well-known and difficult matter in several societies in 
the world, and has been a severe issue in South Africa for decades. One of the most recent 
examples of disbelieves and desperation caused by mismanagement in the South African 
communities came to show through the terrible xenophobic attacks across the country in the 
beginning of 2008. Regardless of what one finds to be the reason for these attacks, they 
certainly have not lessened the distrust between people and towards government.    
2.4 Land Reform  
Expected to deal with the racial divide in ownership of land in South Africa, the discussion on 
land policies started in the early 90s. The World Bank was an important contributor, 
suggesting a range of tools in order to get a more economically efficient agriculture in the 
country. They argued that small farms are more efficient than the larger ones, according to the 
inverse size-productivity relationship in the sector. Among the tools brought up in these early 
stages were land taxes, land ceilings and subdivision of farm land. Other discussions 
addressed whether the process should rely on the land markets, how to choose beneficiaries, 
financing mechanisms etc. Finally the parties agreed on a programme which secured property 
rights, and where the transformation from racially separated property politics was to be 
pursued through a market-based approach. The 1997 White Paper on South African Land 
Policy introduced an increased neo-liberal framework to land reform with the WSWB-
approach as a foundation for the governments policy on Land Reform (Lahiff 2005: 1). The 
market-led approach of WSWB was absent from the ANC’s “ready to govern” document 
from 1992, where they focused on non-market led mechanisms like expropriation. Nor was it 
mentioned in their election manifesto; the RDP of 1994. The WSWB approach has been 
influenced by the World Bank, but it is merely a small part of a bigger picture suggested by 
the World Bank during the transition to democracy in the early 90’s. In the World Bank 
document “South African Agriculture: Structure, performance and options for the future” 
from 1994, they recommend a strategy which includes “selective expropriation, land taxes, 
subdivision of land holdings, and negotiated ‘exit strategies’ for current landowners” (ibid: 1). 
The platform, on which the ANC based their land policies, differed considerably from this 
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suggestion especially in terms of the WSWB. In South Africa the land reform was rooted in 
“respect for private property, reliance on market mechanisms, tightly controlled public 
spending and minimal intervention in the economy – the so-called market-based, demand-led 
approach-“ (Lahiff 2001: 1). Almost since the land reform-programme started it has been 
criticised due to its failure to reach its targets, redistribute the wealth and opportunities, to 
create economic growth in the country, and its inability to “deliver on its multiple objectives 
of historical redress” (Lahiff 2008: 1).  
2.5 The Land Reform Programmes 
The history of land and farming tenure in South Africa may be described as a “racist, state-
supported dualist land tenure system with a relatively small number of white owners of 
privately held land and the majority of black citizens enjoying lesser rights either (i) on farms, 
(ii) in former Bantustans/homelands or coloured rural reserves or (iii) various urban 
holding”5. The South African land reform was meant to balance this disparity and was 
presented with three broad headings: land restitution, land redistribution and land tenure 
reform. Of the 4.7million Ha that has been delivered under the Land Reform Programme so 
far, Redistribution contributed with 52 percent, Tenure Reform with 2 percent and Restitution 
with 45 percent. In addition, the transferring of state land came to 1 percent of the total land 
distributed6.  Lahiff (2008) describes the approach to South African land reform with these 
words: “the weakness of the market-based approach that underlies the South African land 
reform programme – loosely captured under the slogan of ‘willing seller, willing buyer – 
extends well beyond this question of land acquisition, and has implications for the types of 
beneficiaries accessing the programme, the often inappropriate models of land use being 
imposed on them, the general failure of post-settlement support and, ultimately, the slow pace 
of reform and the generally disappointing performance of land reform ‘projects’” (p.2). In the 
next sequences, I will go through what has been proposed and done through the land reform-
programmes, with a specific focus on the redistribution programme due to its contribution to 
the land reform programme, but also to elucidate policies and arrangements that are relevant 
in the case-studies later in the text. 
                                                 
5 Unpublished paper, Wisborg, Hall and Shirinda 2007, presented at the Annual Conference of the Norwegian 
Association for Development Research, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, 5-7 November 2007 
6Umhlaba Wethu – a quarterly bulletin tracking land reform in South Africa. No.5, June 2008. PLAAS 
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2.5.1 Land Restitution 
One of the first legislations passed by the new Government in 1994 was The Restitution of 
Land Rights Act 22, or the ‘Restitution Act’. This Act gives effect to the decision that people 
displaced after 1913 have the right to either restitution of the property or compensation. The 
Act established the Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights (CRLR), whose work is to 
request and investigate the Land Restitution-claims and prepare them for settlement. The 
CRLR works under a Chief Land Claims Commissioner, and five Regional Commissioners. 
They were intended to work as an independent organ in the Land Reform, but are now placed 
under the DLA, and therefore also dependent on their funding, policy direction, 
administration etc. The Restitution Act also established a Land Claims Court that rule the 
proposed claims and make decisions on which form of compensation that should be given the 
claimants. The Act further stipulates three different categories of relief for the claimants; 
“restoration of the land under claim, granting of alternative land or financial compensation” 
(Lahiff 2001: 3). The claimants may also get access to state development projects. In 1995, 
the CRLR, with partners in and outside of Government, promoted the restitution process and 
urged people eligible to hand in claims by the end of December 1998. By the set date, a total 
of 63 455 claims had been handed in. This number had risen to 79 693 in 2004, mainly 
because the claims had to be split up in households or individuals, and many claims, 
especially from the rural areas, included hundreds and even thousands of claimants. There 
have later been complaints due to lack of information towards all qualified claimants, which 
probably made a substantial amount of people unaware of the process (Hall 2004). In fact, 
only 10 percent of the supposed 6 million that were dispossessed filed a claim7. 
 
The programme’s initial plan was to spend three years, beginning the 1st of May 1995, on 
establishing claims, then five years on finalising claims and finally ten years on implementing 
all the courts orders. By December 1998, 31 claims had been settled. Because of the slow 
progress in the start of the programme, there were some legislative changes in 1997 in order 
to bring the programme in line with the new constitution. This resulted in direct access for the 
appliers to the Land Claims Court and more power for the Minister of Land Affairs to settle 
                                                 
7 Presentation to the Portfolio Committee on Agriculture and Land Affairs 29 May 2007: p.17 
 http://land.pwv.gov.za/restitution/ 
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claims by negotiation. In addition, the legislative changes were followed by a Restitution 
Review in 1998. This review investigated the CRLR and its close relations with the DLA, and 
led to a considerable increase in settlements (Lahiff 2001: 3, Hall 2004: 13).  
 
According to Lahiff (2001), there has been a clear bias toward urban claimants and financial 
compensations. In 2001, the majority of claims, around 72 percent, came from urban areas 
due to the forced removals under the Group Areas Act during Apartheid. These were mostly 
individual or household-claims. Around 28 percent of the claims came from rural areas, and 
most of them included several households or whole communities. In fact, estimations found 
that around 90 percent of the claimants actually came from rural areas. The provinces of 
Gauteng, North West, Western Cape and Eastern Cape accounted for 87 percent of the total 
settled claims in 2001, which further supports the notion about bias towards urban areas. Most 
of the claims from these provinces are derived from forced removals from i.e. the cities of 
Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and East London. There were far less finalised claims in 
provinces with more rural claimants, like Mpumalanga, the Northern Province and KwaZulu 
Natal, where altogether 8.57 percent of the claims had been settled8 (Hall 2004: 12, Lahiff 
2001: 3). Looking at the reports by CRLR from 1995 to March 2008, the total majority of 
claimants are from rural areas with about 64.5 percent, compared to 35.5 percent urban 
claimants. 87.8 percent of the settled claims were urban, while 12.2 percent were rural. 
Hence, it is questionable whether the Land Restitution has had the wanted effect on rural 
development as the Land Reform Programme stated 
 
The total number of settled restitution claims from 1995 to the 31st of March 2008 has now 
reached 74 747 with 1 415 192 beneficiaries. Only 9105 of the cases are from rural areas of 
the country, but it involves 912 738 beneficiaries. The urban beneficiaries came to 502 454, 
but they were less people behind the claims, with      65 642 claims settled. The urban 
applicants have a tendency to settle with a financial compensation compared to the rural 
claims; 47 726 of the total urban claims settled got the financial compensation, compared to 
4247 of the rural total of 9105 applicants9. On the other hand it is important to notice that 
these are statistics from the CRLR, and they alongside other Land Reform institutions have 
been criticised for a lack of correct data-material and statistics.  
                                                 
8 As of 2001 (Lahiff 2001: 3) 
9 CRLR Annual Report 2007/2008 
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2.5.2 Tenure Reform 
There are two different areas of Tenure Reform; Communal Tenure Reform and Farm Tenure 
Reform. According to Edward Lahiff this is the most neglected reform-programme, but also 
the one that has most potential to impact the poor people of South Africa. In fact, he proposes 
that Tenure Reform has the possibility of more impact then all the other reform-programmes 
put together (Lahiff 2001: 1).  
2.5.2.1 Farm Tenure Reform 
Farm Tenure Reform is intended to better the lives of the farm workers in South Africa. This 
group are among the poorest in the country, earning an average of R544 a month10. Still they 
are very important to the rural economy, contributing with 39 percent of the total rural income 
(Hall 2004: 37).  In addition to the farm workers, who often reside on the farm-land, there are 
also farm dwellers who reside on the area, which most often are children and elderly people. 
Most farm dwellers have access to the residential area only, while a small part also has access 
to areas of land for own livestock and grazing etc. In return for these land areas, the farm 
dwellers are required to work for the land owner without any compensation. Farm owners 
recently had full rights to evict the farm workers- and dwellers. Because of these insecure 
circumstances, the DLA developed a tenure reform under their Land reform programme. In 
1996, the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 (LTA) was introduced. LTA applies for those 
dwellers who have access to parts of land for own agricultural purposes. In 1997, the DLA 
presented another programme, which is called The Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 
(ESTA). This Act was meant to protect the tenure rights for farm workers and secure their 
jobs. It further describes under which circumstances a farm worker may be evicted. This act 
protects all the occupiers living on the farm land with the owners’ approval, also the ones that 
are not formally employed.  
2.5.2.2 Communal Tenure Reform 
With the Communal Tenure Reform, the DLA tries to clarify who has the right to what land 
in the former Homelands. It further tries to elucidate the nature and content of the rights and 
makes an effort to administer them. There are various land ownerships in these areas, with 
land falling in under different Apartheid and colonial proclamations. Thus, the land is owned 
by different parties, like the South African Bantu Trust, the South African Development 
Trust, the South African Native Trust, and also The Minister of Land Affairs (Hall 2004: 47). 
                                                 
10 Numbers from 2000 (Hall 2004: 37) 
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The communal areas of the former Homelands is home to almost one third of the people 
living in South Africa, furthermore, they also hold the deepest concentration of poverty.  
 
After 1994 there has been much ambiguity about who has the right to what land in the 
communal areas of the country, with overlapping claims to land. The “administrative 
vacuum” in the areas has not made the situation any easier (ibid: 48). There have among other 
things been examples of different people getting access to the same plot of land, and also 
illegal sales to outsiders (Hall 2004). All these factors make for an uncertain tenure-situations 
and potential tension and conflict among the people in the communal areas. The Interim 
Protection of Informal Land Rights Act 31 of 1996 (IPILRA), was presented as an effort to 
solve these uncertainties in the communal areas.  However, there is no formal legislation that 
deals with communal tenure, so the Act has been extended on a yearly basis since 1996 (Hall 
2004). In 1999 the Land Rights Bill was presented, meant to acknowledge existing tenure 
rights in communal areas and also to provide institutional aid to the administration of 
communal land. Nevertheless, this Bill was scrapped after protests from various opposition-
parties. In 2002, the Communal Land Rights Act 11(CLRA) was presented for public review, 
leading to threats from some traditional leaders who perceive reforms of the current system as 
an intimidation to their power (Wisborg and Rhode 2003: 1). The CLRA was passed by 
Parliament in February 2004, and signed into law by the president later that year. The Act is 
meant to make sure that there is a democratic management of land by the community that 
owns it. It also empowers the Minister of Land Affairs to transfer property to communities. 
Further it calls for land rights administration committees, which distribute and administers the 
land following community rules. These rules must be recorded and conversely turns the 
community into one juristic person, allowed to own property. In communities with tribal 
authorities, the tribal councils administer the land. These councils are required to have an 
elected membership, including a minimum representation of women (Hall 2004: 49).  
 
Another policy that has been introduced within the communal tenure reform-framework is the 
Transformation of Certain Rural Areas Act 94 (TRANCRAA) from 1998. This act is meant to 
transform the previous ‘coloured reserves’ and secure the users’ rights to land that has been 
used in common by the residents. The act intervenes in 23 former ‘Act 9-areas11’ in Northern-
, Western- and Eastern Cape and also the Free State. Through TRANCRAA the tenure rights 
                                                 
11 The Rural Areas Act 9 from 1987 
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are to be secured by transferring the ownership of the areas to either the residents through a 
Communal Property Association (CPA)12, through another local institution i.e. the local 
municipality in the area, or another body or person approved by the Minister of Land Affairs 
(Wisborg and Rhode 2003: 1). 
2.5.3 Land Redistribution 
The Land Redistribution was set out in the early 90s with a prospect to change the racially 
skewed distribution of land and also to support economic development (Hall 2004: 25). 
Following the commitments to Land Reform in the RDP in 1994, where the ANC made a 
promise of redistribution of 30 percent of the arable land, came the White Paper on South 
African land Policy in 1997. There was considerable changes in the governments approach to 
Land Reform and their policies from ’94 to ’97. Some of these policy changes were results of 
political imperatives, as well as adjustments made after observations by the DLA (Bannister 
2004: 1). The White Paper set the purpose of the Land Redistribution to be “the redistribution 
of land to the landless poor, labour tenants, farm workers and emerging farmers for residential 
and productive use, to improve their livelihoods and quality of life”13. There has been a large 
amount of attention given to this programme as it came to show that neither the tenure reform 
nor the restitution programme was making significant contributions. Restitution contributed 
with less than one third of the transfers up till 2004, while the total of land redistribution and 
tenure reform, as of September 2004, was almost 1.9million Ha. The tenure reform has 
contributed with only a small percentage of this number (Hall 2004). 
 
The White Paper further presented a number of grants that would be made available to 
beneficiaries of land reform, central to these were the Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant 
(SLAG) amounting to R16 000 per claimant. Consequently, after a rather slow start, the 
redistribution of land increased rapidly between 1995 and 1999, where 60 000 households 
were given grants through the SLAG. All in all about 650 000Ha of land were redistributed 
by March 1999, which is less then one percent of the country’s arable land (Lahiff 2001: 4). 
All though there was an increase in land redistributed, several problems became evident 
during the SLAG-process. Among these were “the inexperience of officials in conducting 
land transactions, leading to lengthy delays and loss of interest from sellers; reliance on 
                                                 
12 in terms of the CPA Act, Act 28 of 1996 
13 White Paper on South African Land Policy, DLA 1997: 36. 
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current land owners to determine when, where and at what price land is made available; poor 
coordination with provincial departments of agriculture and local government, leading to 
poorly designed projects and lack of post-settlement support; unwieldy group schemes; 
cumbersome approval mechanisms that acquired ministerial approval for every project; and 
the imposition of inappropriate ‘business plans’ on poor communities” (My underlining, 
Lahiff 2001: 4).  
 
In 1998 the DLA started a review of their policies, especially related to their redistribution 
projects. In 1999, the newly appointed Minister of Land Affairs, Thoko Didiza, launched a 
comprehensive evaluation of the programme and proposed that it had to be better suited for 
those who aspired to be full-time, medium to large scale commercial farmers. She put an eight 
months halt on the redistribution-process, based on the uncertainty whether the grant was 
serving as a means to reach the goals of Land Reform (Bannister 2004: 1). Most of the 
beneficiaries until then where groups of applicants that was pooling their grants in order to 
buy commercial farmland.  The review led to the Land Redistribution for Agricultural 
Development (LRAD)-programme that was meant to broaden the process to include the 
claimants that wanted to become full-time, big scale, farmers. The LRAD-programme was 
created in close relations with the World Bank, with almost no input from the civil society or 
staff at the DLA. The new programme has been undoubtedly aimed at creating full-time black 
commercial farmers. Although it makes promises of ‘food safety nets’ and encourages a 
variety of producers, Lahiff points out that both the policy and the promotion of it has 
unmistakably been aimed at that certain type of beneficiaries (Lahiff 2001: 5). This is 
nowhere more evident than in the fact that the DLA replaced the income ceiling for eligible 
beneficiaries from a maximum of R1500 per month to a minimum of R5000 per month (My 
underlining, Lahiff 2001: 5).  The foundation for this programme is to give grants to 
beneficiaries for acquirement of land for agricultural purposes. Hence, it focuses on fewer 
beneficiaries and greater amounts of land per applicant. This can be seen in the differences 
from 2000 to 2002, where in the first year there where over 30 000 beneficiaries while there 
were less than 10 000 in 2002. The amount of land per beneficiary household increased from 
an average 11Ha between 1996 and 1999, to 19Ha in 2002 (Bannister 2004: 1). 
 
In many respects, the LRAD-programme had the same difficulties and weaknesses as the 
SLAG. First of all it adopts the same ‘demand-led’ approach as the previous policies. Lahiff 
comments it this way: “despite the rhetoric, the programme is neither ‘demand-led’ nor 
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‘supply-led’, and undermines the very ‘market-based’ principles it claims to espouse” (Lahiff 
2001: 5).  The DLA again suggests a bureaucratic process that does not favour the buyers or 
the sellers, and makes it difficult to implement land reform in a well-planned and rational 
manner. Also under this programme, as in the SLAG-programme, the state is merely 
incorporated as financial support for the qualified applicants. The major problem with the 
programme however, is that it tends to favour the ones that already have resources, while 
those in greater need seems to be further marginalised. 
2.6 Recent Activities 
In July 2005 the National Land Summit was launched for the first time. Under the banner “A 
Partnership to Fast Track Land Reform: A New Trajectory Towards 2014” various actors in 
Land Reform discussed progress, achievements, issues and experiences through land reform 
the past 14 years. In the period following the conference, there was an increased debate 
concerning land reform policy, and also a variety of policy initiatives from the government’s 
side. Not since the transition period in the 1990s have there been so much attention and 
discussions regarding land reform in the country. Most of the debate both during and after the 
summit was related to the WSWB-approach adopted by the government. Since then, the 
Department of Land Affairs (DLA) engaged in “a stop-start process of consultations” and 
discussed some new policy proposals (Lahiff 2008: 1).  Between 2005 and 2006, the DLA 
introduced Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (PLAS), and the Land and Agrarian Reform 
Project (LAPR). In addition there has been a restored interest and emphasis on expropriation 
resulting in the Expropriation Bill in 2008, which has been approved by the cabinet but awaits 
parliamentary approval. With these changes there may be a move towards a more efficient 
land reform, by putting less trust in the WSWB-approach. However, there have not been 
many results indicating this transformation yet. By 2007 there had been transferred about 4.7 
million Ha of land back to the dispossessed. This equals nearly 5 percent of the agricultural 
land, which is pretty far from the promise of 30 percent that is supposed to be reached by 
2014.  
 
These mentioned issues are all factors that may have been, and still are, influential in the 
failure of land reform hitherto in South Africa. The implementation of policies have had 
limited results to show to so far. I will therefore focus on groups interaction in communal 
problem-solving, in an effort to look at how beneficiaries may succeed on the agricultural 
marked in spite of the difficult circumstances. This is not to say that I do not see the great 
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importance of a well-functioning state in pushing forward a land reform, but still I will try to 
look at what might be done by the beneficiaries themselves in order to make it. The rural poor 
in South Africa seem to have few chances of improving their situation. For this reason I wish 
to look at the beneficiaries and their possibilities for enhanced influence in the agricultural 
politics in South Africa through the theory of Nodal Governance. Due to the neo-liberal 
model of land reform that the Government have implemented through their policies, there are 
several powerful actors other than the State, involved in the process. Therefore, I wish in the 
theory chapter, to look at the emerging farmers and how they might enhance their possibilities 
for success getting access to powerful nodes within the “land reform-network”. 
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Chapter 3: The Cases 
In this chapter I will look into the two cases I have chosen to study; Vuki and Goodhouse. 
First, I will look into the characteristics of land reform in the Northern- and Western Cape. 
Secondly I describe the areas where Vuki and Goodhouse are situated before I go more into 
detail about each of the two cases.  
3.1 Land Reform in Northern and Western Cape 
Before 1994 the Northern Cape and Western Cape provinces were part of a bigger area; the 
Cape-province. After the first democratic elections the area was divided in three; Western 
Cape, Eastern Cape and Northern Cape. Partly as a result of the strict regulations of black 
African immigrants into the province, Western South Africa did not have any homelands 
during Apartheid. They did however have ‘coloureds’ doing most of their manual labour, and 
this has affected both regions in terms of the demography and language, but also when it 
comes to land reform and what kind of programmes that has been called for. However, when 
it comes to climate and topography, the two regions are very different. The Northern Cape is 
the largest province of South Africa, situated north-west in the country with borders to 
Namibia and Botswana. Furthermore, the region has a poor population that is scattered over 
an immense area which generates several poor rural communities in the province, and many 
of the inhabitants are decedents of the KhoiSan people. Main sources of income have been 
diamond mining and agriculture, the latter mostly confined on the banks of the Orange River 
on the boarder to Namibia. Since 1994, the province has been ruled by the ANC (Gran 2006: 
5).  
 
The Western Cape Province is different from many of the other areas of the country with the 
increasing tourism, the extensive wine-production but also in terms of climate. Further, it is 
wealthy, has extensive modern agriculture, a number of farm workers and a large urban 
population. Because of their predictable rainy-seasons, the agriculture is thriving in the area, 
resulting in 11.5 million Ha of farming land in the province. Consequently, the Western Cape 
produces around 60 percent of the country’s agricultural exports, valued to over R7 billion per 
annum. Of South Africa’s total agricultural production, 20 percent is from this province14.  
 
                                                 
14 Western Cape Department of Agriculture:  http://www.elsenburg.com/economics/statistics/start.htm 
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Since the beginning of the land reform process around 4.2 million Ha of land has been 
transferred to beneficiaries in South Africa through the restitution and redistribution 
programmes15. During this time some provincial tendencies when it comes to project-types 
and sizes have developed. Western Cape reported a variety of project types and is “notable for 
a number of exceptionally large and expensive projects” (Lahiff 2008: 26). This however, 
derives from redistribution projects. When it comes to the restitution process and the rural 
claims settled, the differences between the two provinces become more apparent. A summary 
from 2006 shows that in Northern Cape 13 out of 13 rural restitution projects involved land 
restoration, while 2 of 9 rural projects in Western Cape involved land transfers; the former 
restored 246 670Ha of land, while the number in the latter province was 5246Ha16. The trend 
in the urbanised Western Cape Province has been cash compensation rather then restoration 
of land. Nevertheless, far most claims were settled in this region in 2006/07; 1 263 claims 
against Northern Capes mere 102.  Then again, these 102 claims involved more then double 
the amount of beneficiaries then in the Western Cape17.  
 
The average size per redistribution project across the country in 2006/07 was 902Ha, while 
Northern and Western Cape reported much higher numbers; 2 282Ha and 3 756Ha 
respectively (Lahiff 2008: 24). Looking at tendencies during the years after 1994, the 
redistribution of large areas in Western Cape is more unexpected then in the Northern Cape. 
Northern Cape, on the other hand, has reported large area transfers since the beginning of the 
process. It should be noted though, that the largest projects in Western Cape in 2006/07 
involves forestry and not agricultural land (Lahiff 2008: 26). Northern Cape is, as mentioned, 
an immense semi-arid region with rather few inhabitants, which resulted in the fact that more 
then half of the 1.9 million Ha that had been redistributed by September 2004 took place in 
the Northern Cape (Hall 2004: 26). There have been several municipal commonage-projects 
in the Northern Cape: 50 of the 126 commonage projects by 2004 happened in this area of the 
country. The size of these projects has been impressive: 392 692Ha of commonage land was 
transferred in the Northern Cape by 2004, compared to 5 844Ha on two projects in the 
                                                 
15 DLA 2007 
16 Appendix I Rural Claims Settled – National Summary, 31. March 2006 
 
17 Appendix II Claims settled, by province, 2006/07 
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Western Cape (ibid: 35). Western Cape, with its rich agricultural land and established 
commercial farmers, are popular among property developers and foreign buyers, resulting in 
high land prices in the area, which in turn affects the land redistribution. In addition this 
region is more urbanised than the Northern Cape, with more of its land reform based on cash 
compensation to urban claimants. However, there has been a common trend in all of South 
Africa that bigger areas have been transferred to fewer beneficiaries per project since the 
mentioned policy changes resulting in the LRAD-grants in 2001. 
 
Although the two provinces are very different in terms of agro-ecological areas and the 
amount and concentration of people, this is not the sole explanation for their differences in 
land reform performance, it also appears to “reflect different interpretations of policy and 
different approaches by the various provincial offices of the DLA” (Lahiff 2008: 26). 
Inappropriate institutions and unskilled personnel in the local municipalities has been a 
widely criticised part of the land reform programme (Lahiff 2001, Cliffe 2007, Gran 1997). 
As a result, the prospects for successful land redistribution and projects may vary from 
province to province, and also within the different areas and municipalities.   
3.2 Namaqualand18 
The Goodhouse-community is situated in the Namaqualand region. This area is famous for its 
spectacular flower season in July/August and has Springbok as the regions capital city. 
Goodhouse is a small rural area situated on the banks of the Orange River near the boarder of 
Namibia. The closest city, Springbok, is approximately 80km away. The area is under the 
NamaKhoi Municipality, but is subject to the administration of Steinkopf Transitional 
Council. The Steinkopf Administration-region is the second biggest “coloured rural area” in 
terms of the Act 9 policy from 1987. The majority of the 7500 people living in this area are 
based in Steinkopf, while others are situated in the small communities Henkries, Ikosis, 
Eyams, Gladkopf, Bulletrap and Goodhouse. The area was originally 329 300Ha, but under 
the Land Redistribution Programme an additional 110 024hHa was added19. The Goodhouse 
Community include roughly 550Ha of land and some of the people living in the community 
                                                 
18 Map over Northern Cape – Appendix III 
19 M&E Newsletter 3/2001 - The journal of the Monitoring & Evaluation Directorate, DLA. www.me-dla.org.za 
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have ancestors that have been farming the land since the early 20th century20. The climate in 
the area is very dry and hot, with temperatures reaching as much as 50ºC in summer. 
3.3 Goodhouse Paprika Project 
In March 2003, the production at ‘Goodhouse Paprika Project’ was officially started21. There 
were great expectations that this project would help relieve the devastating unemployment-
rate in the area. After the Okiep copper mine closed down two years earlier and also when in 
addition two large fishing companies had to shut down, work opportunities were desperately 
needed22. With promises of 1.671 new jobs in the end of 200323 and becoming the second 
biggest producer of paprika on the European market, many, including the people in the area 
welcomed the project with open arms24. The Paprika processing factory, with 78 employees, 
was situated in Springbok. The developers’ plan was to create an additional 1.116 jobs apart 
from the 55 beneficiaries from Goodhouse; 1.500 workers, 10 in the cooperative, 8 in the 
nursery, 78 in the factory and 20 in management and administration25.   
 
The “Goodhouse Paprika Project” was initiated by the Northern Cape Provincial Government 
and ‘handed over’ to Mr. Gil Arbel, chief executive officer of Gili Greenworld and Mr. Andre 
Hendricks of Variety Holdings (Pty) Ltd., who together formed the Northern Cape 
Agricultural Linkages (NOCAL). Gil Arbel was the initiator and also the one who made the 
proposal and the feasibility studies. This is not only unfortunate; it is according to Henk Smith 
at the Legal Resources Centre (LRC), illegal. In spite of protests from the Steinkopf 
Transformation Committee (STC) with help from the Surplus Peoples Project (SPP) and the 
LRC, the suggestion went through. The STC applied the Land Bank for support to hire an 
agricultural economist in order to check the viability of the project in Mr. Arbel’s proposal, 
but got no funding.  
 
                                                 
20 Report from the Steinkopf Transformation Committee, SPP-files 
21 Volksblad: http://152.111.11.6/argief/berigte/volksblad/2003/12/05/SV/11/01.html  
22 Thabo Makweya, Northern Cape MEC of economic affairs and tourism, cited in Engineering news – site 
23 Proposal in SPP file 
24 Engineering news 04/10/2002, 07/03/2003 and 28/03/2003,  news24.com 07/03/2003, BuaNews 
05/03/2003, 28/11.2003 
25 Organisation map – Appendix IV 
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The farmers received R5.5 million in LRAD-grants for the project, and a loan from the Land 
Bank of R52 196 00026. In addition the Land Bank also provided them with a medium term 
loan of R40 480 000, a production loan of R5 250 000 and an instalment sale finance loan of 
R3 700 000; R49 430 000 all in all27. NOCAL invested R38 million in the factory. They also 
received an R18 million grant from the National DoA to install high technology drip-
irrigation on the land. The Northern Cape provincial government invested R17 millions in 
shares to be translated into a 25 percent shareholding in the factory by the 55 farmers28. 
NOCAL was to run the project until “the community are developed to such an extent that they 
can take full responsibility for the project management”29. The electricity Company ESKOM 
also sponsored the project with R3 million.  
 
All together there were 55 farmers that were to farm paprika and spices for the business 
‘Goodhouse Agricultural Corporation’. The proposal from Mr. Arbel stated that they were to 
farm according to a Kibbutsza system. This entailed that each farmer had a plot of 10Ha that 
he/she was responsible for, but that they all should share the profit produced by the system; “a 
process which builds lasting relationships and a strong camaraderie between the people 
involved30”. Sadly, this was not the outcome; quite the opposite of ’strong camaraderie’ 
evolved in the community. Conflicts developed between two groups of opposing farmers, the 
ones that were ‘pro-Gil’ and wanted to excise the land and hand it over to the developer, and a 
group that was supported by the STC and meant that “there’s just no way we’re going to 
excise this land and have it in ownership because it is part of the act 9 land of Steinkopf” 
(Interview Mr. May 11.12.2008). Further, according to Mr. May, all the farmers produced 
together on the land and not by means of the Kibbutsza system suggested by the developers. 
Conflict between the farmers and the management also evolved, with allegations of 
alcoholism and drug abuse amongst the farmers from the management-side. According to 
Harry May at SPP in Springbok and Ralph Smith at LRC in Cape Town on the other hand, the 
                                                 
26 Principal Agreement between NOCAL and EDUGAIN 62, SPP-files 
27 Land Bank Loan Agreement, SPP-files 
28 Engineering news: community”http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/red-gold-a-boon-for-desert-
community-2003-03-07 
29 Business Proposition – LRC files 
30 Strategic Overview of the Kibbutsza system of Land Redistribution and Sustainable Development – SPP files.  
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problems were mainly managerial, something they also find as the main reason for the 
collapse of the project.  
 
After visits to various land reform projects in Eastern Cape, Free State and Northern Cape in 
2005, the Portfolio Committee on Agriculture and Land Affairs concludes in their report that 
the Goodhouse Paprika Project has “collapsed completely” and is liquidated and under 
investigation due to alleged financial irregularities. Further they observed there were group 
conflicts and lack of participation and empowerment from the beneficiaries, lack of a dispute 
resolution mechanism and also proper security and maintenance of infrastructure31. The 
“financial irregularities” were amongst other things allegations of corruption in the provincial 
government, and suggestions that Mr. Arbel had used some of the company funds for his own 
benefit32. The affairs were investigated but have not resulted in any clarification or 
reimbursement for the farmers. The report also declare that the factory in Springbok shut 
down in 2005 because there was not enough paprika produced to keep the factory going 
economically efficient. Harry May however claims that the farmers produced a lot of paprika, 
but the company did not manage to sell it. It became evident that the guaranteed market that 
NOCAL promised in their business plan did not deliver as planned33. In addition they 
envisaged a strong demand for paprika, which seemed not be there. The prices per kilo that 
they set up in the budget also appeared to be wrong because of inflation (Interview Mr. May 
11.12.2008).  According to Harry May, what is typical for the entire Goodhouse-history is 
what he calls political mingling (Interview Mr. May 11.12.2008). As of today, there is 
nothing happening on the farming area. The groups of farmers are still fighting over the 
remains, and several of the buildings have been destroyed by angry community members. In 
addition they have sold farming equipment and machinery and also the irrigation 
infrastructure, most likely due to the fact that the farmers were stuck with a R120 million debt 
after the liquidation of the farm. Mr. Harry May describes the outcome of the project with 
these words: “In the end, in my view, they were left actually worse off than where they 
started” (Interview Mr. May 11.12.2008).  
                                                 
31 Report of the Portfolio Committee on Agriculture and Land Affairs on Provincial Oversight Visit to Northern 
Cape, Free State and Eastern Cape, dated 25 October 2005: 
www.pmg.org.za/docs/2005/comreports/051101pcagricreport2.htm. 
32 Inligtingsverslag (Information Report), South African Police Service, LRC files.  
33 Goodhouse Business Plan – SPP files 
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3.4 The Overberg District34 
The Vuki Farm belongs to the Theewaterkloof Municipality in the Overberg District. The 
farm is about 12km east of Grabouw, which is the centre of the Overberg which for many 
South Africans is better known as Elgin Valley; a region famous for its rich fruit-
production35. The district has the highest concentration of agricultural household in the 
province, with two distinct ‘agro-ecological zones’: the grain belt and the deciduous fruit 
fringe. The former includes the towns of Caledon, Swellendam and Bredalsdorp, while the 
latter includes the Vuki Farm and stretches from Grabouw in the north, covering the 
Winelands, and eastwards to Villiersdorp and Barrydale. The deciduous fruit fringe has 
become important to the Overberg in terms of economic growth and employment (Kleinbooi 
et al. 2006).  
3.5 Vuki Farm 
Under its previous owners the Vuki farm was known as Whitehall. It covers 318Ha of land 
and the first efforts of land reform at this farm started in 1993, while the owners, the Hall 
family, were experiencing financial difficulties because of an increasing downturn in the 
apple industry. In 1995, 90 percent of the Hall farm-workers, 121 people, bought 50 percent 
of the shares in the farm. This subsequently became one of the first equity schemes in the fruit 
industry in the Western Cape region.  
 
In 1995, the land at Whitehall was valued to R17 million and the business at R12 million, all 
though it was described by the owners as technically bankrupt. Nevertheless, altogether the 
farm was believed to have a total value of R29 million. The workers organised themselves 
through the Whitehall Farmworkers’ Trust and managed to lend R14.8 million to purchase 50 
percent of the shares. This funding was financed by loans from the Independent Development 
Trust, R2 million, The Development bank of South Africa, R3.8 million, and Standard Bank, 
R9 million. The R9 million from the Standard Bank was later taken over by the Land Bank. 
None of the workers applied for any government grants at this period of time. In 1998, three 
years into the joint venture, all the workers applied for Settlement and Land Acquisition 
Grants (SLAG), which amounted to R16.000 per worker. All together they received R1.936 
million. This money was spent to ‘strengthen the balance sheet’, hence they were not used to 
                                                 
34 Map over Western Cape Appendix IV 
35 Grabouw  web site: www.viewoverberg.com/Grabouw.asp 
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buy new equipment or for new development (Kleinbooi et al. 2006: 26, Interview Mr. 
Witbooi: 28.05.08). The Whitehall farm continued to have financial difficulties following the 
share equity scheme, and as a result of this 34 of the workers left the project in 1999, with 25 
additional workers following in 2000. Finally, on the 9th of January 2002, the Whitehall Farm 
was liquidated and the property was taken over by the Land Bank.  
 
The remaining farm-workers at The Whitehall farm made an agreement with the liquidator 
that they could lease the property and continue their work on the farm for six months. During 
this period the farm had its highest profit in ten years, at R5 million. The improvement was 
somewhat caused by an exceptionally good harvest that year, a strong Rand and an upturn in 
the apple-market, but it made the workers confident that they could take over and run the farm 
on their own. There was however some problems in this period, as the previous owners took 
legal action to prevent the farm from being sold to the workers. These matters were resolved 
when the Hall-family agreed to the sale on the conditions that all claims from the creditors of 
the bankrupt Whitehall Estate should be withdrawn. These conditions were later agreed on by 
all parties (Kleinbooi et al. 2006: 27).  
 
For three years, from 2002 till 2005, the Farm-workers trust ran the business with the 
approval of the creditors36 and paying rent to the liquidators. At this point there were around 
40 workers left and two managers. Moreover, they got an additional loan from the Land Bank 
of R2 million, which later were increased to R3.1 million. Arrangements concerning credits 
were also entered into with marketers and pack houses (ibid: 27). On the 3rd of October 2005, 
a deed of sale was signed between the workers, now called Vuki Trust, and the Land Bank. 
The name Vuki is a Sesotho word meaning literally translated, to stand up. The use of the 
word in Sesotho implies to “Arise, be awake, go and do something for yourself”37. The 
Whitehall farm was now estimated to be worth R11.1 million; R8 million for the land and 
R3.1 million for the business. The Vuki Trust obtained loans from the Absa Bank and the 
Land Bank to take over the land. In addition they applied for LRAD-grants from the DLA, 
which came to R77.524 per person; around R3.1 million all together. The DLA also granted 
them a LRAD planning grant of R465.144. The LRAD-grants were used to reduce the debt to 
                                                 
36 Land Bank, DBSA, IDT and The FNB, ratified by the Master of the Supreme Court (Kleinbooi et al. 2006: 27) 
37 Vuki business plan – DLA files 
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the Absa Bank. In 2005, Vuki acquired a CASP-grant38 from the Provincial Department of 
Agriculture in Elsenburg. This grant came to R1.1 million (ibid: 28). The CASP-grant was 
mainly used to refurbish and replace machinery (Interview Mr. Witbooi 28.05.08).  
 
Today there are 37 permanent workers at the Vuki Farm. These are also beneficiaries from the 
Vuki Trust, which is the only owner of the business, Vuki Farming Pty (Ltd)39. There are six 
managers at the Vuki Farming Pty, each responsible for different areas of the business; 
production, Human Resources, logistics, chemicals, financial management and marketing. In 
additions there are four directors that run the Vuki Trust, selected by the beneficiaries. Some 
consultants are hired on contract and come in every month and work on areas like chemicals, 
wine-grapes and marketing. One of these consultants was assigned by the liquidators before 
Vuki Trust took over the ownership. He is a business recovery specialist, and was hired to 
assist in the project and to act as the General Manager, but is now working as a consultant. 
The production manager describes the consultants as ‘watchdogs’ over their business 
(Interview Mr. Witbooi 28.05.08).  
 
Per year there are around 250 seasonal workers, mostly from the Eastern Cape region, 
working at the Vuki Farm. According to the production manager, it is mostly the same people 
that are coming back every year. The seasonal workers are accommodated in hostels at the 
farm. 21 the farm-workers live on the farm-land with their families, while the rest of the 
workers live in places close-by like Grabouw and the Village. 150Ha of the farm-land is being 
used for productive planting, and they produce apples, pairs and wine-grapes. (Interview Mr. 
Witbooi 28.05.08). Vuki sends its crops to two pack houses, which ships the products to the 
South African markets and international markets, in particular the Tesco supermarkets in UK, 
but also other retailers in Africa, the Middle East and EU-countries (Kleinbooi et al 2006: 29). 
The wine-grapes that are produced at the farm are sold to South African wine-makers that pay 
them back per tonnage. In return the wine-bottles have to have the Vuki Trust brand on their 
label (Interview Mr. Witbooi 28.05.08).  
 
 
 
                                                 
38 Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme 
39 Organisation Map – Appendix VI 
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Chapter 4:  Methodology  
In this chapter I present an overview of the methods used in my research. First of all there will 
be an introduction of the purpose of my study and the approach. Further, I make account for 
the chosen research-design; case study, and the research strategies applied to collect data; 
document-analysis and qualitative interviews. The main purpose of this chapter is to describe 
how I have conducted the research, but also to look at issues concerning the research-methods 
I have applied in the investigations.   
4.1 Purpose of the Study/Context 
Through this research I want to investigate two land reform projects; the Vuki Farm and 
Goodhouse Agricultural Corporation. I will set the two cases up against each other and 
attempt to look at aspects contributing to the widely different outcomes. In order to say 
something about this, I have focussed on three main-groups of variables which are linked to 
the theories and previous research I have based my studies on; ‘trust’, ‘character of authority 
intervention’ and ‘networks’. I will further derive variables under each of the groups, based 
on the theories, previous studies in the field of land reform, and my own research in South 
Africa. Finally I will compare the cases through the method of difference. By means of this 
research I hope to say something about the South African land reform and if the previously 
oppressed farmers may better their performance and influence, by strengthening their capacity 
for communal problem-solving and improve their links towards the established agricultural 
market. My approach is:  
 
Are there certain factors that may explain why some land reform projects in South Africa 
succeed while others fail? 
 
I want to investigate how the land reform beneficiaries manage in the still segregated 
agricultural industry and how/if they get linked with the already established networks, if they 
receive adequate support from government institutions and if trust and trustworthiness within 
the organisations will be a decisive factor for success or failure. To be able to look at this 
more closely, I have investigated two groups of beneficiaries, one that has been quite 
successful and one that failed. However, both cases tend to go towards each their extreme; at 
Vuki, the successful case, the farmers had a well-developed network of acquaintances within 
both public and private spheres, and the project is also situated in an area that is well-known 
for the kind of product that the farmers at Vuki produce. In contrast, the Goodhouse project 
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was situated in a very remote area on the boarders to Namibia. The community is quite 
isolated and seemed to have few connections towards the wider governance network. 
Moreover, the community had a real threat of poverty which was further aggregated by a 
recent downturn in the mining industry where many of the residents got their income. In 
addition, the two cases are situated in different provinces, the Northern Cape and the Western 
Cape, which in turn also have different land reform administrations, something that also may 
have been an important factor when determining the reason for the outcomes in the two cases. 
Further, by choosing two contrasting cases I hope to be able to elucidate the challenges and 
opportunities concerning land reform projects in the country. Thus, my suggestion is that by 
looking at these two different cases, their characteristics will become clearer. My interest is 
primarily to look at challenges and opportunities in land reform projects connected to the 
concept of social capital and communal problem solving, and not necessarily to speculate 
whether my empirical observations may be generalised.  However, I want to investigate if 
there are any characteristics and issues concerning these groups which might help explain the 
current state of land reform in the country. 
4.2 Research design 
There are several definitions of research-design, one being: “a plan that guides the 
investigator in the process of collecting, analysing, and interpreting observations. It is a 
logical proof that allows the researcher to draw inferences concerning causal relations among 
the variables under investigation” (Yin 2003: 21). Most importantly, the design is meant to 
help the researcher avoid situations where the data he collects does not reflect the research 
question he wants to answer (ibid: 21). All investigations need some sort of research design; 
either implicit or explicit. The research design helps the scholar get from a research question 
to a conclusion. There are many variables and unforeseen events that may cause disturbance 
when one does research in “the real world”, thus a research design is meant to help the scholar 
keep focused and collect the data that is relevant for the questions he wants to answer. The 
research strategy I have used in my studies of land reform in South Africa is case study.  
4.2.1 Case Study  
There are various opinions when it comes to what exactly a case study is, how it should be 
used, or if it's even a proper strategy for research. A relatively simple definition is that it 
“includes one or more components of analysis, which are objects of intensive investigation” 
(Ringdal 2007: 149). This definition may be expanded to involve intensive investigations of a 
small amount of cases (components of analysis), which may be individuals, families, 
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corporations, organisations, nations or countries, but also events and decisions (ibid: 149). 
Robert K. Yin has promoted a more complex definition of case studies, suggesting that the 
case study is an “empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context” (Yin 2003: 13). According to Yin, the strengths of case studies are that they 
are useful “when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” 
(ibid: 13). This means that one cannot easily transfer it to a laboratory for an experiment 
where you control the variables and so on. Another strength is that case studies enables a 
researcher to ask “why” and “how” questions about events happening in reality, while they 
can use several research tools like field observation, review of documents, interviews, 
archival and quantitative records (ibid: xii). I have selected two cases for investigation; Vuki 
Farm in the Western Cape and Goodhouse Agricultural Corporation in the Northern Cape.  
4.3 Research Strategies 
In collecting data for case-studies, one may use various sources of information, the most 
common ones being documents, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant 
observations, and physical artefacts (Yin 2003: 83). My main strategies have been document 
analysis and open-ended interviews.  
4.3.1 Qualitative Document analysis 
Qualitative document analysis is based on “systematic examination of documents, in order to 
categorise its content and register the data that are relevant for the approach in the specific 
study” (Grønmo 2004: 187). There is in addition various information that fall under the 
category ‘documents’, i.e. letters, announcements, reports, administrative documents, 
newspaper clippings and formal studies (Yin 2003). Thagaard proposes that all kinds of 
written information that are available for the researcher may be included in a document 
analysis (Thagaard 2003: 59). In conducting this type of research, the selection of data often 
happens during the collection of texts; new information and data emerges while the data is 
gathered. In this way the initial approach may get changed several times during the data-
collection. This type of research-method leads to a somewhat unpredictable process since one 
document or piece of information often leads to several more. This in turn implies that it is 
difficult to plan the process (Grønmo 2004: 187). I have, in my research, made use of several 
types of documents, some of the most important ones being studies published by the 
previously Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, now called Institute for Land and 
Poverty Studies (PLAAS), documents on the cases gathered from the Department of Land 
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Affairs (DLA), information and documents from the SPP, documents from the LRC in Cape 
Town, and newspaper articles. 
 
On the Vuki case, I gathered my documents through PLAAS, the Provincial DLA in 
Stellenbosch, and through newspaper- and magazine clippings. The DLA-files contains 
detailed business-plans on the project, information on the running of the company, the 
beneficiaries included in the project, communication (e-mails, faxes and letters) between the 
beneficiaries and various government actors, but also communication between government 
officials concerning the project. In addition there is a presentation of the project with the 
history of the farm, pictures of the area etc. I managed to get hold of these files through Alie 
van Jaarsveld with the Ministry of Agriculture in Cape Town, who connected me with the 
Provincial Department of Land Affairs in Stellenbosch and Mr. Jimmy Freysen, who in turn 
let me copy their files on Vuki Farm. Further, through meetings with Karin Kleinbooi at 
PLAAS I got hold of a research report from the Theewaterskloof area, which also contains an 
in depth study of the Vuki Farm. The Vuki Farm has been, and is, a very successful project, 
described by Mr. van Jaarsveld as the “flagship of Land Reform in the Western Cape”; hence 
it was quite easy to gather information and documents.  
 
Concerning the project at Goodhouse in the Northern Cape, the gathering of data was a bit 
more of a challenge. However, my main documents are files on the project that I got hold of 
through PLAAS, the NGO SPP and further The LRC in Cape Town. Through PLAAS and 
SPP I have got hold of files on the project which contains pretty much the same kind of 
information as the files I gathered from the DLA in the Vuki Case; business-plans, who is part 
of the project, communication between different stakeholders and government officials of 
various levels of government, and descriptions of the project. In addition the SPP provided me 
with reports on the Goodhouse area; the history of the inhabitants, previous projects etc. 
These documents are for the most part carried out by the STC in the Northern Cape. Further, 
Mr. Henk Smith at the LRC in Cape Town has sent me several files on the Goodhouse-case 
via e-mail. These documents are descriptions of what happened at Goodhouse, 
communication between different stakeholders in the project, overviews of happenings and 
dates related to the project etc. In addition I had two meeting with Mr. Smith at the LRC 
offices in Cape Town, where he let me look into the files LRC had on the case, allowed me 
use their library with several reports and previous research from the area I was interested in, 
besides giving me his personal views on what had happened in the project. Moreover, I have 
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collected articles from South African Magazines and newspapers, but also different 
Government web-sites. The Goodhouse case is looked upon as a quite controversial one; as a 
result it has been a challenge to get information on the project, especially from Northern Cape 
government officials. However, I feel I have collected an adequate amount of information in 
order to compare it to the Vuki Farm-project.  
 
I addition to information on the cases, I also gathered data on the land reform programme in 
South Africa in general. Through studying at The School of Government at The University of 
the Western Cape in 2006, I already had quite some articles on the subject from my course 
literature, especially the “Rural Development and Planning”-course. Moreover I have made 
extensive use of PLAAS’ ‘Status Reports’ that summarise what has happened in the diverse 
fields of Land Reform throughout the years, but also their ‘Policy Briefs’-series that they 
started publishing in 2001. In addition I have read through some of the many research-reports 
and books that have been published by the institute.  
Furthermore, in studying Land Reform, I have looked at the DLA and DoA’s own websites. 
On these sites there is extensive information about the various policies, areas they cover, 
suggestions for further changes in policies etc. I have also studied articles published by the 
SPP, which are available on their websites, in addition to the ones I have gathered and copied 
personally.  When it comes to the media’s coverage of Land Reform, this can not be said to 
have been impressive in earlier periods, but in the past couple of years, there have been a 
slight increase in the interest surrounding agricultural politics. One of the reasons for this 
increase in interest concerning agriculture and the poverty in rural areas increasing interest 
may be the government elections in 2009.  
4.3.2 Issues concerning Document-analysis 
First of all, there have been some problems due to language in my analysis of documents. 
This in particular involves data on the Goodhouse-case, where I found that many of the 
documents I got hold of were in Afrikaans. It has been a challenge to get people to talk about 
this project, which have made me increasingly dependent on documents. The agricultural 
Magazine, Landbou, have covered the Goodhouse-project quite well, but most of their articles 
are in Afrikaans. In addition, several of the files I gathered from the SPP and the LRC on this 
case are in Afrikaans. Because of the amounts of documents and the limited time, I have had 
no opportunity to translate all of them. I have however, considered which documents contain 
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important and new information through discussing it with the people I gathered the 
documents from, but also via translating fractions of documents.  This in itself may be a 
problem, since I then directly affect which documents are selected and which one are rejected. 
On the other hand, the majority of the documents I have studied have been in English, so I do 
not consider this to have been of too much inconvenience for the research.  
Secondly, the researchers’ perspective may influence how and which documents are chosen 
for analysis. If the researchers knowledge on the field is limited, or one perspective on the 
matter have been chosen beforehand, it will undoubtedly affect which documents that gets 
included in the analysis (Grønmo 2004: 192). In this way, documents that could be important 
in order to get an informed approach on the subject matter, is overlooked because it does not 
fit the researchers’ perspectives. By going through PLAAS’ studies and other related 
scholars’ studies on the field, I have included different approaches to Land Reform, in terms 
of what has been doing well and not, and how one should move forward. Since PLAAS is an 
institute with links towards several other universities and scholars, I consider the documents 
to capture various perspectives within the field of research. In Land Reform, there are obvious 
interest-conflicts and clear lines between the various actors and their requests for change. 
Nevertheless, it may be easy to ‘pick a side’ and consequently value some perspectives more 
than others. Because of this I have tried to contact several different actors in Land Reform; 
researchers, farmers, administrators and NGOs in order to gain information and documents.  
Further, research may be based on unauthentic documents. This relates to the researchers’ 
understanding and critical eye on sources, where documents are found etc. To avoid this 
problem, Grønmo suggests one should compare texts and consider their content in relation to 
one another, but also up against other sources and research. This concerns information about 
the texts’ background, its origin, the subjects it examines etc (Grønmo 2004: 192). I feel I 
have avoided this issue by gathering most of the documents through known organisations and 
research institutions in South Africa. A problem related to the fact that I have gathered most 
of my documents ‘manually’ by copying files from organisations like SPP, DLA and LRC, is 
that they are hard for others to verify or re-examine while they might not be easily accessible.  
Generally, the role of the researcher in qualitative document analysis may be problematic. 
Because of the unpredictability in the collection of documents, the process is quite 
challenging and will therefore in most cases be conducted by the researcher himself (ibid: 
187). Hence, the whole process off selecting documents and also the analysis and 
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categorisation of the data, will be decided by the researcher only. In this way my perspectives 
on the subject may influence which documents gets preferred, and it can also affect the 
analysis of the documents chosen. In addition, the researchers’ understanding of context and 
consideration of sources may also affect the results in the study. This relates to knowing who 
your sources are, and how they and the context it is produced in/for might colour the data 
produced, or which data is obtainable (Grønmo 2004).  
4.3.3 Qualitative/Open-ended Interviews 
Using interviews or conversations in order to gather information, is an ancient form of 
investigation. In connection with social sciences, however, interviews are quite previously 
employed (Kvale 1996: 8). Anthropologists and Sociologists have used interviews in order to 
gather background knowledge for a while, but what is new is that during the last decades, 
researchers in social sciences have used qualitative interviews as a research method in its own 
right. Also, there has been an increasing amount of methodological literature on how to do 
qualitative interview research systematically (ibid: 8). I used qualitative interviews to gather 
information about my cases, and to some extent to attain knowledge about Land Reform. My 
main interview-objects have been Mr.Witbooi, the production manager at Vuki Farm, Mr. van 
Jaarsveld with the Ministry of Agriculture in Cape Town, and Mr. May with the SPP-offices 
in Springbok. In addition I have had meetings with Karin Kleinbooi at PLAAS and Henk 
Smith with the LRC in Cape Town. The latter have been helpful with information on the 
Goodhouse Agricultural Corporation.  
Before the interviews I set up an interview-guide with the subjects I wanted to get the 
respondents to talk about. The guide is meant as support in order to keep focus during the 
interviews. Since I was conducting qualitative interviews, the guide has to be comprehensive 
and specific in order to get the relevant information for the studies, but at the same time 
general and simple enough for the interview to be carried out as flexible as possible (Grønmo 
2004: 161). On the other hand, it is not possible to fully identify the need of information 
before the actual conversation takes place. During my interviews I gained new knowledge and 
got additional questions that I did not plan for in the initial guide. One has to be flexible when 
it comes to weighing the importance of new subject matters being presented up against the 
prepared interview-guide, and also to make sufficient notes of or tape the interview (Grønmo 
2004).  I taped my interviews, and transcribed them in full text afterwards. Concerning 
openness in communicating with the respondents, I fully informed my subjects on phone or 
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through E-mail about the purpose of the interview prior to our meetings, how the information 
was to be used and so on. This might have affected the low response I got from government 
agencies related to the Goodhouse-project in the Northern Cape, due to the notion that the 
case has been considered controversial, and the government as developers have had to take 
much of the blame for the outcome.  
4.3.4 Issues Concerning Qualitative Interviews 
Typical issues that might arise in qualitative interviews are connected to communication, the 
researchers’ position and the respondent representation of self or of the situation. Concerning 
communication, my interviews were carried out in English, all though it was neither mine nor 
some of the respondents’ first language. However, I do not feel that this limited or disturbed 
the interviews in any way. In addition, by preparing an interview-guide and giving my 
respondents information about me and my research before the interview-session, the matters I 
wanted to discuss was quite well-defined for both parts. Moreover, Grønmo states that 
researchers may affect the respondents’ answers by conducting behaviour which may 
“stimulate or provoke the respondents to express themselves in certain ways” (Grønmo 2004: 
165). What he refers to here is i.e. to ask leading questions, or in other ways give an 
impression that there are certain answers you are looking for. Nevertheless, my intentions 
with the interviews were to make my respondents talk freely on certain themes that I prepared 
in the interview guide before we met. By sticking to my predefined themes, I hoped to have 
limited my influence on the conversation. When it comes to the respondents’ description of 
the cases and their own part in the process, this might be a problem if the period between the 
experience and the execution of the interview are far apart in time. The processes that were 
brought up concerning the cases did not happen that many years ago, but still, it is important 
to be aware of these issues when going through research and when analysing the findings. 
However, these concerns apply more to interviews when the respondents have to recall events 
from far back in time, i.e. their childhood (ibid: 165).  
4.4 Variables- The criteria for interpreting the findings 
Going through previous research and theory traditions, various text and documents and 
conducting interviews, I have identified a couple of variables which I find to be important in 
groups of land reform beneficiaries. By setting these variables, and measure them up against 
the two cases I have studied, I wish to be able to say something about factors that may have 
been important in order to create successful land reform projects, but also factors that may 
have work against or slow down the progress. A possible problem here might be the 
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definitions and the preconception I have when I think of development, innovation, market-
involvement, the South African governmental agencies etc. Since I choose the variables and 
also measure them, this will largely affect the way the study will interpret findings and come 
to a conclusion. One way to avoid this is by turning to previous research and theories when 
choosing which variables I find important. Which variables do other researchers find essential 
in communal problem-solving? This will be a kind of “pattern matching”, where information 
from the cases may be related to some theoretical suggestion (Yin 2003: 26). The main groups 
of variables I have decided to use in comparing my two cases are; trust, character of authority 
intervention, and networks. I will draw on the Method of Difference when measuring the 
variables in my cases.  
4.4.1 The method of difference 
Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers (1980) identify three different logics-in-use within 
comparative history-research. These are `Parallel Demonstration of Theory', `Contrast of 
Context' and `Macro-causal Analysis'. My research will fall in to the latter category. Macro-
Analysts try to specify “configurations favourable and unfavourable to particular outcomes 
they are trying to explain” (Skocpol & Somers 1980:182). Further Macro-analysts tend to 
move back and forth between different explanatory theories, hypotheses and to compare 
important aspects of the history of their cases, in contrast to exploring and evaluate whole 
histories up against each other in terms of pre-given themes (ibid: 182). Moreover, Macro-
analysts do their research according to one or two analytic designs or as a combination 
between the two. In my research the macro-social unit is the Land Reform in general. My 
‘units of analysis’ in order to say something about land reform beneficiaries, are The Vuki- 
and Goodhouse communities (Ragin 1987).  I will define variables based on theory traditions 
and my own and previous research, and use Vuki and Goodhouse as my illustrations.  
These analytical designs were originally recommended by John Stuart Mill, and are called 
“Method of Agreement” and “Method of Difference”. In the former, researchers try to 
establish that cases which have a similar outcome also have the same hypothesised underlying 
factors, although the cases seemed dissimilar in circumstances. In the latter method, “The 
Method of Difference”, the analyst “can contrast cases in which the phenomenon to be 
explained and the hypothesized causes are present to other (“negative”) cases in which the 
phenomenon and the cause are both absent, although they are as similar as possible to the 
“positive” cases in other respects” ((Skocpol & Somers 1980: 183). 
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Model 1 Method of Difference 
Positive Case Negative case 
A 
B 
C 
X 
A 
B 
C 
Not X 
Y Not Y 
(Skocpol & Somers 1980: 184) 
Looking at this model, one may conclude that the method of difference is a simple statistical 
technique with its cross-tabulations of cause and effect. According to Ragin (1987), this is not 
the case; “the indirect method of difference is used to establish patterns of invariance” (p.40).  
When it comes to the method of difference, one of the main issues is third-factors. There may 
be unknown variables, that I have not taken account for, which may be important in the 
outcome of the cases. I have tried however, to reduce that risk by conducting my research 
through established research-methods, but also by looking into previous studies by well-
established scholars within the field of research. There is certainly a risk of overlooking 
important variables, seeing that I conduct the research, choose documents, interview-
respondents, and variables, but I have, as far as I can, tried to base my research on previous 
findings, established theories and methods, and also through consultations and interviews.  
4.5 Reliability, Validity and Generalization  
Several scholars question the relevance of the concepts of reliability, validity and 
generalization in qualitative research. The reason for this discussion is the tight connection of 
the concepts to quantitative measures. One solution to this issue is to refer to them as 
credibility instead of reliability, confirmation in place of validity and transferability rather 
than generalization (Ringdal 2007: 221). Credibility describes whether the research has been 
done in a trustworthy manner connected to casual bias in measurement. I have tried to be 
aware of these possible biases throughout my studies, i.e. by choosing reliable informants. 
Burris, Drahos and Shearing(2005) claim that trying to understand the ‘rules’ of cause and 
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effect within a collectivity, in this context Vuki and Goodhouse, is a valuable adaption and it 
embodies a great deal of practical knowledge of the collectivity and its environment. On the 
other hand, the fact that everything is an outcome of what has come before, that the processes 
are continuing over time and the fact that our attempts to disaggregate chains of causation 
must inevitably be biased, basically means that one will always to some extent get it ‘wrong’. 
They go on saying however, that this does not mean that it is not valuable and significant to 
get it as right as possible (Burris et al 2005: 35). 
Regarding validity or confirmation I had to be aware that I actually measured the matters I 
wanted to study. This relates to the questions I asked my informants, the variables I choose to 
focus on and so forth. By studying previous research, especially by PLAAS, and also 
discussing the cases and research-methods with well-informed individuals, I have tried to 
recognize this issue. The possibility of generalization or transferability is a difficult task in 
qualitative research. In quantitative research this is a matter of being able to look at the study 
in relation to a larger issue, in my case; land reform. By choosing my cases carefully, making 
use of previous research, official documents and interviewing relevant actors, I hope to be 
able to say something about the work connected to the land reform beneficiaries, at least in 
the Western and Northern Cape. By choosing cases carefully and base it on previous research 
and theories, there are viable chances of drawing lines to a larger area (Ringdal 2007: 221), 
however this has not been my main priority in conducting this research. As mentioned, my 
main interest has been to look at challenges and opportunities in land reform projects related 
to the concepts of social capital and communal problem solving.  
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Chapter 5: Theory  
5.1 Introduction 
When looking at democracies and solving public problems, there are a couple of theoretical 
traditions primarily applied. Xavier de Souza Briggs divide these theories in to three broad 
lines of tradition; “democracy as a contest among interest groups”, “democracy as an 
instrument for deliberation” and “Governance” (Briggs 2008: 7). Most efforts of investigating 
the land reform process in South Africa have looked at processes within the Government 
institutions, the policies they produce, and how well, if at all, these policies get implemented 
in the local communities. These efforts can be placed under the two former approaches 
mentioned by Briggs as it focuses on the strategic processes dominated by the leaders and 
elites of the country, but also the political competition and conflicts in bettering the lives of 
the poor emerging farmers in South Africa (ibid: 7). I wish to base my theoretical approach on 
the latter tradition; Governance. The tradition captures the idea of “managing collective life 
beyond the formal instruments of government” (ibid: 7). Rhodes (2003) discusses the term 
“governance” as opposed to governing and states that governance is reflecting a change in the 
common understanding of governing; it refers to a “new process of governing; or a changed 
condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which society is governed” (p.46). He further 
describes six separate ways of using governance, where `governance as self-organising 
networks' is one of them (Rhodes 2003: 47). His description of this phenomenon is that it 
“sees governance as a broader term than government with services provided by any 
permutation of government and the private and voluntary sectors” (ibid: 51). Networks will in 
this context illustrate independent actors that are involved in the service delivery, in addition 
to the government and its administration. Governance will be the action of managing these 
networks. Furthermore, Rhodes claims that networks are self-organising; they resist steering 
from governments, shape their own environments and develop their own policies (ibid: 52).  
 
Briggs (2008) postulates that this conception of democracy captures the notion that there must 
be 'social connection' and a capacity to work together in local communities in order to 
promote problem solving. This ‘connection’ has by some scholars been labelled ‘social 
capital’ which has been offered as a solution to various difficulties in society, especially 
within socially disadvantaged groups. The focus has been on improving social ties within the 
groups and building networks. However, there have been expressed a need to move beyond 
social capital in explaining mobilization of groups in achieving satisfactory outcomes; they 
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suggest that ‘collective efficacy’ is more relevant in explaining outcomes of collective action. 
Robert Sampson (1999) proposes that “social capital …refers to the resource potential of 
personal and organizational networks, whereas collective efficacy is a task-specific construct 
that relates to the shared expectations and mutual engagement” (Sampson et al 1999: 635).  
 
In South Africa, the land reform process up till this point has been largely affected by the 
governments’ neo-liberal politics. State policies and grants have directed what should be 
focused on and who should be the main beneficiaries. In rural areas of the country the trend 
has been for large groups or communities to apply for redistribution or restitution of land 
together. After the shift in the redistribution policies concerning the LRAD-grants, it has also 
been increasingly common for communities to pool their grants in order to have enough 
capital to buy land and start viable projects together. This is the case in the two land reform 
projects I have investigated. The Government have not hitherto had a trend of actively 
engaging in land reform projects, as they have chosen to follow the neo-liberal WSWB-
approach, where they mainly provide land and monetary support for initiating the projects. 
Thus, several community projects fail after short duration of production due to lack of money, 
in-group conflicts, poor markets access etc. The main impression so far in the land reform is 
that the state institutions are unable to solve the problems that millions of South African land 
reform beneficiaries are faced with.  
5.2 Outline of the Chapter 
In this chapter I will look at theories contributing in explaining how small communities may 
strengthen their capacity to work together and problem-solve, and in addition how they 
through this may build relations to, and get included in agricultural governance-networks. 
‘Social Capital’ has been introduced as a solution to issues concerning collectivities and how 
to make them coordinate their knowledge and capacities. Therefore, I start by introducing 
some of the research presented in the area of social capital. I focus on ‘communal problem-
solving’ and theoretical contributions within this area of research. Initially I look at the social 
capital-concept and further see how the concept has been used and to some extent changed 
through discussions by various scholars. 
 
 In addition to the classical contributions of Coleman (1988), Putnam (1995) and Sampson 
(1999), I include the Nodal Governance thesis by Burris, Drahos and Shearing (2005). Burris 
and colleagues look at Governance and the distribution of power through a “nodal 
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governance” framework and suggest that it is essential to have an understanding of how 
power is distributed and exercised in order to promote just and efficient governance (Burris et 
al 2005: 31).  Nodal governance is “an elaboration of contemporary network theory that 
explains how a variety of actors operating within social systems interacts along networks to 
govern the system they inhabit (ibid: 33). These networks are often complex and can vary 
greatly in size and actors involved, however the characteristics of governance networks as of 
now, is that they entail a plurality of private and public actors which in turn form more or less 
consistent networks, a variety of mechanisms and rapid adaptive change (ibid: 31). Moreover, 
I will try to link this theory up against the South African agricultural networks connected to 
land reform.  
 
Finally, I give an introduction of the variables I will use in my next chapters where I 
endeavour to examine the cases I have studied more closely. The variables ‘trust’, ‘the 
character of authority intervention’ and ‘networks’, are selected by going through previous 
research on land reform and rural poverty in South Africa, and moreover the theories and 
research I present in this chapter. 
5.3 Communal Problem Solving 
Why is it that interactions among some actors, may it be regions in Italy, neighbourhoods in 
Detroit or Land Reform projects in South Africa, work out so well while other group efforts, 
under seemingly the same conditions, fails so terribly? I will, in this sequence look at the 
discussion concerning democracy and problem solving, and identify traits within groups and 
communities that to a large extent may influence whether a project will be successful or not. 
According to Briggs, the “theory and practise of what makes democracy works necessarily 
include the study of problem solving in action and of the collective capacity to problem-solve 
– not only to deliberate about the world and set directions for government, but to change the 
state of the world through collective action, not only to devise and decide, but to do” (Briggs 
2008: 8).  
5.3.1 Social Capital 
The concept of social capital was first discussed thoroughly in Pierre Bourdieu’s Le Capital 
Social in 1980. Some years later James S. Coleman (1988) and Robert Putnam (1995) 
followed up this work and helped develop the discussion further. Coleman wanted to “import 
the economist’ principle of rational action for use in the analysis of social systems proper, 
including but not limited to economic systems, and to do so without discarding social 
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organization in the process” (Coleman 1988: 97). Hence, he uses the concept of social capital 
as a tool in the process of joining both a classical economic view of the rational actor and the 
sociological vision of the socialised actor, governed by rules, norms and obligations in the 
study of social action. He further defines social capital by its functions; it is a variety of units, 
but it has two elements in common: some aspects of social structure and actions of individuals 
within that structure. Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive; it makes the 
achievement of certain aims possible, which in its absence would be impossible. What 
separates this capital from other types on the other hand, is how it “inheres in the structure of 
relations between actors and among actors” (ibid: 98). Thus, it is not in the actors or in the 
implementation of production; it is in the relations between the actors. These actors may be 
individuals, institutions or corporation.  How valuable the relations between the actors turns 
out to be, depends on the social organisation.  
 
Social capital offers a solution to various difficulties in society and as mentioned, the initial 
contributions within the fields’ main focus was on improving social ties within the groups and 
building networks. However, there has been increasing debate connected to whether ‘strong 
links’ through close social networks are a necessity for collective action. Scholars have 
expressed a need to move beyond social capital in explaining mobilization of groups in 
achieving expected outcomes; they suggest that ‘Collective Efficacy’ is more relevant in 
explaining outcomes of collective action. Robert Sampson (1999) proposes that “social capital 
…refers to the resource potential of personal and organizational networks, whereas Collective 
Efficacy is a task-specific construct that relates to the shared expectations and mutual 
engagement” (Sampson et al 1999: 635). The two approaches are quite similar, however the 
collective efficacy-concept view resources and networks as neutral; “they may or may not be 
effective mechanisms for achieving an intended effect” (ibid: 635). Further Sampson suggests 
that collective efficacy can exist outside the tightly knit networks, because it represents 
citizen’s active engagement. This, Sampson states, is not adequately represented in the social 
capital theory. In addition he proposes that strong personal ties in collective action might even 
hinder effective accomplishment. Thus, the discussions surrounding social capital, which has 
been followed up by collective efficacy-scholars, concerns network relations between 
individuals or groups, and factors, like trust and reciprocity, which strengthen the collective 
action40. These traits or collection of constructs however, are interconnected. According to 
                                                 
40 Unpublished paper; Rebecca L. Wickes:  School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Griffith University 
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William M. Rohe, social capital is most efficiently thought of as “a model linking 
constructs…: citizen engagement, interpersonal trust, and effective collective action” (Rohe 
2004: 158). Rohe demonstrates the interconnection through this model of social capital: 
 
Model 2: Social Capital 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Rohe 2004: 159) 
This model is based on Putnam’s definition of social capital: “social organisations such as 
networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual 
benefit (cited in Rohe 2004: 159). Further, it shows how those who are engaged civically will 
due to that engagement be involved in local social relationships, which will lead to greater 
interpersonal trust. 
5.3.2 Collectivities 
Burris et al. define a ‘collectivity’ as “any group of people living in the same place or that on 
some other basis identify themselves as a group for at least some important purposes” (Burris 
et al 2005: 34). The people in the collectivities produce outcomes, which are not necessarily 
caused by intentional action or activities alone, but rather through “the complex interactions 
of what people do, how they relate to one another, the institutions, technologies and 
mentalities they deploy, their biological equipment and the conditions of stimuli from the 
larger physical and social environment in which they operate” (ibid: 34). The authors name 
these collectivities ‘outcome generating systems’ (OGS). The outcomes produced in an OGS 
Civic Engagement 
Social Networks 
Interpersonal Trust 
Effective Collective 
Action 
Individual and 
Social Benefits 
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may include ‘problems’, like hunger, sicknesses, crime etc., but also ‘goods’ as peace, 
economic efficiency, health and so on (ibid: 34). In the poor rural areas in South Africa, the 
trend has been towards chronic poverty41, huge amounts of people infected by HIV/Aids, 
unemployment, food insecurity etc (Kepe and Cousins 2002: 1). However, this is of course 
not the only outcomes that characterise these areas; firstly rural producers are ‘Jacks and Jills 
of many trades’ (Shackleton et al 2001:596). They use multiple, often land-based, strategies in 
order to create income and direct-use values, like livestock, cropping and natural resources. In 
addition there are often complex interconnections between livelihoods systems, both local and 
between rural and urban economies (ibid: 593). This describes how some communities in 
poor rural South Africa have an ability to understand the workings of the OGS and how to 
manage them. This is, according to Burris, Drahos and Shearing, one of the factors that will 
determine the degree of goods and problems that are produced by the OGS in that specific 
collectivity (Burris et al 2005: 35).  
 
Further, the success of collectivies depends on the degree to which they make adaptations 
individually and how they together manage the OGS “that maximise their ability to tap and 
coordinate knowledge and capacity throughout the collectivity (ibid: 36). ‘The tragedy of the 
commons’ and ‘the prisoner’s dilemma’ are important allegories that captures this essential 
dilemma in social action; the issue of cooperation for mutual benefit. In both situations the 
best option for everybody involved is if they cooperate, but they also show that failure to 
cooperate does not necessarily reflect irrationality or ignorance; sometimes it appears more 
rational to be a ‘free rider’ (Putnam 1993: 164). If a collectivity is to function optimally there 
needs to be rules and regulations that directs the members. This relates to the ‘rules of the 
game’ or Bourdieus’ ‘habitus’. Some rules will be created consciously for management 
purposes, while others are not necessarily easily noticed, like ‘facts of life’ or religion (Burris 
et al 2005: 36).   
5.4 Nodes 
The outcomes within a collectivity may be influenced by factors controlled by the individuals 
within the collectivity themselves, but in addition it is important to acknowledge the factors 
that operate at a higher level of the group and sometimes also beyond their local physical 
                                                 
41 The chronic poor are those who experience significant deprivation over many years and/or whose 
deprivation is passed onto the next generation - 
http://www.devinit.org/PDF%20downloads/cprclaunchpres01.pdf 
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environment (Burris et al 2005: 36). All areas of society are set in a physical and social 
environment of other collectivities, which sometimes overlap with each other. A collectivity 
is often linked to several other collectivities within the same OGS or as part of other OGSs. In 
example, a group of land reform beneficiaries will be affected by actions and happenings done 
by group members, like shirking or hard work, but also by the climate and whether or not it is 
a good season for the product they are farming. In addition they will very much be influenced 
by competition in the business, the markets (if there is a need for their products, if there is an 
increase or decrease in food prices etc) and so on.  
 
Nodes are in this context defined as sites of governance. Burris, Drahos and Shearing consider 
it as a site within the OGS, where resources, capacity and knowledge are mobilised in order to 
manage the course of events (ibid: 37). Manuel Castells use a mathematical metaphor when 
describing nodes as “the sites where the ‘curves’ that constitute networks intersect” (cited in 
Burris et al 2005: 37). In this way, many powerful nodes may also function as access-points 
for the nodal network. Moreover, these nodes exhibit four essential characteristics: mentalities 
about the themes the node governs, technologies for influence, resources to support the 
influence and operations, and a structure that makes direct mobilisation of resources, 
mentalities and technologies possible (Burris et al 2005). The strength of each of these 
characteristics in a node will to a large degree decide how much power and influence it holds; 
over other nodes, but also in societies in general. It is important to establish that the nodes are 
real entities, not merely virtual nodes in a network of information. There must be some 
institutional form, even if it is temporary (ibid: 38). The nodes may be any type of 
organisation, ranging from criminal gangs to government agencies. ‘Superstructural’ nodes, 
on the other hand, are according to the nodal governance framework a node which brings 
together members of other organisations in the nodal network in order to gather their 
technologies and resources for their common good. One example of such a ‘superstructural 
node’ in South Africa may be the Land Summit in Johannesburg in July 2005 which gathered 
various land reform actors. Like researchers, government representatives and NGOs, under 
the banner “A Partnership to Fast Track Land Reform: A New Trajectory Towards 2014”. 
Here, the participators discussed achievements, progress, issues and experiences with land 
reform the past 14 years. The summit generated an increased debate concerning the land 
reform policies, and the WSWB-approach in particular (Lahiff 2008: 1). However, if it 
actually accomplished any progress or changes is debateable.  
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Whether or not a node has the capacity to influence or regulate the other nodes or the 
network, depends in large part upon the resources it controls. These resources can be a wide 
range of capital, i.e. social, physical or monetary, which the nodes may use in order to 
influence others and exert political pressure (Burris et al 2005: 39). The most influential 
nodes involved in the South African agricultural network can be said to be located within 
government agencies like the DLA and the DoA; ‘the public land elite’ (Gran 2008: 1). The 
white commercial farmers’ interest organisations, like AgriSA, are also powerful nodes in the 
agricultural network. In addition, international organisations like the World Bank have quite 
some power and influence (Lahiff 2005, Saruchera and Odhiambo 2004, Saruchera 2004). 
However, there is a lack of powerful nodes at the grassroots-level in Africa in general, but 
also South Africa specifically. This may be said to have had coloured the hitherto 
performance of the reform. This is one of the main obstacles in South African land reform, 
while the politicians in power and the government agencies involved does not use their 
influence to push the land reform forward; it has not been a high priority among the political 
elite till this point. In addition the poor and landless does not hold the power and influence 
needed, and therefore their voice and demands are seldom heard or poorly articulated. 
Moreover, the NGOs in the land sector are small and have limited capacities (Lahiff 2001: 1, 
Catling 2008). The reform is influenced by the neo-liberal politics of the government, 
resulting in an extensive focus on making the emerging poor black farmers into profitable big 
scale commercial farmers. The claimants that do not fit the qualifications set by the 
Government will not gain much assistance from the land reform programme; “the 
participation requirements will tend to favour those who already have a reasonable strong 
asset base, and will tend to exclude those who have none. If the poor prove to be 
systematically unable to meet the requirements set by the DLA, they will be left out of land 
redistribution” (Lahiff 2001: 5). These are important factors in explaining the lack of progress 
experienced so far. 
 
If the groups of land reform beneficiaries are to exert pressure and influence towards the 
South African agricultural networks, it might be necessary to strengthen the groups from 
‘inside’. Some of the reasons for the extensive failure of many of the land reform projects till 
now are group-conflicts, poor management and other in-group related issues (Lahiff 2008, 
Interview Mr. van Jaarsveld 17.07.2008). I will in the next parts of this chapter look at the 
variables I will make use of in looking at the cases. The variables, ‘trust’, ‘relations towards 
government officials’ and ‘networks’, will hopefully help in elucidating how the two groups 
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of beneficiaries worked together, and moreover if there are differences in how they were 
linked to private and public actors, and moreover if these traits were decisive in the outcome 
of  the two cases.  
5.5 The Variables 
The different subjects and theories I have looked at so far provide factors that may increase or 
inhibit chances of success for groups of land reform beneficiaries in the agricultural markets 
in South Africa. Lahiff comments in his report from 2008 that some of the reasons for the lack 
of impact from land reform projects are “inadequate or inappropriate planning, a general lack 
of capital and skills among intended beneficiaries, a lack of post-settlement support from 
state-agencies, most notably local municipalities and provincial departments of agriculture, 
and poor dynamics within beneficiary groups” (Lahiff 2008: 6). The variables I have chosen 
to apply in the research are trust, character of autonomy intervention and networks. 
5.5.1 Trust 
Firstly, I have chosen to focus on ‘trust’ as an important factor in strengthening the groups of 
beneficiaries from ‘the inside’. The concept of trust in this context relates to trust through 
strong ties and organisation within the group. In going through the contributions following the 
social capital theory, several of the scholars label trust as an important asset in creating strong 
collective action with high levels of loyalty and reciprocity. The suggestion is that strong 
interpersonal ties in a group will assist in keeping small groups together and also to keep them 
sustainable. Distrust, on the other hand will often lead to discrimination, antagonism and 
defensiveness (Askvik et al 2005: 4). 
 
Sztompka identifies three dimensions of trust; trust as a quality of a relationship, trust as a 
cultural approach, and trust as a personality disposition. I will focus on the first dimension in 
my analysis. According to Sztompka, the most complex systems of trust appear in situations 
where one must cooperate. Cooperation occurs when we act together in attaining a goal which 
can not be reached individually. In these situations, the success of each one involved, depends 
on the actions taken by all others; “This significantly enhances the uncertainty and risk, as this 
is multiplied by the number of partners, each of whom is a free and principally unpredictable 
agent” (Sztompka 1999: 62). Hence, he states that trust is the precondition for cooperation, 
and also the product of successful cooperation. Conversely, distrust will destroy cooperation; 
“if distrust is complete, cooperation will fail among free agents” (ibid: 62). Factors that have 
been favoured by scholars when it comes to trust and collective action are a limited number of 
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players, ample information about the players and their history, and that the players do not 
discount the future to heavily (Putnam 1993: 166). Moreover; “It is necessary not only to trust 
others before acting cooperatively, but also to believe that one is trusted by others” (ibid: 
164). Coleman uses a metaphor of credit-slips to explain the value of trust and reciprocity in 
group interaction: “If A does something for B and trusts B to reciprocate in the future, this 
establishes an expectation in A and an obligation on the part of B” (Coleman 1988: 102). The 
idea is that one may gather several of these credit-slips from various actors which one can call 
back when needed. This is of course unless one has placed its trust unwisely; this will count 
as bad debts which will not be paid back (ibid: 102). Obligation and expectation depends on 
two elements according to Coleman; trustworthiness of the social environment and the extent 
of obligations held. Some organisations, like rotating credit associations, would not be able to 
exist without a high degree of trust between the actors.  
 
There can be said to be three orientations with which we face the insecurities and dilemmas in 
society; hope, confidence and trust. The first orientation is passive, vague and unjustified 
rational, in that it describes the feeling that everything will work out, in example “I hope I 
will be rich some day”.  Its opposite is resignation.  The second orientation, confidence, is 
also passive, but more focussed and somewhat justified. It may be describe as an “emotion of 
assured expectation” (Sztompka 1999: 24), while its opposite, doubt, may be describes as 
assured disbelief. One example of confidence may be that one has confidence in the legal 
system, because it has previously shown to be fair.  Both these orientations are 
“contemplative, detached, distanced, noncommittal” (ibid: 25). In situations where we act, 
despite of risk and uncertainties, we make use of the third orientation, trust. Trust then, 
becomes a strategy for handling a future that is unclear and may not be controlled; “a 
simplifying strategy that enables individuals to adapt to complex social environment, and 
thereby benefit from increased opportunities” (ibid: 25). One definition of trust, presented by 
Sztompka is that “trust is a bet about the future contingent actions of others” (ibid: 25). 
Hence, it appears in the context of human action, and its orientation is toward the future. In 
addition it entails two main elements; beliefs and commitment. First, when placing trust, we 
have certain expectations and beliefs of how others will act and behave; accordingly we act as 
if we knew the future. Second, we face the future actively by committing ourselves to specific 
actions. Therefore trust can be defined as  “the correct expectations about the actions of other 
people that have a bearing on one’s own choice of action when that action must be chosen 
before on can monitor the actions of those others” (ibid: 26).  
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When ‘placing a bet’, different varieties of commitments are involved. First, Sztompka 
identifies ‘anticipatory trust’. This kind of trust does not involve any obligation for the 
trusted, which may be the services or the products of a company. The trusted may, in fact, not 
even be aware of the trust placed here. Secondly, there is ‘responsive trust’, which implies 
letting other individuals take care of something that the truster cares about, “where such 
caring involves some exercise of discretionary powers” (ibid: 27).  In this way, one places the 
responsibility of the object in some other individuals’ hands, which can be natural or artificial 
as in nations or companies. In this way one gives up ones own control over the object while 
expecting responsible care taken by the trusted. In the first chapter of analysis, I will look at 
responsive trust with the variables ‘participation’ and ‘accountability’. Responsive trust will 
therefore in this paper relate to a trustworthy structure of the organisations. Through 
participation one will have a saying, or at least a feeling of participating, when it comes to the 
management of the land and capital one has invested in the organisation. Accountability is 
about responsibility on the management side; “this engenders a specific obligation to meet 
trust, to live up to expectations expressed by the act of entrusting” (ibid: 28). This notion of 
trustworthy structures through accountability also includes a degree of transparency; openness 
and adequate levels of information between the management and its environment. Through 
transparency the farmers are able to know exactly what is going on in the organisation, what 
the plans are for the future, what decisions that has been taken etc.  
 
Third, Sztompka identifies ‘evocative trust’, as a final variable of commitment in trust. This is 
“when we act on the belief that the other person will reciprocate with trust towards ourselves” 
(ibid: 28). Also, a feeling of obligation towards other people or certain behaviour and 
activities is an important side of group-interaction and reciprocity. Obligation may be defined 
as “the state of being forced to do something because it is your duty, or because of law etc” 
or, in addition; “something you must do because you have promised”42. This is similar to the 
previously mentioned credit-slip metaphor that Coleman (1988) draws on to explain the value 
of trust and reciprocity in group interaction. In the context of land reform beneficiaries, this 
relates to trust within the groups of farmers; in order to work together and create well-
functioning communal problem-solving and efficacy there needs to be a high degree of trust 
within the beneficiary groups. As I have shown previously, some scholars postulate that this 
                                                 
42 Oxford advanced learner’s Dictionary, 7th edition; Oxford University Press.  
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acquires strong links within a group, while others have pointed at dangers involved with 
having too strong links between groups of individuals in a community. In my analysis I will 
look at the evocative trust in the group with assistance with the variables ‘history of the 
communities’ and ‘social cohesion’. Concerning the history of the community, this is by some 
scholars looked upon as a promoter of social capital in communities; norms of trustworthiness 
and reciprocity develop through a level of closure within the group and also that one has 
sufficient information about the members and their history (Coleman 1988: 105, Putnam 
1993: 166). Coleman views social capital as evolving through a level of closure within the 
groups; through this they will develop norms of trustworthiness and reciprocity (Coleman 
1988: 105). Moreover, repeated and intensive networks are important for the structuring and 
monitoring of social capital. Coleman thus concludes that social capital have two distinct 
functions; to assist solid social links which in turn are responsible for creating in-group 
loyalty, solidarity and mobilising norms of reciprocity; “close ties, through family, 
community and religious affiliation” (ibid: 99) is helpful in creating social norms, rules and 
regulations in a group of individuals, while breaking the other members’ trust would 
aggregate serious consequences as in i.e. loosing your position as a member of the 
community.  
 
Coleman goes on suggesting that social capital is important for distributing information and 
opportunities, in order to link the group to external assets and create norms of generalised 
reciprocity43. Social cohesion is an important promoter for healthy cooperation and social 
capital within a group; “cooperation occurs when we act together in attaining a goal which 
can not be reached individually. In these situations, the success of each one involved depends 
on the actions taken by all others” (Sztompka 1999: 62). Accordingly, it is essential that the 
group work towards the same goal, and do not divide into fractions of various groupings with 
their individual goals and strategies, which may cause insecurity and distrust amongst the 
individuals. In one act of trusting, all three types of commitment, anticipatory, responsive and 
evocative, may overlap, and it is therefore somewhat unnatural to separate them. However, I 
will in my analysis make use of this dividing in order to elucidate the variables I have chosen 
and their purpose when looking at trust in the two cases. As mentioned, I wish to look at trust 
in the group of beneficiaries through Sztompka’s two variations of trust; evocative and 
responsive. In this way I hope to be able to say something about trust and trustworthiness in 
                                                 
43 Unpublished paper; Rebecca L. Wickes:  School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Griffith University 
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both groups of beneficiaries. By separating between trust within the group of farmers and 
trust towards the management, I want to demonstrate that there is a difference between 
placing trust and commitment in your colleagues and trusting a group of individuals to 
manage your assets.  
5.5.2 Character of Authority Intervention 
My second variable, ‘character of authority intervention’, relates to assistance from 
government institutions. Several scholars mention ‘third-party enforcers’ as an important 
criterion for successful problem-solving in a community (Coleman 1988, Lahiff 2008, 
Seligman 1997, Putnam 1993). The fact that the poor rural farmers are such a fragile and 
weak group, in addition to the amount of failed land reform projects in the past in terms of 
“poor dynamics within groups of beneficiaries” (Lahiff 2008: 6), suggest that there is a need 
for assistance from government agencies in terms of financing, training, evaluation, 
monitoring etc. According to Lahiff there has been a growing understanding the past years 
that “the beneficiaries are receiving little when it comes to training, financial support or at all 
any support beyond the transfer of land. This might be a very important reason for why it is so 
difficult for successful claimants to actually launch productive and well-functioning 
enterprises” (ibid: 11). Seligman (1997) states, in relation to public goods and the lack of trust 
in some societies, that “without confidence all contracts, promises, and obligations - whether 
economic, social or political, public or private - can only be maintained by third-party 
enforcers” (Seligman 1997: 4). The purpose of the third-party is to be a neutral law-giver that 
both, or several, parties can rely on and trust in arranging their cooperation and creating 
norms and rules for them to follow. In Hobbes view, “if both parties concede to the Leviathan 
the power to enforce comity between them, their reward is the mutual confidence necessary to 
civil life” (Putnam 1993: 165). On a macro-level, we have laws and regulations that control 
how we can and can not behave in the public spheres, many of them printed and agreed upon 
in national constitutions. In a smaller scale though, one often needs to make additional 
regulations in order to create common norms and ways of behaving that is agreed upon by the 
members of the group. Norms and regulations have been put forward by several scholars as 
important in promoting collective action (Seligman 1997, Putnam 1993, Coleman 1988). This 
is to avoid free-riding, and that “traitors” will be punished. The public trust towards 
governmental agencies in South Africa has been decreasing due to corruption-scandals, lack 
of performance and delivery etc. Moreover there are other factors like the unfulfilled 
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expectations towards the promises of a “New South Africa” among the previously oppressed, 
racism etc., which make trust between the public and the state a difficult subject matter.  
 
Knut Dahl Jacobsen (1978) did extensive research on the transformation of the agricultural 
system in Norway in the late 1900th century, and in this process, the relationship between the 
state officials and the clientele, the farmers. His research is to a large degree based on David 
Easton’s model of the political system:  
 
  Model 3: The Political System 
    
  ENVIRONMENT 
I                                                                                                                     O                         
N                                                                                                                    U 
P      DEMANDS                                                        DECISIONS              T 
U     SUPPORT                                                           OR POLICIES           P 
T                                                                                                                     U  
S                                                                                                                     T 
                                              FEEDBACK                                                    S 
                                                      ENVIRONMENT 
(Jacobsen 1978: 3) 
 
Through this model Easton shows that the political processes are to a large degree shaped by 
demands from actors, or in this context ‘nodes’, in society. These demands are aimed at the 
political system, which further are considered political issues that certain actors in society 
demand should be resolved. This is what keeps the system running, but it must be paired by 
support, or legitimacy, in order for the political system to function. Further, the issues may, 
through the processes within the system, become decisions or policies. These in turn 
contribute with feedback, which in Jacobsen’s words are “a process to decide whether and in 
what scale the system gets new energy so it can go on functioning” (Jacobsen 1978: 3). 
Among other things, this model puts focus on how certain actors in society may shape the 
politics in society, in terms of which demands are put forward and moreover what policies 
and decisions that are made by a political system. Jacobsen makes an analytical separation 
between two different aspects of the decisions that are made: 1) a choice between alternatives 
that may refer to different values, views and social identifications, and 2) an establishment of 
A 
POLITICAL 
SYSTEM 
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certain social relations between the official and the client in question. The second aspect will 
take shape through who initiates the decision, if the decision includes force and if there are 
any third-persons involved (ibid: 4).  
 
As mentioned, the poor rural citizens of South Africa do not seem to have a high degree of 
power when it comes to influencing the decisions and policies made by the Government. 
According to Jacobsen (1967), this lack of influence and power is partly caused by the fact 
that poor people are not just poor when it comes to resources; they are subject to ‘political 
poverty’. This is further in line with Tilly’s argument that due to lack of ‘slack’, resources and 
time to organise etc., poor people are often not organised and thus does not exert any power to 
put pressure on government politics and policies (Gran 2006: 163). Further, when poor people 
are politically passive, they are not included in the political agenda and moreover, they can go 
on being ignored without there being any consequences for the people within the political 
system. Jacobsen goes on suggesting that the workings of political systems demands control 
by the affected clients themselves, something that further requires motivation and contribution 
from the clients’ side, which in turn will ‘reward the well-informed and outspoken, and 
punish the ignorant and silent”44 (Jacobsen 1967: 9). Moreover, whether one is part of a 
‘silent’ or ‘outspoken’ group will affect the relations one will have towards the government 
officials.  
 
The variables that will be employed to look more closely at the relations towards government 
officials in chapter seven is related to the character of authority intervention in the projects. 
Hence I will compare the assistance they received from the state agencies in two periods of 
the projects; ‘launching the project’ and ‘post-settlement support’. By this I attempt to 
investigate whether there were any differences in amounts of support received in the initial 
phases of the project, relations towards the officials in terms of force or support, and 
moreover if they have received different/any degree of support after the projects got started. If 
so, I want to establish if this was an influential factor in the difference in outcomes in the two 
cases.  
                                                 
44 Translated from Norwegian 
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5.5.3 Networks 
Finally, I find links towards the greater networks to be of great importance in deciding 
whether or not a group of beneficiaries will succeed. This variable directs its attention beyond 
the group members per se, and focuses on the connections the group has towards the greater 
network of agricultural nodes. The idea is that strong interpersonal ties are important within 
small groups to keep them together and sustainable, while, in Putnam’s words, “networks of 
civic engagement that cut across social cleavages nourish wider cooperation” (Putnam 1993: 
175). Granovetter looks at the relation-ties to acquaintances as a crucial ‘bridge’ between 
groups of strongly connected individuals. He states that individuals with few weak ties will 
not manage to get hold of important information, which in turn may give you opportunities 
that you wouldn’t know of if you only kept with your closest group of friends; your ‘strong 
ties’. If one applies this communication-argument to a macro-situation, Granovetter points out 
that a social system without weak ties would be “fragmented and incoherent” (Granovetter 
1973: 202). In this way ideas would spread in a slow manner, scientific progress would be 
limited and we would in general know little about what happened in other parts of the world 
than in our own little group of close contacts. Although Putnam seems to focus on the closure 
of a community in order to develop a healthy social capital within the group, he acknowledges 
Granovetter’s work on the importance of weak ties in his publication: “Ironically, as 
Granovetter has pointed out, “strong” interpersonal ties (like kinship and intimate friendship) 
are less important than “weak ties” (like acquaintanceship and shared membership of 
secondary associations) in sustaining community cohesion and collective action” (Putnam 
1993: 175). 
 
The network I am referring to in my research is the governance networks concerning 
agriculture and land reform in South Africa. Due to white commercial farmers’ previous 
domination in the agricultural markets, it may be vital for emerging farmers to have links 
towards or relations with actors within these established networks that may connect them to 
the industry. In South Africa, and especially the two regions I have looked at, about 70 
percent45 of land-owners are white. In a study by the SPP where they investigate land 
transfers in five regions in Northern Cape and Western Cape between 1998 and 2002, they 
state that 58 percent of property sold during this time-period was bought by people already 
owning land under the same title deed of the land they were buying. The remaining 42 percent 
                                                 
45 Why do the landless remain landless? SPP 2002 www.spp.org.za 
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were property bought by people not owning land under the same title deed. In fact, the study 
shows that 98 percent of land sold in these areas from 1998 till 2002 were either bought by a 
private owner, a trust or a company46. This however does not necessarily mean that all the 
buyers were established white farmers or companies, while one of my cases, the Vuki Farm, 
bought their land through a trust. It is, on the other hand problematic that the individuals that 
the land reform is designed for, the poor landless people, have been pushed aside. It seems 
like the people buying land are the ones that already have resources and connections, which in 
addition are supported by the LRAD-policy that demands an income of minimum R5000 per 
month in order to get grants to buy land from the DLA.   
 
The report further suggest that internal markets, farmers attitudes towards land-reform sales 
and the high prices of land compared to the amounts received in grants are to blame for the 
distribution of property-owners in the region. The internal markets and sometimes negative 
and racist attitudes towards the beneficiaries achieving land are also mentioned as reasons 
why it may be difficult for land reform beneficiaries to enter the established networks. 
Although the South African Agricultural Marketing Act from 1996 dissolved the existing 
market-infrastructure that connected co-operatives, marketing agents, marketing boards and 
agri-processors “within the exclusively white “Organised Agricultural” networks”47 that were 
managed by the state, the agricultural markets are still not as open and easy to gain access to 
as one had hoped for. In fact Qeqe and Cartwright state that it has had an opposite effect then 
what was planned; “the deregulated and highly competitive nature of current markets has 
created new barriers for capital-poor emerging farmers”48. They go on saying that many of 
these barriers are due to “the cost of information, risk, capital and the role of social networks 
and quality standards within the new market network. Collectively the barriers account for 
market failure and contribute to the persistent poverty in rural economies.”49 An overarching 
                                                 
46 Why do the landless remain landless? SPP 2002 www.spp.org.za  
47Qeqe and Cartwright: South Africa’s Agricultural Commodity Markets-Understanding the rules of the game in 
five commodity markets with the intention of creating opportunities for emerging farmers www.spp.org.za 
48 Qeqe and Cartwright: South Africa’s Agricultural Commodity Markets-Understanding the rules of the game in 
five commodity markets with the intention of creating opportunities for emerging farmers www.spp.org.za 
 
49 Qeqe and Cartwright: South Africa’s Agricultural Commodity Markets-Understanding the rules of the game in 
five commodity markets with the intention of creating opportunities for emerging farmers www.spp.org.za 
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factor in the land market is one of equality; the WSWB-approach assumes that the sellers and 
the buyers are equal. This is far from reality while the case for many of the land reform 
beneficiaries is that they have few resources and are poorly organised. Hence, they 
independently have to engage in the land markets while other buyers, like the established 
white farmers, have more information because they are part of tightly knit networks50.  
 
In order to investigate the connection towards private and public actors in the governance 
networks connected to agriculture and land reform in South Africa, I will try to establish if 
there were any difference in the two cases when it comes to ‘number of links’ and further the 
‘utility of links’. By this I hope to find whether there are variations in the two groups of 
beneficiaries when it comes to cooperation with other actors and acquaintances in the 
agricultural industry, and moreover how they have made use of these connections. This might 
further establish whether the groups can be said to be able to manage, and to a degree control, 
their environments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
50 Why do the landless remain landless? SPP 2002 www.
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Chapter 6:  Trust  
Previous research on the mentioned collective efficacy, a form of social capital, has defined 
the concept as resting on patterns of small-scale social organization, dependent on proximate 
trust, social cohesion and the expectation that others will act with you if the need arises 
(Briggs 2008: 9). Like physical capital and human capital makes effective action possible, so 
does social capital. Moreover, when trying to accomplish social capital and consequently 
collective problem-solving in a group, trust is a factor that might make the process easier. 
James S. Coleman (1988) emphasise that “a group within which there is extensive 
trustworthiness and extensive trust, is able to accomplish much more than a comparable group 
without that trustworthiness and trust” (Coleman 1988:101). Distrust may be described as 
“the negative mirror-image of trust” (Sztompka 1999: 26). As trust, it involves placing a bet, 
the difference being that distrust places negative bets; it entails negative expectations about 
the future actions of others. Also, it involves defensive commitment as escaping and avoiding. 
Moreover, it is important to separate between distrust and the concept of mistrust. Mistrust 
refers to a neutral situation where trust and distrust are suspended. Further this condition is 
coloured by a lack of clear expectations and also hesitations concerning commitment. 
Sztompka postulates that mistrust is a temporary, intermediate phase when building trust, and 
moreover that it is either “a former trust destroyed, or former distrust healed”. However, when 
moving from trust to mistrust, it easily leads to full-fledged distrust, while mistrust resulting 
from “healed distrust” will move towards trust very slowly (Sztompka 1999).    
 
In this chapter, I wish to analyse trust and trustworthiness in the two groups of beneficiaries 
that I have investigated. There are clear advantages of a high degree of trust in a community: 
“With a high degree of trust there is also less need for monitoring others as well as increasing 
openness and spontaneity within a group” (Sztompka 1999: 63). There are several ways in 
which one may approach an analysis of trust. I do not however intend to approach this in a 
cognition-based way, while I have no direct information neither through interviews nor 
documents concerning the individual farmers and their expectations concerning themselves 
and others (Grey & Garsten 2001: 232). Rather I wish to investigate the group-dynamics 
indirectly and whether there can be said to be a sound environment for trust between the 
actors involved in the two cases. Further, I wish to look at the groups of beneficiaries through 
Sztompka’s two variations of trust; evocative and responsive. In this way, by separating 
between trust within the group of farmers and trust towards the management, I want to 
demonstrate that there is a difference between placing trust and commitment in your 
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colleagues and trusting a group of individuals to manage your assets. This way of 
approaching the cases is based on the notion that besides interpersonal lines of trust in a 
cooperating group of individuals and generalised trust invested by each one of the individuals 
involved, there is a more abstract trust in organisational management like coordination, 
leadership, supervision that “safeguard smooth cooperation (“this group is well-organised and 
wisely managed”)” (Sztompka 1999: 63). The trust toward management is based on 
trustworthiness and confidence. “Trust as confidence relates to the proper performance of 
institutional roles, while trust relates to the ability to interpret roles, choose between them and 
move in the undetermined space between them”51.  
 
I will try to analyse these notions of trust by looking at the history of the groups, social 
cohesion, participation and accountability. The two former ones being based on evocative 
trust, while the two latter ones are based on responsive trust, as mentioned in the theory 
chapter. The data I make use of in this chapter will be the organisational structures, the 
composition of the group, documents of communication between different actors in the 
projects, but also interviews with persons closely connected with the project and previous 
research in the field of trust but also on the specific cases. I did not interview any of the farm 
workers, and therefore I do not have any direct information from the farmers themselves. I 
will however try to grasp the group dynamics and collective efficacy in each group by looking 
at the interviews I did with Harry May at SPP, Jan Witbooi at Vuki and to a degree also the 
information I gathered through interviewing Alie van Jaarsveld with the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Henk Smith with the LRC. Harry May has extended knowledge on the group 
of farmers at Goodhouse, while he has been working with them since the beginning of the 
project. Jan Witbooi is part of the group of farmers that bought the Vuki Farm after the 
previous owners went bankrupt. Further I will, in the case of Vuki, make use of a previous 
study by Kleinbooi and colleagues. Here, they refer to other research done on the same group 
and also interviews they have conducted with the farmers. In looking at Goodhouse I make 
use of newspaper articles, and other documents that I have gathered, especially documents 
from the SPP and STC, that worked closely with the project. In addition I have various letters 
and e-mails that have been sent between different stakeholders connected to the project that I 
got hold of through SPP and LRC. Through these documents and indirect information and 
                                                 
51 Unpublished paper Jan Froestad: “Can Trust be Managed within Formal Organizations? Lessons drawn from a 
Study of a Municipal Health Agency in the Western Cape Province, South Africa”. 
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observations I feel I get a sense of how the community functioned together as a group. In the 
next sections, I will try to identify, through the information I have gathered about both groups 
in terms of documents and interviews, whether trust was an important factor in deciding the 
outcome in the two cases. 
6.1 History of the Communities 
Coleman claims that through closely linked groups where there are certain levels of ‘closure’; 
social capital will evolve through norms of trustworthiness and reciprocity (Coleman 1988: 
105). With ‘closure’ he refers to the social structure of a group or community; in order for 
people to develop social capital there must be relations between the actors, which in turn, 
according to Coleman, acquires levels of contact and closeness between the individuals, hence 
there should preferably be restricted number of members in the group. Coleman views closure 
as essential while it is “important not only for the existence of effective norms but also for 
another form of social capital: the trustworthiness of social structures that allows the 
proliferation of obligations and expectations” (ibid: 107). My criteria for measuring trust with 
the variable ‘history of the communities’ will be that the group has some degree of history 
together; something that connects them, and thus a certain level of closure in the group since 
they know each other and thus may communicate freely together. Closure is hard to measure 
based on the data I have gathered. However I will try to say something about this based on 
information I have gathered on the history of the groups and for how long they have been 
farming together. This is based on Coleman’s view on social norms and its importance in 
order to gain social capital in a group of individuals.  
 
Coleman suggests that “social action inheres in the structure of relations between actors and 
among actors” (ibid: 98). Further, he uses the diamond markets in New York as an example in 
explaining how “close ties, through family, community and religious affiliation, provide the 
insurance that is necessary to facilitate the transactions in the markets. If any member of this 
community defected through substituting other stones or through stealing stones in his 
temporary possession, he would lose family, religious or community ties” (ibid: 99). Hence, 
in order to sustain trust within a group one of the criteria may be that the group is ‘closed’ to 
some extent and trough this that information may flow freely. Through this structure in the 
relations between the members, Coleman suggests that social capital and further collective 
action is made possible. Seeing as the communities I look into have been connected as a 
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community for generations, I will try to research whether this may be a promoter for trust 
among the community members.  
 
Vuki started up being 124 farmers entering the equity scheme, but ended up as 37 after the 
liquidation and the process of renting and finally buying the land. Hence, the farmers involved 
in the Vuki Trust are all previous farm-workers at the Whitehall farm. Some of the families 
worked for the Hall family for more then 30 years before they took over the farm land. 
Because of financial difficulties the farm workers entered into cooperation with the owners, 
the Hall family, in 1995. This cooperation worked as an equity scheme, where the Halls’ kept 
50 percent of the shares and the farm workers purchased 50 percent. In 2001 the farm 
experienced further financial difficulties which resulted in the liquidation of the farm in 
January 2002. From there of the farm-workers took over the production, first through renting 
the farm from the liquidators and from 2005 as owners through the Vuki Trust (Interview Mr. 
Witbooi. 28.05.2008, Kleinbooi et al 2006). The production manager at the Vuki Farm, Mr. 
Witbooi, regards a restricted number of people in the group of beneficiaries as an advantage: 
“You see we must be very careful to make our group too big. When you make it too big your 
trouble are bigger. And the government with all the legislation make it much difficult for you. 
So the smaller your group… but it must be…manageable. The better, then you can talk with 
each other, with everyone” (Interview Mr. Witbooi. 28.05.2008).  Also Mr. van Jaarsveld 
with the Ministry of Agriculture found restricted group size to be of importance:  “as it is, one 
commercial farmer struggles to make a living out of agriculture. So how can you now, in 
terms of government programmes, of empowering people economically and otherwise, think 
that you can have a hundred people, maybe fifty families, cause two individuals per family, 
how can you expect them now to make a good living out of a farm like that?” (Interview Mr. 
van Jaarsveld 17.07.2008). Most of the beneficiaries live with their families on the farm land 
while some other families live in the villages nearby. In addition to the beneficiaries of the 
trust, there are also about 250 seasonal workers coming every fall to help pick the apples. 
These temporary workers are mostly from the Eastern Cape and live in hostels at the farm 
while they are there.  
 
Mr. C Weidner of the Oudsthoorn Land Development Company took over the Goodhouse 
farm the 4th of April 1913. The farm was later bought by the Gordon family in 1944 before 
the Government took over the area in 1948 for renting it to white farmers. The last white 
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farmer to rent the land was Mr. C Rossouw in 196452. Some of the families that worked for 
Mr. Weidner still live in the Goodhouse area today. After the white farmer tenants, it have 
mostly been farmers from Steinkopf that have been farming at Goodhouse. Because the 
Orange River is flowing past the Goodhouse area, the area is quite convenient for irrigation 
farming. Hence, some families started moving to Goodhouse, using it as graining areas, made 
flood irrigation systems etc. There have been several other irrigation projects previous to the 
Goodhouse Paprika Project, but according to Harry May, these projects have mostly been 
arranged for farmers from Steinkopf while the Goodhouse community have been used as 
labour. The Goodhouse Paprika Project involved 55 beneficiaries. The majority of these 
beneficiaries came from the Goodhouse community, while a couple of them came from 
Steinkopf (Interview Mr. May 11.12.08). The developers were approached by the Provincial 
Government in the Northern Cape to start this project in Goodhouse with the families that 
lived there. In addition to the 55 beneficiaries, there were 78 workers at the factory in 
Springbok, and plans of employing as many as 1500 additional workers at the farm53. I do not 
have any information on whether these additional workers were included in the project before 
it went bankrupt, but this is something that probably would have disturbed the existing benefit 
of being a community with a restricted number of members and therefore a level of closure. 
In situations where several members has to cooperate in order to reach common goals, which 
can not be reached individually, the success of each of them depends on the others involved, 
therefore the more people are included the higher is the risk; “This significantly enhances the 
uncertainty and risk, as this is multiplied by the number of partners, each of whom is a free 
and principally unpredictable agent” (Sztompka 1999: 62). Further, some of the farmers 
involved in the project were from Steinkopf, the village close to Goodhouse (Interview Mr. 
May 11.12.2008). Whether this have affected the group in any way is hard for me to say, due 
to the fact that I have not discussed this issue with the farmers in Goodhouse, and moreover 
no data confirming or denying this to be an issue. Harry May with the SPP has spent much 
time working with the project and the members of the Goodhouse community, and he did not 
express this as a contributing factor to the projects failure. Goodhouse is part of the Steinkopf 
area and farmers from Steinkopf did own land in Goodhouse and may therefore not have been 
considered as ‘outsiders’. On the other hand they may have been a component that disturbed 
the relations within the group. Distrust will destroy cooperation within a group. As 
                                                 
52 Document from the Steinkopf  Transformation Committee - SPP 
53 Business Plan, files from the SPP 
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mentioned, some of the factors that have been put forward by scholars when it comes to trust 
and collective action are a restricted number of actors and ample information about the actors 
and their history (Putnam 1993: 166). 
 
Going through the information I have on the groups of beneficiaries, it seems like both are 
rather closely connected through having lived together as a community for decades; however 
there are factors in the Goodhouse-case which may have been limiting the trust between the 
farmers. Both set of farmers entered the projects as a community; there were no process of 
selecting individual farmers, rather the groups were included in the respective projects as an 
already existing community of farmers. Consequently, the closure and restricted number of 
individuals involved is apparent in both cases. How strong the links between them are and 
how much trust the groups contain on the other hand, is hard to measure from the data I have 
gathered. I have not conducted any interviews with the beneficiaries at Vuki or at Goodhouse, 
and do therefore not know whether they can be said to be a strong social network or if there is 
a high degree of trust between them. However, the families involved have known each other 
and worked together for generations, something that indicate that there is closure in the group.  
6.2 Social Cohesion  
 In addition to being small groups with degrees of closure and strong links, it is essential that 
the group work towards the same goals in order for them to create trust towards each other 
and within the group; “the success of each one involved depends on the actions taken by all 
others”(Sztompka 1999: 62). Further, “because the success of each requires the contribution 
of all, the cooperative situation, apart from having all the normal types of risk: that 
others…will defect and make the efforts of the rest futile. The risk is significantly raised when 
the goals to be achieved by cooperation have the character of public goods, eventually 
beneficial to all independent of the degree of their contribution” (ibid: 63). The goods with 
reference to the farmers in my cases, are first and foremost profit from their investments and 
employment, but also other goods like health facilities, schooling etc. A feeling of obligation 
towards other people or certain behaviour and activities is an important side of group-
interaction and reciprocity, while social capital as collective efficacy “inheres in the structure 
of relations between actors and among actors” (Coleman 1988: 98). On the other hand, social 
cohesion does not necessarily mean collective action through consensus. It is widely 
recognised that any collective project or organisations will benefit from divergent thinking 
and conflicts. However, the collective will best make use of conflicting ideas and thoughts 
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through “robust and flexible mechanisms for “getting to yes” as well as space and rules for 
“having a good fight” (Briggs 2008: 42). Without any mechanisms for conflict resolution, 
valuable differences in the group may quickly turn bad, which in turn may reduce the group 
members’ willingness to deliberate, engage etc.  
 
Once more, the data I have collected is weak when it comes to explaining how exactly the 
group members related to one another. However, I will try, by indirect information based on 
the data I have gathered, to give an impression of whether the farmers pulled in the same 
direction, and moreover if the ambitions of the management and the farmers are 
corresponding. The criteria for measuring the social cohesion will first and foremost be the 
interviews I have conducted, but in the case of Vuki also the previous research by Kleinbooi, 
Lahiff and Tom in 2006. In addition I will look at mechanisms for handling conflicts in the 
two cases through documents describing the management of the projects, i.e. the report from 
the Transformation Committee in the case of Goodhouse, and the DLA-files on Vuki. I will 
evaluate ‘social cohesion’ through mechanisms for conflict management and common goals.  
 
First of all, both groups farmed together on the common land. That everybody engages in this 
to make the production go smoothly is an essential ambition. At Vuki the farmers got off to a 
great start when they managed to obtain the highest profit in ten years the first period they 
farmed together without assistance from the Whitehall-family. It is likely that this made the 
people trust each other more as it showed that they all, both farmers and management were 
doing their best to make the project successful; “This brief experience convinced the workers 
that they had what it takes to make a success on the farm” (Kleinbooi et al 2006: 27). Further 
they made a plan to purchase the farm back from the liquidators, this time on their own. In 
order for them to take this step, there must have been a level of trust and common ideals 
among the members while the action to take over the land and farm on their own entails an 
amount of risk. In order for this risk to be minimal, the group had to be united in their 
decision. As mentioned, the data I have collected when it comes to interaction and trust 
between the members of the group is limited. I have however, gathered some opinions about 
the group through the data I have collected; “It is obvious the that the participants are very 
enthusiastic about their farming venture and have managed to make a very noticeable 
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difference to the profitability to the farming operations within the two last years” 54(sic). In 
addition Alie van Jaarsveld with the Ministry of Agriculture expresses these thoughts; “I think 
what you found on the farm is probably a very well organised, very well structured group of 
people. They do their own management. But Clive (MacKrill)55 spent a lot of time in terms of 
conflict-management, group-dynamics, and also human capital development in terms of the 
development of the people” (Interview Mr. van Jaarsveld 17.07-08). Hence, there has been 
specific work on conflict management on the farm. According to the business plan the Vuki 
management has handed in to the DLA, Mackrill’s tasks are mentorship, guidance and 
training.  
 
Moreover, at Vuki the management are part of the group of farmers that bought the farm from 
the previous owners. This may be an advantage when it comes to trust, in that the farmers and 
managers are “on the same team” and have known each other for years.  On the other hand 
this is a problem when it comes to the uneven distribution of reimbursement and other 
benefits. Seeing that all the farmers and managers at Vuki are beneficiaries of the land and 
property at the farm, there has been some dissatisfaction with the arrangements on the 
workers behalf. In Kleinbooi, Lahiff and Tom’s study (2006) they refer to several workers 
that demonstrated frustration with the project; “We thought maybe it will bring a bit of extra 
money but not a better life. The problem was we never saw any money, not even today”, “it is 
all about the money, ‘ek wil n’ leefbare loon he’ (I want a living wage) (Kleinbooi et al 2006: 
30) expressed some of the farmers they interviewed. The research further concludes that there 
is a need for the workers to feel more than that they are merely working for a capitalist 
employer and start to enjoy the benefits of co-ownership. The majority of farmers interviewed 
by Kleinbooi and colleagues did not experience any difference in their lives after they became 
co-owners of the Vuki Farm. Due to this, Kleinbooi, Lahiff and Tom arguments that one can 
view Vuki as more of a Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) project for the members of the 
workers who have entered the management positions rather than as a workers cooperative like 
suggested in the formal structure (ibid: 31). On the other hand, research by Eckert and others 
in 1996, showed high levels of employment satisfaction and also a labour productivity 
increase of 30 percent following the buy-in in the Whitehall farm (ibid: 26). Also, the Vuki 
                                                 
54 Memorandum from Kelly Theunis, chief planner, Stellenbosch Regional Office of the DLA to Jimmy Freysen, 
Regional Manager, Cape Winelands & Overberg Districts of the DLA 2004 
55 Clive MacKrill is the Management Consultant on the farm 
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business plan from 2003/2004 claims that there has been a substantial increase in the minimal 
daily wage, and moreover that they now rank as one of the production units with the highest 
average daily wage in the Western Cape56. Although there is some dissatisfaction with the 
dividends among the farmers, I find it in this context important that they seem to be able to 
discuss their disagreements, have channels through which they communicate, and also rules 
they follow in terms of the signed Deed of Trust. This in turn demonstrates that there are 
space and rules for divergent thinking and conflicts in the organisation.  
 
At Goodhouse, the production went well in the initial period; the farmers had high hopes for 
the project while there had been much optimism and high expectations from media, 
government and the community before it started. As time went by however, the group got 
divided as they wanted to obtain their goal in different ways. The farmers divided into two 
different coalitions; pro and anti- expropriation and got each their representatives from 
outside the community. Based on the information I have gathered I would say that the 
conflicts and discussions in the Goodhouse case were not managed well; “you had these two 
groups and then they weren’t talking to each other(…)I mean, so they were always fighting 
against the other (Interview Mr. May 11.12.2008). Also in the business plan-proposal there 
were not any planned mechanisms for handling conflicts or disagreement in the group; 
“Negative behaviour must be seen as counter productive in terms of a safe, friendly and 
positive community”57.  It is important that the management and the workers pull in the same 
direction when it comes to trust within the group and social cohesion. At Goodhouse this 
became difficult as the group of farmers got divided partly as a result of the management. 
Both researchers I talked to at SPP in Springbok found the management of Goodhouse to 
have been the main problem of the project. Mr. May at the SPP in Springbok also states that 
some of the farmers were co-opted by the managers (Interview Mr. May 11.12.2008).  
 
There was a severe lack of conflict management in the Goodhouse-organisation. However, 
like the managers wrote in a document with responds to questions from the Transformation 
Committee; “this is a project run on purely business basis as it is a private sector controlled 
project in terms of the Principal agreement with government. Government are the facilitators 
of the land redistribution and sustainable Agricultural development aspects of this project 
                                                 
56 Vuki business plan 2003/2004 - DLA files 
57 Business Plan Proposal, LRC-files.  
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only…Labour issues will be determined as in all business by the productivity of the labourers 
themselves in the sense that if a labourer is unproductive he will obviously be replaced as is 
the case with any business”58. The developers have signed an agreement with the farmers, 
which entitle them to manage and run the project for a period of five years in order to 
establish the project and provide skills to the farmers through training etc. Hence, it seems 
like there were minimal focus on the social aspects of this project, while the managers 
considered their task to be building a profitable business. Goodhouse was, and still is, a 
severely deprived community with desperate need for social development and that was also 
why the Provincial Government hired the developers to build a profitable project in the first 
place. However, it seems to have been an uncertainty or disagreement as to who was 
responsible for the social aspects of the project and also who should tend to dispute resolution 
and conflict management. The business plan says nothing when it comes to this area of 
management, and in a document from the management to the Transformation Committee, the 
management emphasises how SPP is under mandate from the Provincial Government to take 
care of dispute resolutions in the project59.   
 
According to Alie van Jaarsveld at the Ministry of Agriculture, what happened with the group 
of farmers at Goodhouse is quite ordinary in land reform-projects in South Africa; “And then 
very often then what happens is that the first six months, yeah, everything is fine. There’s 
expectations and….expectations which is most probably sometimes very, very unrealistic. 
And then they start fighting amongst each other, group-forming, and eventually the project is 
a side-issue and the fight between the people in the group becomes so major that, you know, 
they forget about the farming and… and that’s were most of the failures actually comes from” 
(Interview Mr. van Jaarsveld 17.07.2008).  
6.3 Participation 
 By ‘participation’ I refer to a “degree of involvement and ownership of affected 
stakeholders” (Hyden and Court 2002: 27), the stakeholders here being the farmers involved 
in the two projects. Consulting the stakeholders which are very much affected by decisions is 
not only a must in any democratic society, it is also psychologically important; “People are 
                                                 
58 Answers to the Transformation Committee’s Questions; ad Para 23, SPP-files.  
59 (Submission to Transformation Committee of Steinkopf, Northern Cape from Mr. Labuschagne – The GPP 
files (SPP). 
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much more likely to be satisfied with decision outcomes when they feel they have been heard, 
even when the decisions are costly and unpleasant” (Briggs 2008: 40).  In addition, consulting 
others may produce better decisions; ‘two heads are better than one’. “Managed well (and 
those are the key words), inclusionary groups and processes, which blend different sources of 
knowledge and disseminate knowledge too, can generate better, more actionable ideas than 
top-down, exclusionary, technocratic planning” (ibid: 41).  As mentioned previous in this 
paper, social capital “inheres in the structure of relations between actors and among actors” 
(Coleman 1988: 98). Moreover, how valuable the relations between the actors turns out to be, 
depends on the social organisation. Consequently, I will look at the organisation for 
participatory action in the two cases. I will try to do this through looking more closely at what 
channels the farmers have for participating in decision-making, and if there are any 
regulations that control this right to participate. I will make use of documents describing the 
structure and management of the organisations in investigating this, documents of 
communication between the management at Goodhouse and the STC,  but also some of the 
interviews in describing how this part of the organisation functions.  
 
At the Vuki farm, the workers are participating through being co-owners of the land and 
beneficiaries of the trust. The previous workers at Whitehall are 100 percent owners of the 
land and all fixed property. Still, some of them have remained workers while others are 
managers in Vuki Farming (Pty) Ltd. The Vuki Trust has an Annual General Meeting where 
one of the members of the Board of Trustees is appointed to be Chairperson the following 
year. In addition there shall be appointed a secretary and a treasurer of the Board, the balance 
sheet and the financial statement of the affairs of the Trust are to be considered, election of an 
auditor, determine a quorum for all meetings of the Board and consider and decide any other 
issues that may be raised.  In addition there should be held ordinary meetings as often as 
considered necessary60. There are clear rules concerning objects of the Trust, the power of the 
trustees and what disqualifies them, the beneficial interest etc. With these regulations and 
possibilities for the beneficiaries to affect the managing of the Trust, there are good 
conditions for participation and co-determination. Whether the farmers are heard in the day to 
day workings of the farm though, is harder for me to establish from the data I have gathered. 
Through interviewing the production manager at the Vuki Farm however, he made the 
impression that they all know each other and by being a small group it is easy to discuss 
                                                 
60 Deed of Trust - DLA-files 
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issues when they arise; “So the smaller your group… the better…then you can talk with each 
other, with everyone” (Interview Mr. Witbooi 28.05.08). The management team at the Vuki 
Farm has weekly meetings where they plan ahead and go through budgeting etc (Interview 
Mr. Witbooi 28.05.08). My impression, based on the information I have, is that the farmers 
have a model of direct participation which is not particularly well organised besides the 
annual Trust-meetings.  
 
At Goodhouse, the model of communication was the following; the main “communication 
artery” was to be from the five different phases of farm-activities through the management 
committee and further to the management. The farmers in each of the five phases had to elect 
a group leader, which is then a member of the management committee as a representative for 
that phase or that group of farmers. Each of the five groups was to get together early every 
week, before the management committee gathered in the end of the week to tend to the issues 
raised at the former meetings. Information was also meant to “flow” back to the farmers in the 
same manner61. The participation may therefore be described as a representative one.  The 
farmers did have adequate possibilities to participate and bring up issues, not directly, but 
rather through informing their representatives through meetings.  This is the model that was 
suggested by the developers in the business-plan which was proposed to the provincial 
government. According to Harry May though, the meetings did not bring up relevant subjects 
and the workers did not really have a saying in how the project was managed. ”So I mean it62 
wasn’t about the issues of workers and of the project itself and that…you could have meetings 
discussing labour issues or ‘you’re not working at the right pace’” (Interview Mr. May 
11.12.2008). Hence, it seems like the farmers did not use their opportunity to represent their 
issues towards the management through the model of communication that was proposed.  
 
As the conflicts and frustration in the project grew, the farmers have adopted an even more 
representative model when it comes to the conflict between them, where they have people 
from outside the project as representatives for the groupings. The two opposing parties got in 
touch with each their representative actors; Mr. Labuschagne and the STC. The STC further 
worked together with the Northern Cape SPP, which in turn got assistance from the LRC in 
Cape Town. Mr. Labuschagne represented a fraction of the farmers, the ones that were pro-
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expropriation. Early in 2002 these farmers signed an agreement which entitles Mr. 
Labuschagne to “investigate an allegation that their land rights could be infringed upon”63. 
The remaining farmers were represented by the coalition STC, SPP and LRC. Further, apart 
from representing some of the farmers, Mr. Labuschagne also was under mandate of the Gili 
Group of Companies, which means that he is also working for the developers of the 
Goodhouse Project64. The management communicated through Mr. Labuschagne in the 
conflicts (i.e. documents between the Transformation Committee and the management), while 
he at the same time was representing one side of the group of beneficiaries. This further 
increased the frustration in the community.  
6.4 Accountability 
Accountability is by Rhodes defined as “holding individuals responsible for their actions by a 
clear allocation of responsibilities and clearly defined roles” (Rhodes 1997: 48). Hyden and 
Court adds to this that one should also, as an accountable actor that promotes ‘good 
governance’ be “responsive to public demand” (Hyden and Court 2002: 27). Promoting clear 
responsibilities and roles also demands a management organisation with levels of 
transparency towards their employees, but also the environment in general. A high level of 
transparency refers to openness and satisfactory information and creates trust between 
management and workers and also within the group of workers. Jan Froestad suggests that 
‘Playing with open cards’ and offering information about relevant political and social 
processes “is an adjacent strategy to reduce staff insecurity, and to build a managerial 
reputation for being honest and open”65. I will look at accountability in the projects through 
the documents I have on the organisation in the projects, research by Kleinbooi et al, 
communication between actors in the Goodhouse project and the information I have gathered 
through interviews. Further the concept of accountability will be measured through 
responsibility taken by the management and clearly defined roles.  
 
The Vuki project is organised around two legal entities; Vuki Trust and Vuki Farming (Pty) 
Ltd. Vuki Trust is the owner of all the fixed property and land on the farm and is the only 
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64 Submission to Transformation Committee of Steinkopf, Northern Cape from Mr. Labuschagne – SPP files   
65 Unpublished paper Jan Froestad: “Can Trust be Managed within Formal Organizations? Lessons drawn from a 
Study of a Municipal Health Agency in the Western Cape Province, South Africa”.  
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shareholder in the operating company. The Trust is run by seven elected trustees. The Vuki 
Farming (Pty) Ltd is the main source of funding by the trust and it has appointed directors 
which are responsible for the corporate governance of the farming operation. The operation is 
further managed by using a consultative management forum that consists of seven managers 
in various fields of expertise which are further supported by technical consultants66. Vuki has 
developed a model of organisation that has worked well. In fact, because of their well 
rumoured management structure, they were approached by the people that bought one of the 
neighbouring farms, South Hill, and asked to manage and run the farm for them (Interview 
Mr. van Jaarsveld 17.07.2008). However, as mentioned, there has been some dissatisfaction 
amongst the farmers in that they think it is too big a difference between the former workers 
that now are managers and the farm workers. Interviewing Jan Witbooi, who is part of the 
management team, he emphasised the importance of separating between workers and 
management: “It’s a very difficult thing because if you go partnership with your workers 
always remember that workers is not business-people. The workers is workers. Farm workers. 
And, you can’t expect from farm-workers to be (…) business-men. And to be marketers” 
(Interview Mr. Witbooi 28.05.2008). Consequently, the management takes the main 
responsibility in running the farm, and the workers do not have a direct impact on the 
managing of the farm. Witbooi explains it this way: “when you own a thing everyone they 
want a cut off it. You see. And if your management is not good enough then the next year 
there is nothing. And that’s the problem. That’s why I said we as…directors in the 
management team we run the business side of the Vuki Trust. And Vuki Trust is the only 
owner of the business. We must see that there’s enough money to run the business. And… 
then your mentor must foresee that there’s no misconducts (….) I think that’s the success of 
Vuki” (Interview Mr. Witbooi 28.05.2008).   
 
Further, there seems to have been openness concerning plans, communication and the running 
of the organisation. This is most apparent by the fact that they have several consultants 
coming in every month to make sure that “the business is running smoothly, the money is 
spending wisely” (Interview Mr. Witbooi 28.05.2008). In fact, Kleinbooi, Tom and Lahiff 
(2006) states that what is central to the success at Vuki is part their extensive involvement of 
skilled consultants (p. 66). Further they propose that this aspect should maybe be more 
emphasised in land reform projects in general. Moreover, the management has a close 
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cooperation with government institutions and the municipality when it comes to using their 
agencies for support mechanism like training, advice etc. However, the production manager at 
the farm emphasised that they had no aspiration of getting into too close relations with the 
government agencies; “…the government with all the legislation make it much (…) difficult 
for you” (Interview Mr. Witbooi 28.05.2008). Anyway, all though there are no formal bonds 
as in permanent formal meetings etc between the government agencies and the Vuki Farm, it 
seems to be openness between the management and its surrounding environment towards the 
municipality and provincial government. When it comes to openness towards the farm 
workers, this seems to be in place through the routes of co-determination that has been 
established, furthermore there is a deed of trust which describes how the Trust is to be 
managed, how often there should be meetings between the beneficiaries of the Trust, rules for 
payments to beneficiaries etc67. Through these clear guidelines and a general meeting once a 
year I got the impression that there are high degrees of transparency in the group. Moreover, 
due to the fact that the group of permanent workers contains few people, it is quite easy to 
keep control over what is happening within the group, if there are any conflicts etc. Also, 
since all the permanent farmers at Vuki are co-owners of the land and beneficiaries of the 
Vuki Trust, it does demand a level of openness and communication when it comes to 
processes and management of the farm.  
 
Moreover, the workers receive benefits as beneficiaries of the trust. There have been 
established an evening school where one may have schooling in literacy. There are also 
courses in computer literacy. In addition there is a nursery, first-aid clinic, aftercare, health 
facilities, possibilities for agricultural training and the workers may obtain interest-free credit 
to use specified doctors. There is undoubtedly a value in the long-term benefits for the 
beneficiaries of the Vuki Trust when it comes to social benefits, employment, housing and 
participation in decision-making (Kleinbooi et al 2006: 31).  The majority of the workers (21) 
with their families live rent-free on the farm, and the ones that do not live on the farm area 
receive a housing allowance of R100 per month and free transport to the farm. Over 20 
houses have been refurbished since 2002 and the workers are given a certain amount of free 
electricity per month which is paid by the farm (Interview Mr. Witbooi 28.05.2008, Interview 
Mr. van Jaarsveld 17.07.2008). There is a media centre with computers available for the 
workers and their dependants free of charge and a number of bursaries have been given to 
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family members of the workers so they may attend tertiary institutions. Moreover, there is 
established a pensions fund, funeral policy and disability policy (Kleinbooi et al 2006). Thus, 
although there has been expressed some dissatisfaction among the farmers due to the 
difference between the former farmers in management and the ones that still work the land, 
there are clear roles of conduct in the organisation and the management takes responsibility 
for running the business sustainably and also for improving the social aspects of the 
beneficiaries’ lives through improved housing, schooling etc.  
 
At Goodhouse, NOCAL (Pty) Ltd was a partnership between Gili Greenworld Holdings and 
Variety Holdings, with Gil Arbel as owner of the former, and Andre Hendricks as holder of 
the latter. These two companies had each 50 percent shares in NOCAL. Further, the 
Goodhouse Agricultural Corporation (Pty) Ltd was established. Gili Greenworld had 26 
percent of the shares in the corporation. That left the farmers with 74 percent in which the 
Northern Cape Provincial Government had a 20 percent share on behalf of the farmers68. 
However, going through the business plans and proposals for the project, the set-up of the 
ownership and how much percent ownership the different stakeholders have in the two 
companies varies quite a lot. The suggestion in the proposal however was for the managers to 
control the business for five years, or until the farmers themselves were ready to take over the 
daily managing of the company. Looking at the proposal for the Goodhouse project, there 
seems to be a high degree of accountability from the management. They have covered most 
areas of development, set up a model for communication etc69. However, most of the 
promises in the business plan were not followed up.  
 
Transparency was one of the major issues at Goodhouse. The management did not show 
much openness towards government institutions or the Goodhouse community. First of all, 
Mr. Arbel who was one of the developers and proposers of the Goodhouse Paprika Project 
also did the feasibility studies in the area. Thus, he overemphasised the positive contributions 
of the project and did not consult any of the local inhabitants in Goodhouse or the surrounding 
area when it comes to climate and suitability to grow paprika etc. Mr. May with the SPP and 
Mr. Smith at the LRC were both sceptical as to how the project got accepted under these 
dubious and in fact illegal circumstances. Mr. May states that “political mingling” between 
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the developers and some government officials was apparent in all stages of the project. 
Secondly there was a lack of information and communication between the management and 
the governmental institutions involved in the project through extensive funding and grants; 
“currently it seems as if Provincial Government is playing a very limited role. They are not 
involved in project development planning, implementation or monitoring”70. Further, when 
the paprika factory opened, it was decided that there should be a forum where the developers 
and, amongst others, the NamaKhoi municipality were supposed to discuss issues concerning 
the project, something that did not take place. Mr. van Wyk goes on saying that he feels that 
the main reason for the frustration that emerged was poor communication between NamaKhoi 
and the project managers, and also that “the lack of a clear project plan with a clear 
development path and a clear role for the municipality contributes to the frustration”71. In 
addition there were not much openness between the management and the farmers at 
Goodhouse; “it wasn’t very transparent, I mean they didn’t provide people adequate 
information” (Interview Mr. May 11.12.2008). The management gave varying degrees of 
information to the different farmers in the project; it seems like they were choosing some 
farmers to be part of the “in-group” while some of them were left out; “So...I also think the 
relationship between the management and (…) the people on the ground were unequal, and 
totally…in terms of information” (Interview Mr. May 11.12.2008). Further, the management 
made many promises, like easy market access in the proposal for the project, which they did 
not manage to keep. The market access and extended export of paprika did not work as 
planned; “And I mean also the demand for paprika that say... he72 said it was such a big 
demand but it wasn’t, and also the price of…everything was inflated and in the end they had a 
big problem, I mean they produced all this paprika, but they couldn’t sell it” (Interview Mr. 
May 11.12.2008). This fact might also have damaged the trust-relations between the 
management and the farmers while the managers made several promises that they could not 
keep. In example there were a proposal of an extensive Human Resources Management with 
committees concentrating on disciplinary matters, training, welfare, employment and sports 
and recreation. In a letter from J.F van Wyk, an MP at the parliament to F.M Dipico, at that 
time Premier of the Northern Cape Province, in July 2003, he addresses the lack of exactly 
these factors that the managers emphasise so clearly in the proposal. Amongst other things he 
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states that there is put too much stress on the economic development “with very little 
emphasis on social development and human resource development”73. This is merely one 
example amongst many issues in the proposal that was not followed up by the management at 
Goodhouse. This shows a clear lack of accountability in the Goodhouse management, which 
is further highlighted by the fact that they finally just abandoned the project, leaving the 
farmers in the community with huge debts.  
6.6 Main Findings 
Going through the variables chosen for analysing trust within the two groups of beneficiaries, 
I arrive at this model: 
Model 4: Main Findings on Trust in the Cases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is a clear pattern of poor trust within the Goodhouse community, and also a lack of 
trustworthiness towards the management in the project. Some key differences between the 
two projects are the clear roles of the members in addition to strong norms and rules and 
openness within the groups. Both groups had a relatively small amount of members, and more 
importantly according to the theories I have applied, there were strong links between them 
based on the fact that they had known each other and lived and worked within the same 
communities for generations. When it comes to social cohesion, both groups seemed like 
strong groups in that they all wanted to work together to reach their common goals in the 
projects. One of the main differences here may have been the fact that the Vuki-farmers 
‘escaped’ a situation of dependence towards the previous owners and Government agencies 
(as liquidators) and moved towards their goal of independence and having a 100 percent 
ownership of the land and the farm they had been working at for years. In Goodhouse, the 
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Variables Goodhouse Vuki 
History of the 
Communities 
Been living together as a 
community for generations 
Been farming together as a 
community for the Hall 
family before they 
purchased the farm land 
Social Cohesion Two fractions Strong 
Participation Through Representatives Direct 
Accountability  Weak Strong 
Levels of trust Inadequate Adequate 
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farmers went into a co-owner arrangement with several powerful actors involved. What was 
meant to be a project of social upliftment, became a struggle between the different 
stakeholders in terms of how to reach their goals, which as far as I can see did not correlate 
well. When saying that they had a larger degree of social cohesion in the beginning of the 
project, I refer to how all actors, both governmental, developers and farmers were optimistic 
in terms of the project in the initial period. They all showed great trust in that this project 
would be successful, manifested in i.e. money spent, funding and attendance.  However, when 
the initial optimistic period came to an end, it came to show that the means in which people 
wanted to reach these goals differed. The farmers got a marginal percentage of ownership and 
the government agencies were to some extent excluded from the running of the project, all 
though they had invested huge amounts of capital. Among other things this resulted in the 
conflict between the farmers, and I would say, a growing mistrust towards the management 
based on “a former trust destroyed” (Sztompka 1999).  
 
Both groups of farmers had the opportunity to participate. At Goodhouse there were set up a 
system of participation which was based on representatives from the groups of farmers in the 
various areas of production. At Vuki, the only system of formal participation that I could trace 
was the annual Trust meetings. However, although the system for participation seemed better 
organised at Goodhouse, the result bears no trace of this. It seems like the farmers disagreed 
to such an extent, that most meetings between them have been disturbed by this fact, and 
hence the participation towards the managing of the project has been interrupted. When it 
comes to accountability, the management at Vuki Farm shows a great responsibility towards 
their community of farmers. They have focussed especially on areas of conflict management 
and social rewards, something that may in turn have increased their level of trustworthiness 
and therefore the level of trust and confidence shown by the farmers towards the management. 
Of course, this being an organisation where almost all of the people74 involved are part of the 
beneficiary group, makes the situation extraordinary; a content group of farmers that work 
efficiently will benefit everyone. At Goodhouse the accountability showed by management 
towards the farmers when it comes to social incentives etc. was not impressive. However, it 
seems like the managements’ main focus has been to make the business profitable, and that 
they expected the government to take care of monitoring and evaluating the project in terms 
of how the community functioned together and also in terms of social incentives. The task 
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was highly disregarded by all parties. Transparency is important in creating a relation of trust 
between, in this case, the farmers and the management. When one gets an adequate amount of 
information about the processes within the organisation one is part of, it is easier to predict 
the future, and one may rely on confidence in role structures, expert knowledge and standard 
operation procedures; “when we think we can predict the outcome of social interactions, trust 
is superfluous”75. At Goodhouse, the future was hard to predict for most actors involved, as 
the management did not reveal much information and further broke several of the promises 
they made to several of the parties involved.  
 
Going through documents and talking to involved actors it seems as though the trust and 
strong links between the farmers was enough to make the Vuki-farmers get together and 
manage the farm on their own. Thus, the strong links and social capital that was already 
apparent in this group was fruitful for further communal problem solving. The management 
further emphasised the autonomy of the project through not being too closely linked towards 
Government agencies and managing their finances through commercial banks. Moreover they 
have showed a degree of trustworthiness through working closely with consultants. 
Kleinbooi, Tom and Lahiff (2006) state in their report from the area that central to the success 
of Vuki is “a radical restructuring of all aspects of the operation and the ability to raise (and 
repay) capital from commercial sources, through the involvement of skilled managers and 
consultants” (p. 66). Further they propose that this is what separates Vuki from other land 
reform projects in the area, and also that these aspects should be more emphasised in the land 
reform programme in general (Kleinbooi et al 2006: 66).  In the Goodhouse-case the farmers 
were sidelined and they did not have much power over their own situation, therefore the 
strong links and trust within the community did not make much of a difference for the 
production and communal problem solving. The conflict that evolved between the two groups 
of farmers made the situation worse, as one group was “with” the management and 
consequently the other one was pushed further away. Further the farmers were not included 
much in the shaping and the running of the project, while Nocal was supposed to build the 
project for them and make it profitable before the farmers themselves could take over. Hence 
there is a great difference in the level of autonomy of the groups of farmers in the two 
projects. 
                                                 
75 Unpublished paper Jan Froestad: “Can Trust be Managed within Formal Organizations? Lessons drawn from a 
Study of a Municipal Health Agency in the Western Cape Province, South Africa”. 
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Chapter 7:  The Character of Authority Intervention  
Research on social capital in terms of collective efficacy and problem solving has emphasised 
the role of formal institutions in reducing transaction costs, and also in enabling the actors to 
effectively overcome problems within the groups, like opportunism and ‘free riding’ (Putnam 
1993: 166). Transaction costs in this context are cost of monitoring and enforcing agreements. 
As mentioned, at a macro-level we have laws and regulations to safeguard smooth 
coexistence i.e. in the public sphere. With small groups of people cooperating together, there 
is a need for additional regulations so there are common norms and regulations which are 
agreed upon by the group members. These norms and regulations promote efficient collective 
action and avoid free-riding, and also that opportunists will be punished. Further, the benefits 
of social capital and collective efficacy in a group will be limited unless there is also a degree 
of trust towards other institutions and actors, which in this context constitutes the institutions 
and organisations related to land reform. As mentioned in the previous chapter describing the 
context of my research, ‘The New South Africa’, the country may be characterised as a low-
trust society due to the issues following years of ethnic segregation and the migrant worker- 
structure during the Apartheid regime. This inevitably also affects the delivery of land reform 
i.e. through the racism and distrust between the farmers and the government, but also within 
the agricultural communities with white commercial farmers and the African small-scale 
farmers. This is an ongoing issue which in turn also may have been one of the reasons for the 
slow progress in the land reform programme76. According to Seligman (1997), in a society 
where there is an unequal delivery of public goods, which the majority of South Africans has 
been deprived of, and a lack of trust in others and the public, there will be little confidence. 
Without this confidence in other actors, “all contracts, promises, and obligations – whether 
economic, social or political, public or private – can only be maintained by third-party 
enforcers” (Seligman 1997: 4). The purpose of this third party is to be a neutral law-giver that 
both, or several, parties can rely on and trust in arranging their cooperation and creating rules 
and norms for them to follow. Moreover the third party enforcers, in this context the land 
state77, are supposed to secure the established contracts that have been settled.  
 
                                                 
76SPP “why do the landless remain landless”  
77 The state organisations the Government has set up to implement land reform (Gran 2006), meaninig the 
National and Provincial DoA and DLA, in addition to the Local municipalities.   
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Knut Dahl Jacobsen has analysed the Norwegian agricultural state system that went through 
major changes the last 40 years of the 19th century. He goes through some aspects of the 
relationship between the agricultural state systems’ relations towards the clients, the farmers, 
and the political system, Stortinget and the Government. In going through this development 
he integrates the actor-decision theory in his analysis of the relationship between the officials 
and the clients and how it affects the implementations of decisions made at the central level of 
the agricultural state system. Jacobsen made use of two dimensions in order to look at this; 
the reciprocal expectations between officials and clients in how the decisions were to be made 
(who makes the decisions), and the reciprocal expectations between officials and clients in 
terms of the outline of the decisions, how the parts were held to the decision made (is the 
decision made by the official deciding something, does he give assistance or instructions, and 
does he hold sanctions). Further he made a model based on these two dimensions:  
 
Model 5: Relation between officials and clients according to the decisions’ initiation and 
commitment level.   
 
The decision’s level of commitment 
         
                                                                                  Assistance,                           Force, 
                                                                                   Ascertainment              Instruction 
   The initiative of the decision             Official 
   lies with                                             
                                                              Client 
 
(Jacobsen 1978: 58) 
 
From this model, Jacobsen postulates two ideal models of categories of official-roles; ‘the 
educator’ and ‘the service provider’78. The former was a temporary figure in the beginning of 
the agricultural reform in Norway and is characterised by field-specific knowledge and the 
spreading of this knowledge to the clients; “the educator’s business must first and foremost be 
based on creating interest in the knowledge of the field that he holds and keeping this interest 
alive. His pedagogic qualifications therefore are equally or more important than his field-
                                                 
78 Translated from his Norwegian terms ’Folkelæreren’ and ’Tjenesteyteren’.  
a b 
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knowledge. The aim for the educator is to get the client to accept certain basic views or 
values, and this in turn demands preaching, agitation” (Jacobsen 1978: 63). Further, the 
educator neither can oblige people to become clients nor count on their voluntary 
participation. He himself must take initiative and the subsistence of the relationships he 
creates is dependent upon his ability to convince the client that the relationship will be useful 
and give him something in return (ibid: 63). With the establishment of a state-institution of 
assistance in Norway in 1854-55, the role-decision dimensions changed. A principal of 
voluntariness was implemented, which in turn meant that the officials should only assist the 
farmers that singlehandedly asked for aid. Hence, their role as officials now became less 
accountable in implementing changes in the clients and more bureaucratic and 
professionalized. This development was appropriate, juxtaposed the liberalistic view of the 
state and its responsibilities, and also the process of bureaucratization of the Norwegian state 
system. Furthermore, this provided the principal of the changes its strength. Following these 
changes there also developed a justified unequal treatment of the clientele. The principal of 
voluntariness itself was part in pushing this tendency forward, and moreover the service 
provider was especially well fitted for servicing the clientele that was of high society and 
therefore had the necessary information and capital to access the agricultural state system and 
its professionals (Jacobsen 1978).   
 
What is more, Jacobsen looks at two different foundations of legitimacy in making 
bureaucratic decisions. Firstly, one may have legitimacy in that the person making the 
decision has a position that gives him the right to interfere in other peoples’ business within 
the field in question. Jacobsen names this the authoritative persons’ legitimacy. Secondly, one 
may have legitimacy based on specific technical knowledge on the field in question, which 
the person will make use of with the clients’ interest in mind. This may be called the experts’ 
reason for legitimacy, and according to Talcott Parsons this legitimacy depends “entirely on 
securing…voluntary consent” (ibid: 78). This analytical divide between expertise and 
authority cuts across the two dimensions of public decisions that creates the four kinds of 
relations between public officials and clients pictured in the model above. In all of the four 
types of relations the foundation for legitimacy may be authority, expertise or both. However, 
Jacobsen postulates that there are certain empirical circumstances where the two types of 
legitimacy are conducted. This in turn indicates that in relations where force and instruction 
are used in the relations between client and official, the basis for legitimacy is authority. 
Further, where assistance and ascertainment is describing the relations, the bases for 
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legitimacy in the decisions made are expertise (ibid: 78). Going through the data I have 
gathered on the two land reform projects, these notions are very describing of the differences 
in the relationships the farmers had towards the land state officials. The Vuki Farm in the 
Western Cape had a relationship towards the land state officials that was legitimised by 
expertise, while it seems like the Goodhouse project’s relationship with the Northern Cape 
land state officials was more coloured by authority. However, is this something that is 
describing for the provinces’ land administrations in general? 
 
The implementation strategies for land redistribution in South Africa vary across provinces 
due to factors as different needs, institutional capacity, priorities, land prices and provincial 
dynamics. As decided by the DLA, the delivery of land reform occurs at district level and is 
supposed to be based on the various needs and priorities in the area. In addition, the province 
and local offices are supposed to develop individual business plans and budgets. However 
there have been developed some overarching strategies for the land reform programme as a 
whole, i.e. improving beneficiary participation, standardising processes, procedures and 
information requirements for land reform products, changing the product mix to better suit the 
needs of the beneficiaries etc. (Levin 2000: 73). Thorvald Gran (2006) has performed studies 
on land reform delivery in South Africa, and the Northern- and the Western Cape specifically. 
He proposes that the lack of powerful external demands from rural social and political 
movements may be part in explaining the tendency to assign high importance to the land 
reform at national levels, while not giving resources and status to actually implement the 
policies at local levels. Moreover, the land bureaucracy has not experienced much pressure 
from Government to develop or expand its competence in supporting new small-scale farmers 
on private or communal land.  This in turn may suggest a loose coupling between the different 
levels of the Government, or that implementing policies becomes more difficult the farther 
one moves from national to local level; “the farther down the denser is the historical legacy, 
the more difficult is innovation and change” (Gran 2006: 132). Gran goes on suggesting that 
the kind of ‘local sclerosis’ that can be witnessed at the local levels within the country’s land 
administration may be devastating in countries like South Africa which are going through 
changes from authoritarian to democratic rule, and moreover that “without external demands 
land reform can deteriorate to a welfare programme (grants) combined with a specialised 
programme for support to some black commercial farmers (LRAD)” (ibid: 163).  
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Gran states that the DoA in the Northern Cape seemed less professional and less 
representative of occupations than the same department in the Western Cape Province. 
Jacobsen proposes that lack of technical knowledge or expertise often leads state officials to 
depend on authority rather than expertise in their decisions. This in turn may lead to less 
assistance and more force and instructions in the relationship between the officials and their 
clientele. Hence, Gran’s data does to a certain degree confirm that the differences in 
relationships towards government officials in the two cases I have looked into, may be 
describing for the provinces and the culture with their officials in general. Gran goes on 
saying that this may mean that the department in the Northern Cape could be weaker, less 
embedded in society and has relatively frail autonomy. Hence, it may be a department which 
is more prone to bend and follow external power and authority. The Western Cape DoA is an 
established and large institution, and according to Gran, more difficult to influence from the 
Cabinet. Further increasing these differences in the two provinces, is the fact that the Northern 
Cape is an ANC-ruled province, while the Democratic Alliance (DA) is in power in the 
Western Cape. Gran states that the Western Cape-regime is perhaps somewhat less interested 
in change of the basic land policy than the Northern Cape due to political power and influence 
from national level (Gran 2006). Through questioning a selection of bureaucrats and 
politicians in the two provinces, he found that the two land administrations were struggling to 
adjust to the new political ANC-regime in the country. However, the impression of the land 
administration in both provinces was that they were trying to be loyal to and understand the 
demands of the Government, but that they on the other hand are fragmented and internally 
have a chaotic system.  
 
Since both cases I look into are land reform projects with involvement from the state 
agencies, I will focus on the government institutions participation in planning and 
implementing the land reform programme related to the two cases. Thus, I look at what kind 
of assistance and support, if any, the two projects have received from the state. Further, I want 
to find out whether different kinds of support will be deciding for the outcome of the cases; 
will projects which receive wide assistance be more successful? Moreover, what kind of 
assistance have they received? May this be linked towards Jacobsen’s model of official-client 
relationships, and has it had any effect on the outcome? I will investigate my cases in terms of 
relationship towards state officials through looking more closely at what exactly the projects 
have received in terms of support from the involved government institutions. I have chosen to 
divide this into two ‘periods’ of the projects, launching and post-settlement. Hence, I do not 
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wish to point out what the different agencies may have done right or wrong during the 
establishing of the projects per se, but rather look at what kind of assistance they offer, and 
what possible effects it has had on the two cases. I will look at this through contracts between 
the projects and the government agencies, business-plans, interviews, statements from NGOs 
and other organisations working in the related areas, communication between stakeholders in 
the projects and previous research.  
7.1 Launching the project 
In ‘launching the project’ I refer to what kind of assistance the projects received prior to 
starting their production. In the case of Vuki, I refer to the period before the farmers gained 
full ownership of the farm land in October 2005, and in case of Goodhouse before the 
production started in March 2003. The criteria I have set to measure are the degree of support 
through financial support as loans and grants and ‘other assistance’ in starting up the projects. 
In both cases I have got hold of various contracts between government institutions like DLA 
and Land Bank which are the main financial contributors in supporting projects financially 
after they have been approved. I will therefore make use of these in looking at support, but in 
addition I use interviews, documents of communication between various actors, and previous 
research.  
 
Both projects have been approved by government which is essential in order to gain land and 
grants. The Vuki farmers were already farming the land, but did not own it, and therefore 
needed the Land Bank’s approval, as the liquidators, in order to buy the farm. The remaining 
farmers from the Whitehall Farm established the Vuki Trust and were approved for the 
LRAD-grants in 2004 when they bought and took over the farm area. The grants came to 
R3 100 960, or R77 524 per person. In addition they received a LRAD planning grant of 
R465 14479. What is more, the farmers also received SLAG-grants from the DLA in 1998 
when they were still in joint venture with the Hall-family and had established the ‘Whitehall 
Farming Trust’. 90 percent of the farmers at this point, 121 persons, were part of the trust, and 
through the SLAG grants each of them received R16 000 each, which amounted to R1.936 
million (Kleinbooi et al 2006: 26).  
 
                                                 
79 SPP-files 
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At Goodhouse the farmers resided on the land as a community and were entitled to the land 
through Act 9 policies. The Northern Cape Provincial Government hired the developers in 
Variety Holdings and Gili Greenworld to start up the project at Goodhouse. The farmers at 
Goodhouse received a LRAD grant of R5.5 million, or R100 000 each. In addition they were 
given R52 196 000 in loans from the Department of Agriculture, Land Reform and 
Environment in the Northern Cape Province, and R49 430 000 from the Land Bank. In the 
latter, R40 480 000 was a medium term loan, R5 250 000 was a production loan and R 
3 700 000 was an instalment sale finance loan80. However, these loans were for starting up 
production, building the irrigation systems etc., not for purchasing the land as with the Vuki 
Trust. The farmers gained a limited ownership of the production company, while the land was 
still in the States’ possession and the developers got a big share in the company. According to 
Mr. May with the Springbok SPP offices, the land at Goodhouse was in the Land Banks’ 
possession for an agreed period of 25 years (Interview Mr. May 11.12.2008). This was 
something that the developers and some of the farmers did not agree with, while they wanted 
the Goodhouse Production Company to gain ownership over the farm land.  
 
The Vuki farmers deliberately did not take up many loans from public institutions, neither 
when they bought in with the Hall family in the late 90s, nor when they purchased 100 
percent ownership in 2005. In 1998 they borrowed R14.8 million from the Independent 
Development Trust (R2 million), the Development Bank of South Africa (R3.8 million) and 
Standard Bank (R9 million) in order to purchase 50 percent of the shares in the Whitehall 
Farm. However the Standard Bank component was later taken over by the Land Bank 
(Kleinbooi et al 2006: 26).  Afterwards, when they rented the farm from the liquidators they 
obtained a further seasonal loan from the Land Bank of R3.1 million. Finally when the Vuki 
Farmers bought the land, the Vuki Trust obtained loans from the Absa Bank and the Land 
Bank. From Absa they obtained three separate loans, amounting to R11.5 million81. The 
LRAD-grants were used to reduce the debt to the Absa Bank (ibid: 28). Mr. Witbooi suggests 
that the limited financial support from state institutions is one of the major factors of their 
success. “Yah, the first thing is we bought…brought money to buy the farm. That’s the first 
thing. You see when you, when you buy a farm with (…) states money, then there’s trouble. 
                                                 
80 Signed Agreement between the Department of Agriculture, Land Reform and Environment in the Northern 
Cape Province and Nocal and EDUGAIN 62. SPP- files.   
81 Letters from Absa Bank to the Directors of the Trust conferming the loans, 26th of July 2004. DLA-files.  
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Because the state must give you money to buy the farm, and give a little bit…for the running 
cost for the first year, and the second year and the third year, that’s when the trouble come in. 
But when you buy a farm and you (…) brought money from the commercial banks, then you 
know you must pay the bank, and if you want grants from the government then you can 
apply” (Interview Mr. Witbooi 28.05.2008). This relates to the restricted amount one receive 
in government grants and how one often must be huge groups and pool the grants in order to 
have enough capital to be able to run a commercial farm production. Witbooi also mentioned 
in the interview how the government with all their legislations makes it difficult to run a farm, 
and that is why they have preferred to do their own thing and not rely too much on 
Government (Interview Mr. Witbooi 28.05.2008).  
 
However, the Vuki farmers actively made use of government institutions in order to buy the 
farm land from the liquidators. The production manager at the farm, Mr. Witbooi, was part of 
the district council for over six years and also served under the Theewaterskloof Municipality 
for three and a half years (Interview Mr. Witbooi 28.05.2008). Hence, the management has 
got connections within the local and provincial government institutions. In fact, Mr. van 
Jaarsveld with the Ministry of Agriculture in Cape Town was one of the state actors that were 
approached by Mr. Witbooi with the management at Vuki. Mr. van Jaarsveld supported the 
Vuki farmers and helped them set up meetings with various governmental agencies, a process 
he say went on for about a year before the Vuki farmers were able to purchase the land from 
the liquidators. He further describes this period of about a year as an ‘upwards battle’. 
However, they managed to get different “prominent people” to come see the project, and van 
Jaarsveld points out Mr. Jerry Arries, deputy director for farmer settlement and development 
with the DLA in Stellenbosch, as one of the involved actors who was very helpful (Interview 
Mr. van Jaarsveld 17.07.2008). In addition, by reading through the Stellenbosch DLAs’ files 
on Vuki, one finds several letters from the Vuki farmers, represented by the management, to 
various prominent actors within land reform in the country, i.e. the at that time Minister of 
Agriculture and Land Affairs, Thoko Didiza82, but also several letters from engaged actors 
within the system promoting the project and urging that the Vuki Trust should be able to take 
over the farm land.  
 
                                                 
82 Letter from Tshapile with the Vuki management to the Minister 18.08.2004. DLA files 
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At Goodhouse, the situation was rather the opposite, while it was the provincial Government 
that hired the developers in order to get the project started. Due to this and also the fact that 
the Provincial Government invested rather substantial amounts of funding and capital into the 
project, there was one representative from the DoA in the board of Directors at Goodhouse. 
Hence, the Goodhouse project was a private-public partnership, where the Provincial 
Government to a large degree was involved. However, the cooperation did not work as 
planned partly while the meetings and planned sharing of information between the 
management and the government did not take place. While I did not manage to get hold of 
any comments from the departments within the Northern Cape Provincial Government nor the 
NamaKhoi Municipality, I do not have sufficient data to make any assumption on their part 
when it comes to this cooperation. However, the Goodhouse area is under the administration 
of STC. The STC have since the initial planning periods of the project at Goodhouse been 
quite active in terms of communication with the NOCAL Company and the developers and 
have followed the process carefully with help from SPP and LRC. They expressed their 
scepticism towards the lay-out of the project both in the initial phases, but also after it started 
production, i.e. through requesting support to hire an agricultural economist to give guidance 
and advice concerning the assessing of the business plan and future implementation of the 
project83.  
  
Consequently, a major difference between the two cases, besides ownership of land versus 
private-public partnership, is the communication between government institutions and the 
project management. At Vuki, the management used their contacts within government in 
order to purchase the liquidated farm land; a time consuming bottom-up process. In addition 
they use the DoA at Elsenburg for training and advice; as expertise. In addition they have 
employed expert consultants to assist them. At Goodhouse on the other hand, it seems as 
though the process was top-down based and authoritative from the beginning. The 
government departments, STC and the Managers have discussed their differences of opinion 
while the farmers to a large degree have been sidelined, and have not been consulted. Harry 
May with the SPP in Springbok also emphasise this, and calls it ‘political mingling’, 
something that he states has coloured the whole process at Goodhouse (Interview Mr. May 
11.12.2008).  
                                                 
83 Letter from Johnny Cloete, Chairperson of the STC, to Mr. Fandeso executive director at the Land Bank. 
14.March 2002. SPP-files.  
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7.2 Post settlement support   
With post-settlement support I refer to if there has been any support in terms of monitoring, 
evaluation or direct support after the projects got started. I will divide this in to variables of 
training, post-settlement financial support and monitoring and evaluation. After the farmers 
through land reform funding have settled on the farm land, the DoA is responsible for post-
settlement support through grants like the Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme 
(CASP)-grants. Thus, in addition to making use of the same data as in ‘launching the project’, 
I will make use of documents and agreements between DoA and the established businesses.   
 
At Vuki they get training programmes from Elsenburg, the Provincial DoA in the Western 
Cape, which some of the farmers has made use of. In addition they have established their own 
schools with various courses and further they fund tertiary education. Also, there have been 
established a relationship with the Department of Health in the Province. According to Mr. 
van Jaarsveld, there are facilities at the farm where representatives from the Department come 
a couple of timed per month to tend to the Vuki farmers and their families’ health (Interview 
Mr. van Jaarsveld 17.07.2008). Further, they have been funded with CASP-grants through the 
DoA. The grants came to R1.1 million and were used for new machinery at the farm 
(Interview Mr. Witbooi. 28.05.2008, Kleinbooi et. al. 2006). Accordingly, although the Vuki 
Trust has to a large degree taken care of post-settlement benefits as housing, education etc., 
they have contacted and received help from government agencies when it comes to post-
settlement funding, health care and training. I do not know how much monitoring there have 
been from the government side after the farmers became owners of the farm area, but there 
seems to be much awareness in the government institutions about the project, most likely 
because it is such a great success in terms of land reform. According to Mr. van Jaarsveld 
with the Ministry of Agriculture, in the Western Cape Province the various actors involved in 
land reform have started cooperating across the institutions and have formed a committee 
called ‘Land Reform Coordinating Committee’ which consists of DLA, DoA, Ministry of 
Agriculture, Land Bank and other actors involved with financing projects . In this way they 
hope to be able to “speed up the whole Land Reform process. But also to work in a much 
more coordinated way, in terms of projects” (Interview Mr. van Jaarsveld. 17.07.2008). In 
addition he mentions how the departments may benefit from sharing information and using 
each others expertise in order to establish more sustainable projects. However, referring to 
Gran’s data on the land administration in the two provinces, there is a lack of integration 
between the levels and departments of government, leading to distrust and even enmity 
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between the actors (Gran 2006: 163). Accordingly, the cooperating across department-borders 
was mentioned by Mr. May with the SPP as a lack in the overall land reform process in the 
Northern Cape Province. However, the cooperation is a good initiative, but whether it will be 
fruitful or even feasible remains to show.  
 
There have been provided training for the farmers by the Northern Cape DoA, but as in the 
case of Vuki, the farmers were used to working with farming as they had been living and 
farming as a community in Goodhouse for generations. However, there were no specific 
training provided in terms of growing paprika which was new for all of them (Interview Mr. 
May. 11.12.2008). Further, all though the Provincial Government in some ways was very 
much involved in terms of having representatives in the Board of Directors and urging more 
formal meetings with the management, they did not do much concerning the farmers and 
post-settlement support. Mr. van Wyk with the parliament writes in a letter to the Premier of 
the Northern Cape Province; “currently it seems as if Provincial Government is playing a very 
limited role. They are not involved in project development planning, implementation or 
monitoring. From discussing with MEC Dawid Rooi it is clear that he also is very frustrated 
about the way in which things are going at Goodhouse”84. Moreover, he states that “Instead of 
being partners the project management and municipalities act like opposing parties, which is 
not good for the project. This contributes frustration on both sides”85. Hence, neither the 
Provincial Government nor the municipality was ‘let in’ the project, which in turn has 
affected the lives of the beneficiaries and eventually was part in the collapse of the project 
which left the farmers at Goodhouse without employment and in huge debts. Mr. van 
Jaarsveld with the Ministry of Agriculture propose this lack of cooperation and assistance 
from anyone outside land reform projects as one of the reasons for the high degree of failures 
in land reform projects; “Most of your failures are people who want to take the thing, say we 
can do it, we don’t need your assistance, we know how to do it. And then, somewhere along 
the line they sort of, you know, just fail in their effort. I think that’s what, that’s probably one 
of the main reasons” (Interview Mr. van Jaarsveld. 17.07.2008). On the other hand the lack of 
cooperation may also be an effect of the lack of trust with Government institutions in the 
                                                 
84 Letter from van Mr. Wyk, National Assembly to Mr. Dipico MPL, Premier of Northern Cape Province 10.July 
2003.  
85 Letter from van Mr. Wyk, National Assembly to Mr. Dipico MPL, Premier of Northern Cape Province 10.July 
2003. 
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country as mentioned earlier. Regardless, the farmers at Goodhouse received no post-
settlement support as far as I could find, besides training from government institutions. 
7.3 Main Findings 
In terms of what I wanted to measure in this chapter, I arrive at this model based on assistance 
with launching the projects and the following post-settlement support:  
 
Model 6: Main Findings on Character of Intervention in the Cases 
 
Variables Goodhouse Vuki 
Launching assistance Grants, Funding Grants, Funding 
Post-settlement support Training Grants, Health Assistance, 
Training 
Character of intervention Instructions Assistance 
 
Goodhouse was to a certain degree a more ‘authoritative project’ from both management and 
governmental sides when it comes to the farmers. The project was meant to be relieving the 
massive unemployment and poverty that had escalated in the area after the downturn in the 
mining industry, and due to this there was an immense interest in the project, considerable 
financial support and a wish to participate from governmental agencies, NGOs and others in 
order to safeguard a sustainable project. However, the farmers were not consulted to any 
extent and not much was done to serve their needs, which I also mentioned in the previous 
chapter on trust within the organisations. Further it may seem as the management at 
Goodhouse was uninterested in the involvement that the government agencies wanted in the 
project. They wanted the government to handle the social and human resource side of the 
project while NOCAL should focus on the managing and business side of the company86. 
Hence, there seems to have been a disagreement between the management at Goodhouse and 
the Provincial Government when it comes to what role the Government should play in 
relation to this project. While the management seemed to be interested in cooperation where 
the Land Administration should function as experts i.e. through assisting them with health and 
social relations issues, the government officials were picturing a more structured project 
where the management followed their instructions and regulations.  
 
Vuki was a different project in that it was initiated by the farmers themselves; the farmers at 
Vuki wanted to purchase the land they were renting from the liquidators and took action 
                                                 
86 Answers to the Transformation Committee’s Questions; ad Para 23, SPP-files. 
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through using the connections they had within government agencies, and in addition got them 
to support their cause and also using their own connections in making it happen. Vuki had, 
and still has rather strict principals of autonomy and independence. To a large degree they 
avoided the issue of Government control by receiving loans from commercial banks, and 
hence they were not, like Goodhouse, under ‘supervision’ by the government institutions. 
According to the production manager at Vuki, Mr. Witbooi, getting extensive assistance from 
state institutions will be followed by several regulations and legislations. Therefore, it seems 
like they preferred the contracts with the commercial banks where the directives that follows 
make more room for them to run the farm in the manner they find more suitable. According to 
the business plan, “forging strategic alliances with selected service providers and customers is 
part of the overall business strategy”87, hence they do not get in to too tight alliances with 
other actors, but try to stay as autonomous as possible while seeking advice when they need it. 
This was also emphasised by the Vuki Production Manager Mr. Witbooi as one of their core 
principals in order to build a sustainable business (Interview Mr.Witbooi 28.05.2008).  
 
Jacobsen proposes that one of the reasons for the increase of interest and reformation of the 
Norwegian agriculture in the end of the 1900th century, was the external pressure from the 
representatives in the Parliament, and also that the situation in the agriculture was defined as 
in a crisis. Hence, he suggests that it is “traits with the problem structure and the transaction 
structure that to a large degree will decide the relations of influence between the state 
institutions and its clientele” (Jacobsen 1978: 6). Accordingly, it seems as though the issues in 
the South African agriculture has not been a high priority neither in Government nor in 
Parliament. In addition there is weak and lacking organisation of small-scale farmers’ 
interests in the country, which further lessens the strength of external pressure on Government 
in terms of land reform.  Therefore, my suggestion is that the land administration is connected 
towards the clientele in highly bureaucratic ways and on professionalised terms; the clients 
must apply for assistance, something that often takes years to get through the administration, 
which in turn will result in redistribution of land, grants and funding, or both, if they are 
found eligible. As mentioned previously in the text, the way things are functioning as of now, 
it resembles a welfare programme with specialised support to a chosen minority of black 
commercial farmers more than a land reform programme (Gran 2006: 163). This relates to 
Jacobsen’s description of the bureaucratic government with state officials as ‘service 
                                                 
87 Vuki business plan DLA-files 
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providers’, and where their basis for legacy is authoritative, infused with force and 
instructions. In addition, the conscious unequal treatment of clientele that Jacobsen mentions 
as a trend in Norway in the late 1800s is also visible in the land reform in South Africa. The 
emerging black commercial farmers and the rural elites seem to be those, if any, that benefits 
from the support and resources that are being provided through the land reform programmes. 
While they often have relative levels of power, information and networks, they ‘trap’ the 
resources, while the poorest of the poor are being pushed further out on the sidelines, 
resulting in a further increasing gap between the ‘chronically poor’ and the rural elites. As 
mentioned, what changed these circumstances in the Norwegian agricultural reform was the 
characterization of the situation as an emergency, a crisis, and furthermore increased external 
pressure on government departments, which consequently also changed the prioritising of a 
few into a notion that everybody must be included in the transformation. The difference in 
assistance experienced in the two cases I have investigated might be affected by exactly this 
prioritising of the eligible black commercial farmers in South Africa. Seeing that the Vuki 
farmers had good prospects for running a profitable commercial production unit, this might 
have increased the levels of assistance that they received compared to the Goodhouse project. 
On the other hand, the difference may also have been caused by the differences in the land 
administration in the two provinces, as Gran reports in his study, or a combination between 
the two.   
 
There are strong arguments for the need for a strong third-party enforcer in land reform in 
South Africa, while the beneficiaries need the government to be a trustworthy third-party that 
can, besides giving financial aid to launch the projects, monitor and evaluate the development 
after they have started. A focus on conflict management and proper planning, housing, human 
resources etc. is important in order to gain sustainable projects especially in cases like 
Goodhouse where the community is widely deprived. However as for now, the roles and 
responsibilities of the different departments, officials etc are blurred and there are no clear 
strategies for how to monitor and evaluate the projects that have been initiated;  “there 
remains a clear need for continued involvement by governmental and non-governmental 
organisations in monitoring the performance of the new joint ventures in order to protect the 
interests of claimants and support community property institutions (CPIs) in areas such as 
capacity building, business advice, dispute resolution and distribution of benefits” (Lahiff 
2008: 20).  
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Chapter 8: Networks 
In chapter six I focussed on trust and a degree of closure within the group. In this chapter I 
will look at the importance of having links towards networks in order to be included, get 
information, communicate and function within the agricultural industry. Burris et al. address 
this issue in their theory of nodal governance when they state that outcomes within a 
collectivity may be influenced by factors other then those controlled by the individuals within 
the group themselves; factors that operate at a higher level and often beyond their local 
physical environment (Burris et al. 2005: 36). Hence, in order to be aware of these factors and 
to a certain degree manage them, it is essential to have connections and links towards these 
‘higher levels’. Granovetter has pointed out this necessity of ‘weak ties’ in sustaining 
community cohesion and collective action. By weak ties he refers to acquaintances, shared 
membership of secondary associations etc. as opposed to the strong interpersonal links like 
intimate friendship and connections. While weak ties provide people with access to resources 
and information, strong ties are typically more available and more motivated to assist 
(Granovetter 1983: 209) Putnam supports this notion and proposes that strong links within 
groups are important in order to keep them together and sustainable, while weak ties towards 
networks that cut across social gaps promote wider cooperation (Putnam 1993: 175). 
Granovetter suggests that ‘bridges’ between closely knit groups of people are vital in order to 
gain information and resources (Granovetter 1983: 202).  
 
People without weak ties towards other networks are deprived of information, have a 
disadvantaged position in the markets, and also will be difficult to organise or integrate into 
political movements of any kind. This is while the most common way to be recruited into 
these organisations is through friends and acquaintances. Moreover, one of the explanations 
for these circumstances, according to Granovetter, is due to the tendency for poor and 
disadvantageous people to rely more on the strong ties than others, while these strong ties or 
close acquaintances are more readily accessible. A person that has sufficient resources which 
he may rely on is freer to explore alternative options than one that does not have a surplus of 
resources (Granovetter 1983: 211). Further this is supported by the work of Charles Tilly, 
while one of his arguments is that political mobilisation among poor people is difficult for 
“lack of slack, for lack of resources and time to organise. Poor people organise first 
defensively, when they are attacked they try to secure what they have. Rich people organise 
early on offensively, exploiting new opportunities for gain” (Gran 2006: 162-163). Further, 
Granovetter looks at Pool’s (1980) argument that the number of weak ties a person or 
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community has increases linearly with the development of the communication system, 
bureaucratisation, population density and the spread of market mechanisms (Granovetter 
1983: 210).  Moreover, Granovetter suggests that networks built on close relationships, strong 
ties, seem to be connected to economic insecurity and lack of social services. Poor people 
have a tendency to be stuck in these kinds of deficient structures more then others, and 
Granovetter refers to applied research to explain this concept; “some people typically find it 
advantageous to maintain strong networks and we88 have shown that these people are more 
likely to be young, less well educated, and black” (ibid: 212). He goes on saying that as long 
as traits in these communities like high unemployment rates and real threats of poverty and 
moreover that members find it difficult to access social welfare services, medical aid etc., one 
can expect this reliance on strong networks to subsist among them (ibid: 212). However, all 
weak ties does not necessarily provide the benefits as described in Granovetter’s theory, only 
if they function as bridges between parts, or as in the nodal governance theory; “nodes” of the 
network.  
 
Lack of integration towards the wider, already established, agricultural networks has been 
proposed as one of the problems when it comes to establishing sustainable land reform 
projects89. The Government has addressed this issue to some extent by promoting joint 
ventures with private entrepreneurs where the entrepreneur, or strategic partner, invests in and 
takes responsibility of a farm management often for a period of 10 years with possibilities for 
extensions. In these joint ventures the farm workers most often get a small percentage of the 
shares (Derman et al. 2006: 1). There has been raised some questions by scholars whether 
these partnerships are fruitful for the South African land reform programme. First of all, it has 
been questioned whether the land reform programme as pictured in the Constitution and the 
Restitution Act of 1994 are being accomplished with this practise, and if the claimants are 
receiving the benefits they are supposed to through these collaborations. A second issue is 
whether the state has the capacity to actually plan and implement these intricate commercial 
deals in a multitude of cases, and moreover if they can provide support to claimants and their 
strategic partners, and in the long term to secure the interests of communities and their 
members (ibid: 1). As the situation is now, and referring to the mentioned studies performed 
by Gran (2006) where he studies the Western- and Northern Cape Provinces and their rather 
                                                 
88 Ericksen and Yancey 1977 
89 Why do the landless remain landless? SPP 2002 www.spp.org.za 
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chaotic and limited organisation and resources, this seems highly unlikely. Also, when 
looking at the Goodhouse project, it is a good example of how the state does not have the 
capacity to maintain and control such massive commercial projects in a sustainable way. 
Thirdly, the issue of ‘industrial farming’90 as experienced in the Eastern Europe  and Tanzania 
among other places, may be an important to keep in mind when including large private 
investors in a land reform programme, which is so desperately called for in the poor rural 
areas of South Africa.  According to Jacobs (2001), the power relations in the joint ventures 
are unequal while the private investors often proscribe what should be produced, offering no 
protection if there should be market failures or an over supply of the produce. Therefore, the 
risk is transferred from the private investors to the small scale farmers (Jacobs 2001: 5). Then 
again, other research has recognised these partnerships as one of the main providers of 
successful projects in land reform (Lahiff 2007: 23). The major advantages are capital 
resources, sharing and distribution of risks, and moreover it may capture the workers’ 
capacity for innovation and commitment91.  
 
The network I am referring to is the wider agricultural networks of both governmental and 
non-governmental organisations in South Africa. As mentioned previously, one of the issues 
for the land reform beneficiaries is that the commercial agriculture have been controlled by 
white farmers, and therefore as a consequence it has been experienced difficulties in entering 
these established networks for black emerging farmers in the country. In the Northern- and 
Western Cape provinces the majority of land owners are still white, and investigations have 
shown that there are high levels of scepticism towards the land reform programmes and also 
racism expressed by these landowners92. Qeqe and Cartwright state that many of the barriers 
experiences are because of “the cost of information, risk, capital and the role of social 
networks and quality standards within the new market network. Collectively the barriers 
account for market failure and contribute to the persistent poverty in rural economies.”93 
                                                 
90“ (...) the assumption that the great collective farms would operate like factories in a centralized economy (…) 
fulfilling state orders for grain and other agricultural products” (Scott 1998: 211).  
91 Research report by Surplus Peoples Project and Human Sciences Research Council: Joint Venture Schemes: 
KZN, Western Cape, Mpumalanga, Eastern Cape. www.spp.org.za 
92 Why do the landless remain landless? SPP 2002 www.spp.org.za 
93 Qeqe and Cartwright: South Africa’s Agricultural Commodity Markets-Understanding the rules of the game in 
five commodity markets with the intention of creating opportunities for emerging farmers www.spp.org.za 
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I will investigate the two cases I have studied and their links, or weak ties, towards the wider 
governance networks of agriculture firstly by looking at which organisations they have been 
in contact with, in this context called nodes, weak ties or links, what kind of assistance they 
have offered, how closely they were/are connected and how important these links has been for 
the two cases. I have divided this in to two variables; ‘number of links’ and ‘utilizing of 
links’.  I will look at this by using the data I have collected through interviews, the files on the 
projects that I have got access through by SPP and DLA, and previous research from the area 
where the projects are situated.  
8.1 Number of Links 
In his theory on the “strength of weak ties”, Granovetter suggests that people or groups with 
few weak ties will not be likely to mobilise efficiently for collective action within their 
communities (Granovetter 1983: 224). Consequently, I will in this section look at whether 
there are differences in amounts of weak ties towards various “nodes” in the two cases I have 
investigated, and moreover the variety of acquaintances they have when it comes to different 
sectors of the governance network.  I will try to do this by making use of the interviews I have 
conducted and also the descriptions of the two cases and their environments through previous 
research and business plans etc. that I have got hold of through the DLA, the SPP and the 
LRC.  
 
The Vuki Farm seems to have quite some connections within the local and provincial 
governmental institutions, as mentioned in the previous chapter, and they made use of these 
links in order to buy the farmland from the liquidators and also for assistance and training 
after they started production at the farm. One example of outcome of these connections they 
have with the governmental institutions is the mentioned relationship they have established 
with the Department of Health, where they provide medical services at the farm on a 
permanent basis every month. Further Mr. Witbooi states that through his time in the district 
council and the Theewaterskloof Municipality, he is familiar with the NGOs in the area and if 
he needs their advice he call them (Interview Mr. Witbooi 28.05.2008).  In addition, Mr. 
Witbooi said that the farmers knew their neighbours very well, mostly other commercial 
farmers, since they had been living in the area for generations. He himself has many 
acquaintances in the area that are commercial farmers, while he is part of their committees 
and associations, and through this has known them for years. However, he goes on saying that 
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although they talk to each other and they approach these established farmers for advice when 
they need to; they have not gained any support from the commercial farmers in the area 
(Interview Mr. Witbooi 28.05.2008).  However, the farm has recently started growing wine 
grapes in addition to fruit, which they deliver to a local wine-producer for export (Interview 
Mr. Witbooi 28.05.2008). In addition, four businessmen that bought one of the farms in the 
area, South Hill, approached the Vuki management and asked them to manage and run the 
farm because they heard of the success at Vuki (Interview Mr. van Jaarsveld 17.07.2008). 
This cooperation and confidence indicates that they have established links towards the 
commercial farmers in the area, and that they can be said to have been included in the 
networks of the commercial farmers. Moreover through employing consultants from several 
companies, they further have links towards different expertise in various fields of agriculture.  
 
Vuki may have had an advantage in that the area they are farming in is a well developed fruit-
production region, hence the market might be easier to access then if there were no tradition 
for apple and other fruits- production in their environment. On the other hand, exactly this 
fact that people have been farming fruit in the area for decades, may have created tightly knit 
networks of established white commercial farmers which can be difficult to access. Although 
I do not have any data confirming or rejecting either of these suggestions, while I have not 
talked to the other farmers in the area, I would suggest that the Vuki farm has been well 
integrated among the other commercial farmers due to the fact that they are cooperating and 
moreover that they have several commercial farmer-acquaintances in the area. Thus, this is in 
line with the argument that the number of weak ties a person or community has, increases 
partly by the spread of market mechanisms (Granovetter 1983: 210), which should be well 
established in the area while agriculture is the major economic activity, and also the main 
employer of the inhabitants; in fact 53 percent of the citizens in the Theewaterskloof area 
were in 2006 employed in agricultural activities (Kleinbooi et al 2006: 22).   
 
The farmers at Goodhouse had direct links to private companies in that Gili Greenworld and 
Variety Holdings were running the management and production of the project. They further 
created the NOCAL-company together to run the business at Goodhouse. The two private 
companies in turn got other actors to invest in the business, apart from the Provincial 
Government in the Northern Cape, also the electricity company ESKOM supported the 
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project with R3 million94. Moreover, the companies had links towards export companies that 
were to sell 90 percent of the paprika that were produced to markets in Europe, USA and 
Japan95. The relationship between NOCAL and the government institutions however, did not 
seem to be working well after the Goodhouse project started production. According to my 
data it seems like NOCAL avoided cooperating with any governmental institution, both local 
and provincial. A fraction of the farmers did, as mentioned, have connections towards the 
NGO SPP and the STC. 
 
According to du Toit (2004), the commercial farmers in the area were hoping that the project 
at Goodhouse would succeed, but they were sceptical to as how the project was started up. 
They further suggested that there had not been a proper impact study before they started 
production; the area is not suitable for paprika production while the temperature for paprika 
production must not exceed 32ºC and Goodhouse sometimes reaches 50ºC in summer; “He96 
added that the area never before produced paprika, and that the Department of Agriculture had 
conducted a study on paprika growing near Upington and had concluded it would not work 
there. Goodhouse is hotter than Upington” (du Toit 2004: 92). Hence, the project probably 
had support from the commercial farmers in the area before they started, but might have lost it 
after the information about lacking impact studies and knowledge about the circumstances in 
the area. Moreover, the owners of NOCAL did have consultants coming in to give assist 
them, but according to du Toit (2004) they did not take their advice (p 92). According to the 
limited data I have managed to get hold of concerning Goodhouses’ links towards the wider 
agricultural networks, it seems as though NOCAL had several connections and every 
possibility to make use of them while it was run by established private companies and 
moreover that many people were excited about this project and wanted it to succeed. 
However, the community at Goodhouse seems to have few weak ties towards other networks, 
and therefore has been the dependent actor in the cooperation. This is in line with Pool’s 
(1980) observations that poor people often will get dependent on other protective actors in 
order to attain progress (Granovetter 1983: 211).  
                                                 
94 SPP-files 
95 Business plan SPP-files 
96 A local commercial farmer 
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8.2 Utility of Links 
Whether it will be an advantage to have weak or strong ties in different settings does not 
merely depend on the number of links one has at different levels of strength, but also the 
utility of ties of various strengths (Granovetter 1983. 209). According to network theories and 
research on weak ties, there is a tendency for poor and disadvantageous people to rely more 
on strong ties than others, while these strong ties or close acquaintances are more readily 
accessible. A person that has sufficient resources which he may rely on is freer to explore 
alternative options than one that does not have a surplus of resources (ibid: 211). Therefore, 
the utility of weak ties are dependent upon the security of the individual or community, 
moreover the persons wealth. If a person has high levels of insecurity he might come under 
strong pressure to become highly dependant on one or more protective individuals (ibid: 210). 
I want to look at if reliance on strong versus weak ties may be something that can help explain 
the different outcomes in the cases. I will look at this by using the same data as in the 
previous sequence; however this data is weaker when it comes to measure utility rather than 
measuring mere numbers of links. Since I have not talked to the groups of farmers at 
Goodhouse, and just one of the previous farmers (now manager) at the Vuki Farm, my data is 
insufficient in order to make any definite statements on the communities’ tendency in general 
to rely on weak or strong ties. However, I will try to get a sense of whether there is a 
difference in how the organisations used their links towards various ‘nodes’ in the networks, 
if they relied more on their close community than ‘outsiders’, and moreover if the links they 
had provided ‘bridges’ for the communities towards other network segments. I will do this 
through making use of the information I have and by applying theories from the field of 
network studies. I further ‘measure’ this by looking at whether the communities have made 
use of the links they have, and further if they can be said to have made lasting connections 
with the links they have towards the wider governance networks.  
 
At Goodhouse, the farmers were in joint venture with NOCAL, and moreover the 
management was made up of already established companies with existing links towards the 
agricultural business. This is the main purpose of joint ventures; to launch the project, run it 
for a set period of time, and link the farmers towards agricultural networks when it comes to 
market access etc. However, it may seem like this ‘strategic partnership’ did not benefit the 
community much. This may be due to the short durance of the project, but nonetheless the 
community members were not involved in the managing of the project, and thus did not hold 
any links on their own towards nodes in the governance networks. Therefore, I suggest that 
 100
there were no bridging between the network and the Goodhouse community, something that is 
apparent in the fact that once the management left, there was nothing happening in terms of 
trying to save the project, mass protests or production. What did happen was that the farmers 
sold production equipment and destroyed many of the buildings (Interview Mr. May 
11.12.2008), something that might bare witness of a deprived community with few links 
towards other networks. Deprived people or communities rely on strong ties rather than weak 
ones while the strong ties are more easily accessible, conversely; “an individuals access to 
opportunities and resources can only be fully exploited if he or she is linked with others in 
diverse positions furnishing different information, but strong ties tend to involve closed 
circles that limit such access” (Granovetter 1983: 222). Thus, it is easier to stick with ones 
own group if one has ‘lack of slack, lack of resources and time to organise’97, rather then to 
try access other groups in the governance network and get acquaintances. Moreover, this 
tendency to rely first and foremost on ones closest connections seems to be linked to this 
economical insecurity, but also lack of social services; and further “as long as the 
unemployment rate is high, the treat of living in poverty is real, and as long as large segments 
of the population find access to medical services, day care, and social welfare services 
problematic, we can expect to find reliance on strong networks to continue among them” 
(Granovetter 1983: 212). The unemployment rate in the area was very high when the 
Goodhouse project was initiated, while many of the people living there had been working at 
the mines, which now were closed. Due to this and moreover the fact that the community now 
has a debt of R120 million, I suggest that the threat of poverty is very real for the members 
(Interview Mr. May 11.12.2008). Whether it is problematic to access social welfare services 
in the area, I can not say, but the trend in rural South Africa in general is lack of adequate 
welfare and social services and a persistence and possible worsening of poverty and 
inequality (du Toit 2005: 3) Thus, referring to these notions there is reason to believe that due 
to the devastating poverty, the high unemployment rate and insecurity, the Goodhouse 
community will rely more on strong ties than weak ones, and therefore it has been, and 
probably will be difficult to mobilise efficient communal problem solving unless these issues 
are attended to.  
 
The history of the Vuki farmers describes quite a different story when it comes to connecting 
to governance networks through weak ties. In contrast to the farmers at Goodhouse this 
                                                 
97 Charles Tilly referred to in Gran 2006 
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community managed to take over the land they used to farm as workers after it went bankrupt. 
How they managed to do this is probably a combination of the traits I have described in the 
previous chapters, but also the fact that they made use of the acquaintances they had in 
various segments of the governance network related to agriculture, and moreover land reform. 
Through these acquaintances they managed to rent the farm for a couple of years before they 
finally purchased it. They communicated with existing and new acquaintances in the 
governance network, mainly governmental, and thus got access to social networks and made 
them pursue the ‘upwards struggle’ with them (Interview Mr. van Jaarsveld 17.07.2008). 
Through this connection with links in other social spheres than their closest connections, they 
managed to get hold of information and resources that they probably would not be able to get 
hold of on their own. Further, after they started farming without the Hall-family, they 
managed to get support through grants, loans and different assistance from government 
organisations; they have connected with other local farmers in the area, leading to i.e. 
cooperation with a wine farm where Vuki produce wine grapes which the wine farmer then 
make use of for wine production (Interview Mr. Witbooi 28.05.2008). They have also 
managed to get market access; they deliver the fruit they harvest to two different pack houses 
which further sell the fruit in South Africa, but also export to Tesco Supermarkets in the UK, 
other outlets in EU-countries, Africa and the Middle East (Kleinbooi et al 2006: 29).  
 
Through the fact that the management at Vuki, which are almost all previous farm workers at 
the Whitehall farm, had already established quite some weak ties towards the local 
agricultural networks through actively engaging in local politics and participating in other 
farmers organisations and boards, it seems as they could more freely investigate and make use 
of weak ties than the Goodhouse farmers that comes across as a more isolated, poverty 
stricken community, which in addition was not included in the management of the land they 
were farming. Due to this notion that Vuki had more weak ties and created lasting cooperation 
with some of them, the farmers managed to mobilised efficient communal problem solving 
that benefitted the whole group.   
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8.3 Main Findings 
 
Model 7: Main Findings on Networks in the Cases 
 
 Goodhouse Vuki 
Number of Links Several links through 
NOCAL towards  nodes in 
business networks while 
they were in joint venture, 
but the community 
members themselves does 
not seem to have many 
weak ties 
Links towards a variety of 
different networks, both 
private and public 
Utility of Links Did not make use of their 
weak ties  
Weak ties were an 
important factor in 
purchasing the farm land 
and moreover for 
accessing markets and 
networks 
Degree of inclusion in 
networks 
Weak Strong 
 
Vuki seems to have a better network surrounding them than Goodhouse. This might be for the 
fact that the two communities are placed in very different areas; one within an established 
fruit production location and the other one in a very remote and arid area with few 
inhabitants. This further implies that the market mechanisms, bureaucratisation when it comes 
to agriculture, and the communications systems might be better developed, which according 
to Granovetter (1983), in addition to population density, makes for better circumstances for 
having larger amounts of weak ties than if these circumstances are not highly developed. 
Moreover, people who have few resources and live in high insecurity tend to stick to their 
closest social networks, while one who due to degrees of resources is freer to organise 
offensively, make use of acquaintances and foresee events in the future. This does not only 
apply for agricultural activities, but most dynamics in society (ibid: 202). This difference 
between being proactive, and on the other hand the passivity that often characterise poor 
community, seems to be one of the major differences between the two cases I have looked 
into. This characteristic of deprived communities is further in line with Knut Dahl Jacobsen’s 
(1967) research on ‘political poverty’, where he questions why the issue of poverty is not 
more apparent in society and further, why is it not part of the central issues in social politics? 
In short, he answers this by saying that the issues that are raised through politics are created 
through social collaboration; they affect and are affected by political action and the supply of 
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political influence in society; when minority groups fall outside the accepted issues of social 
politics, as the land reform has till now reminded more of a social welfare programme than an 
agricultural reform (Gran 2006), it is connected to the fact that they are poor when it comes to 
political power. “Poverty is conditioned by poor influence, by political poverty98” (Jacobsen 
1967: 8). However, in South Africa the poor rural people can hardly be characterised as a 
minority group while, according to statistics, over 50 percent of South Africans live in small 
villages or rural areas99. Further, in 2002 over 70 percent of the poorest in the country resided 
in rural areas, and over 70 percent of all people living in rural areas are poor (Kepe and 
Cousins 2002: 1). The more links one has towards important nodes or actors within the 
networks which govern, the more information and resources one will obtain (Granovetter 
1983), and moreover, according to Jacobsen (1967), the more one will manage to influence 
ones own situation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
98 Translated from Norwegian 
99 SA mediafacts 2009 – www.omd.co.za 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion  
In this section I will try to give answers to the research question that I put forward in chapter 
four on my methodological approach by firstly going to go through the main themes that have 
arisen when analysing the two cases in chapter six, seven and eight. Moreover I relate this to 
the land reform programme in South Africa in general by looking at the concept of social 
capital and whether it can be built through engaging the rural poor and landless and further by 
influencing the political system. Finally I summarise some of the challenges facing the 
distribution of sustainable land reform.  
9.1 Providing Answers to the Research Question 
The research question I presented in chapter four had the following approach: Are there 
certain factors that may explain why some land reform projects in South Africa succeed while 
others fail? 
 
In order to investigate this I first of all considered trust as a possible promoter of collective 
problem-solving within the groups of land reform beneficiaries. Secondly, I looked at the 
character of authority intervention from the land reform administration and the officials 
involved in the projects, before I, based on Granovetter’s theory of the strength of weak ties, 
examined the links the beneficiaries had towards the governance networks with its private and 
public ‘nodes’. By going through these notions in the two different cases, I have shown how 
having a degree of trust and confidence within groups will make communal problem solving 
easier than if there are levels of distrust. Further, this also makes the group more efficient in 
that the members may focus more on their tasks, and moreover on external factors that may 
affect the groups. In addition, chapter seven described how different relationships towards the 
government agencies and established roles and responsibilities might affect the assistance and 
the outcome of projects. Finally, I tried to show how weak ties towards the wider governance 
networks holding a variety of nodes might be a promoter of successful projects. The case of 
Vuki demonstrated that these traits of social capital; trust, characteristics of intervention from 
government agencies and links towards networks, push each other forward; they had links 
towards various nodes in the governance networks, and were a group that seemed to have 
high levels of trust between them and that worked well together. This again aggregated 
progress, and also linked them to new actors.   
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This enhancement of trust will in turn lead to more efficient collective action which 
eventually is followed by individual and social benefits (Rohe 2004: 159). Rohe’s model, 
presented in chapter five on theory, demonstrates quite well the difference between the two 
cases I have studied; Vuki with members that were civically engaged and had weak ties 
towards the local businesses, municipality, and provincial government, and through this built 
a strong group that created individual benefits like housing and health care for its members, 
and further social benefits like education. In contrast, the farmers at Goodhouse were held 
outside the running and managing of the business, they did not seem actively engaged in a 
productive way, and there were low amounts of trust and links towards other social networks. 
This in turn led to a worsening of the situation for all. However, the farmers can not be held 
fully responsible for the outcome, while the private businesses that ran the company and the 
government agencies involved, did not assist in building this project in a productive and 
sustainable way. This assistance and character of intervention from government agencies, is 
one of the major differences between the cases. At Vuki, the farmers had acquaintances and 
were engaged in various spheres of public and private organisations. In this way, they fit the 
profile of ‘new black commercial farmers’ that has been put forward by the government, and 
probably for this reason had relations towards the government with characteristics of 
assistance and expertise, rather than authority and instruction which is more describing in the 
Goodhouse case. In addition, with links towards various actors within the governance 
networks of agriculture, the Vuki farmers had access to more information and resources than 
their counterpart Goodhouse, which where isolated, poor and relied more on their close social 
networks. According to Jacobsen’s mentioned research, one may say that due to these 
circumstances, the Vuki farmers were more in control of, and could to a certain degree 
manage, their situation, while the Goodhouse community were ‘politically poor’ and therefore 
were held outside the management, control and decisions made in the project.  
 
 The Goodhouse case is further a prime example of how civic engagement and weak ties not 
necessarily leads to trust and social capital in a community. It was a skewed power 
relationship between the developers of the project and the beneficiaries, which demonstrated 
that all though the farmers were linked to private companies and governmental agencies 
through the developers, there were not much trust developed through these relationships, and 
no ‘bridging’ between the community of farmers and the wider governance network. 
According to Rohe, this scenario is often the case when community development projects are 
initiated by outside organisations (ibid: 160). This is a major challenge for land reform in 
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South Africa, where there has been placed great confidence in private companies and actors as 
promoters of land reform, both by government, certain scholars and society at large. The 
Goodhouse case demonstrated how the ‘strategic partner’ was highly unsuited for solving key 
issues in the community, other than employment. Moreover, the government agencies 
involved did not have the capacity to follow up or secure the situation for the community. 
This incapacity for evaluation and monitoring of projects is not unique for the Northern Cape 
Province, and therefore a real threat for weak poverty stricken communities all over the 
country that gets involved in land reform projects with strategic partners. When the risk is 
transferred from the private partner or government to the beneficiaries, as in the Goodhouse 
case, it might end up worsening the situation for rural communities rather than improving it.  
 
Rohe goes on suggesting that interpersonal trust within a community and trust towards 
representatives of outside organisations are vital ingredient of any successful  community 
development effort (ibid: 159). However, how this trust may evolve is hard to establish. As 
mentioned in chapter two, there are severe issues concerning trust throughout the South 
African society. According to Briggs “trust is hard won and easily lost, especially where a 
history of inequality and resentments across ethnic or other social boarders cast a shadow” 
(Briggs 2008: 11). This is a highly suitable statement for describing how there are amounts of 
distrust in the post-Apartheid South African society. This in turn makes rural development 
and cooperation a challenge. Gran found through his studies that the government institutions 
in the Northern- and Western Cape Provinces are poorly organised and further that there are 
distrust between the members of the different institutions (Gran 2006). This makes 
development of trust through civic engagement difficult, while, as Rohe mentions, civic 
engagement may also lead to even greater mistrust in a society. With inefficient government 
institutions as one of the major reasons mentioned by scholars when explaining the slow 
redistribution of land, and even mistrust within these institutions themselves, this problem of 
distrust towards government through engagement may be a highly relevant issue when it 
comes to improving the conditions for rural inhabitants of the country. If, for example, 
members of a community would engage in developing their area, but the local and provincial 
officials where to ignore or disturb the plan and engagement made by the members, the 
distrust among residents towards local, provincial and national government may increase 
(Rohe 2004: 160).  
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9.2 Can social capital be built? 
Poverty is not solely understood in terms of low income and consumption, but moreover 
peoples’ ability to provide for basic needs and possibilities for personal and social 
development. Capital, such as financial, natural resources, land and social capital are part in 
establishing peoples’ ability to meet these needs (Adams et al. 2000: 116).  In rural areas of 
South Africa, social capital may provide people with opportunities when they lack financial 
capital. Memberships of kin groups, or strong ties towards other members of a community, 
are essential in providing support for the people living in extreme poverty, while they may 
give them access to natural resources and opportunities for paid work (Ibid: 116). However, 
as mentioned in chapter eight; networks that are based on close relationships, which often are 
vital to the rural poor, are often connected with economic insecurity and lack of social 
services. Poor people have a tendency, more than others, to get stuck in these structures, thus 
they are dependent upon these networks to keep their head above water. On the other hand 
these networks might keep them from actually obtaining any progress or improvements in 
their situation. This is in line with Granovetter’s theory of the strength of weak ties, where he 
postulates that the fact that poor people seem to rely on strong ties due to economic pressure, 
may be one of the reasons why poverty is self-perpetuating (Granovetter 1983: 213). 
 
The lack of links or weak ties going from the poor rural areas towards the established 
agricultural networks, and moreover influence towards the political system, has been 
proposed as some of the main hold-backs when it comes to the hitherto performance and 
influences of land reform on rural areas. According to Rohe, building social capital will 
require a two-sided strategy. First of all, there must be an increased engagement in 
community development activities by community residents, in this context the rural poor and 
emerging farmers. Secondly, at a larger scale, the systems must be opened up for participation 
and influence from community members; “if we engage people but that engagement doesn’t 
influence the dominant political and economic systems, engagement is likely to lead to 
cynicism, apathy, and distrust, rather than to trust” (Rohe 2004: 162). In the context of land 
reform in South Africa, these notions may be translated into engaging the rural poor in land 
reform and further, influencing the political system.  
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9.2.1 Engaging the rural poor  
When looking at citizen engagement Rohe suggests that one must make a distinction between 
horizontal and vertical engagement (ibid: 160). Horizontal engagement and integration is 
important in order to get a significant number of engaged citizens, if this is not accomplished, 
it will be difficult to get things done and moreover hard to influence the actions of larger 
community organisations (Ibid: 160). According to Saruchera there is a need for African 
people to understand and analyse the challenges of securing land and resource rights in order 
to fight poverty, exploitation and oppression. Further, he suggests that this is an essential 
prerequisite for the ability of the previously oppressed to participate efficiently and influence 
the international and national policy making that effects them (Saruchera 2004: 1). He goes 
on suggesting that “the role of civil society actors in capacity building, conflict management, 
policy making, networking, information and experience-sharing…is essential to meeting the 
development challenge” (ibid: 1). Moreover, when a group or community experience great 
support from “within”, it makes gaining support from external actors easier. Thus, the 
horizontal engagement is often insufficient; however it will be a promoter in linking the 
members of the community to, and engage them with actors and organisations outside the 
community (Rohe 2004: 160).  
 
Vertical engagement refers to this effort of being engaged with external actors. These 
relationships have the potential of extending the resources of the community, and further, 
increase the community members’ information and expertise (ibid: 161). However, as 
mentioned, whether these links will in fact better the situation for the community will rely on 
whether there are created bridging between the actors or not. Vidal (2004) distinguished 
between horizontal and vertical engagement through the concepts of ‘bonding capital’ and 
bridging capital’. Bonding capital brings people who already know each other closer together 
and makes communal problem solving possible, while bridging capital connects people who 
previously had little or no interaction (p. 165). Both are important when developing a 
community and creating communal problem solving; the success of collectivities will depend 
on how the members make adaptations individually and further, how they together manage 
the outcome generating system (OGS) “that maximise their ability to tap and coordinate 
knowledge and capacity throughout the collectivity (Burris et al 2005: 36). 
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Looking at the case studies in my research, Vuki is an example of how being linked to 
external public and private actors may in fact strengthen a group and assist in their progress. 
However, there is reason to believe that most rural communities and land reform projects go 
more in the direction of the situation at Goodhouse, rather than Vuki. This suggestion is based 
on what research in the field of land reform projects generally concludes with, namely that 
most project have a limited impact on rural livelihoods and productive land use, and that the 
most common reason for this is claimed to be “inadequate or inappropriate planning, a 
general lack of capital and skills among intended beneficiaries, a lack of post-settlement 
support from state agencies, most notably local municipalities and provincial departments of 
agriculture, and poor dynamics within beneficiary groups” (Lahiff 2008: 6). Thus, in order to 
build stronger groups and link them towards external actors and organisations, there is a need 
for a broader land reform programme with capable officials at local levels to monitor and 
evaluate the projects after they have started up. The Goodhouse-case demonstrates how there 
is a need for extended government control, monitoring and evaluation in land reform projects. 
Handing over land and money to a project is necessary, but far from sufficient in making the 
projects successful. There must further be access to markets, machinery, infrastructure for 
transport and communications, as well as support when it comes to extension, training and 
marketing advice. According to Cousins (2001), these are traits are absent in most land reform 
projects (p.17). Although connections towards the governance networks are important for the 
emerging farmers, it is unlikely as the situation is now, that the rural poor are going to be able 
to make these connections, or manage them, on their own. The rural poor are poor in 
resources, connections outside their communities and political influence. Therefore, an 
increasing amount of researchers find that the state must broaden the support offered to the 
land reform beneficiaries. Some scholars find that it might be necessary with a strong state 
with land ceilings, taxation etc. in order to make the markets work for the poor emerging 
farmers. Other suggested methods are subdivision of land, expropriation, forced advertising of 
land-sales and so on100. Cousins state that “even World Bank economists are now beginning 
to question the practises of the international financial institutions, and the conventional 
wisdom of the neo-liberal economics. In the last few years the idea that the state has a central 
role to play in development has staged a belated come-back in development theory” (Cousins 
2001: 1).  
 
                                                 
100 Why do the landless remain landless? SPP 2002 
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The land reform programme so far has given little attention to the multiple issues that face the 
rural population in the country, and almost no new policies or mechanisms has been proposed 
in order to speed up the redistribution of land or broaden the base of beneficiaries, especially 
the people living in extreme poverty who wish to do small scale farming (Lahiff 2008: 31). 
With the introduction of the LRAD in 2001, there was a further narrowing down of 
beneficiaries as there was a “clear shift away from land reform as a programme aimed at rural 
poor and landless to one that aimed at the creation of a new class of commercial farmers” 
(Hall et al. 2003: 32). The ones that to a large extent benefit from the land reform programme 
as it is now are the rural elites, which promotes an idea of “them as has, gets” instead of 
relieving the devastating poverty that persists in the rural areas. Therefore, it is important to 
determine who decides what rights for whom, in which the political system has a critical role 
to play (Saruchera 2004: 1).  
9.2.2 Influencing the political system 
A major issue when it comes to agriculture in South Africa is the grassroots’ lack of influence 
on the governing organisations in land reform. Thomas and Grindle claim that “groups that 
are already organised around common interests will respond more quickly to perceptions of 
threat to their self-interest than their less organised counterparts, and will be much more 
efficient participants in public affairs” (Thomas and Grindle 1990: 1176). In South Africa, the 
emerging black farmers seem to be poorly organised and “politically poor”, while the white 
commercial farmers have over several years built strong markets and organisations. This 
consequently suggests that the established white commercial farmers have a good chance of 
influencing the political system and therefore the outcomes and policies. The small-scale rural 
farmers on the other hand, are often separated geographically, and do not have the same 
history of strong organisation. This may be an important aspect to acknowledge when it 
comes to lack of voice and development in small-scale rural agriculture despite governmental 
programs and reforms. Knut Dahl Jacobsen's studies confirm that strong farmer organisations 
are important in developing agriculture. He employs David Easton’s model of the political 
system and how it is affected by its environment, in the context of the transformation of the 
Norwegian agriculture from mid 19th century to the beginning of the 20th century. One of his 
findings related to how the farmers had to act together as a group in order to influence the 
external changes (Jacobsen 1966: 81).   
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Further, Jacobsen also found that the definition of problems within the administration was 
closely linked to the officials’ private aims and social identifications. In the initial process of 
transformation they chose to focus on the upper class clientele partly because it was in 
accordance with their own social attitudes as professionals and moreover in accordance with a 
‘profit model’ that was to improve the efficiency and surplus of agriculture (ibid: 89). These 
characteristics correlate closely with some of Gran’s  findings in the context of South African 
land administration. Like several other scholars, he finds that the land reform programme has 
been consciously focussed on creating a group of black commercial farmers. Further, the 
ANC government made several promises to the international community of developing the 
South African economy as a part of the global market when they came to power in the early 
1990s, which in turn is one of the motivations for the focus on emerging black commercial 
farmers in the rural areas of the country. In addition, ANC members became “legitimate and 
important members of the urban middle class in South Africa” (Gran 2006: 191), which in 
accordance with Jacobsen’s research have further increased the focus on the higher class, 
resourceful farmers. Hence, these obligations within the government have, according to Gran 
“seriously slowed land reform down and…led to a devaluation of knowledge of small-scale 
agriculture rurally and inside the land bureaucracies”, and further “led to the assignment of 
low priority to the development of local government, where such knowledge of 
conditions/demands for small-scale farming was present” (ibid: 192).  
 
However, although there are obvious advantages in formal organisation, it is also probable 
disadvantages or even dangers involved. Monique Nuijten suggests that in some societies it 
may be better to remain outside the control of the state, especially when it is known to be 
“unpredictable, dangerous, and sometimes violent” (Nuijten 1999: 2). Further she suggests 
that although these informal networks may be looked upon as corrupt and damaging for the 
rural poor, it may to some extent provide them with freedom and liberty in their actions; it 
may be more important for rural households to engage in loose personal networks that go 
beyond the village borders instead of getting organised in local collectives (ibid: 2). Hence, 
the rural poor may have justifiable explanations for staying outside formal organisations for 
reasons that may not be obvious for outsiders. Many other researchers have written about the 
disadvantages of organisation and standardisation in a society, among them James C. Scott. 
One of his remarks is that “the more static, standardized, and uniform a population or social 
space is, the more legible it is, and the more amenable it is to the techniques of state officials” 
(Scott 1998: 82). Thus, it is important to see both sides of formal organisation in rural areas of 
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South Africa. Even if the inhabitants may get more protection from state officials through 
formal organisation, they will also experience increased control and standardization.  
 
There is nevertheless still need for an increased participation and strengthening of grassroots 
movements in order to influence the politics and policies of agriculture in South Africa. 
According to Gran (2006), a strong popular demand for redistribution of resources and a high 
level of international legitimacy of this reorganisation, was the reason why the massive 
transformation of the country in the 1990s was possible (p.192). As it is now, the popular 
awareness and thus demand for a change in the rural areas seems to be lacking. Due to this, 
civil society organisations (CSO) are struggling to get funding and are thus constrained by 
this in addition to organisational weakness. The NGOs are important contributors of 
assistance to these CSOs, but they are themselves limited, in part by the “growing NGO 
professionalism and neo-liberal ideological pressure for individual advancement” (Saruchera 
2004: 2).  Accordingly, land reform are receiving little input from the rural poor, which in 
turn has negative impacts on implementation and the establishing of political support for land 
reform (Hall et al. 2003: 33).  
 9.5 Increasing the possibilities for successful land reform 
projects?  
Some of the main contributions intended by the Land Reform Programmes is to promote 
social justice and socio-economic equity (Hall et al 2003: 25), and to change the racially 
skewed pattern of landownership after Apartheid. In practise, there have been paid very 
limited attention to wealth, gender and age in choosing beneficiaries. The main issues so far 
in land reform has, according to previous research, been inappropriate policies, institutions 
that are unfit for their tasks, a skewed profile of beneficiaries, a lack of spending the budget 
the first years followed by draining the budgets for years ahead following LRAD, and 
problems of acquiring land for the previously disadvantaged101. This may threaten to expand 
the differences within the poverty-stricken communities instead of changing the patterns of 
landownership, which in turn means that the poorest of the poor in rural areas, may be further 
disadvantaged.  
 
 
                                                 
101 Policy Brief series – PLAAS. www.plaas.org.za 
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According to Rhodes (2003), the self-organising networks resist steering from government 
and further Briggs (2008) postulates that there must be a capacity to work together in local 
communities in order to promote sustainable problem solving. Exactly this lack of steering 
from government in South Africa, and moreover the weak grassroots organisations and 
politically poor rural inhabitants is a combination that seems to be devastating for the 
beneficiaries land reform programme. In order for rural poor emerging farmers to be able to 
influence the politics and policies of land reform, there must be an increased awareness of this 
need to include and engage the rural poor in the land reform programme. Until now, “only lip 
service has been paid to the notion of community participation” (Cousins 2001: 18). Secondly 
there must be a more comprehensive support from the state towards the beneficiaries.  The 
DLA, which is responsible for policy making and the managing and implementation of the 
policies, does not seem to handle their responsibilities well, and are because of this dependent 
upon assistance from and partnerships with private and civil society actors in the 
implementing process (Hall et al. 2003: 2). Receiving support from civil society and private 
investors however is not the issue; an increased participation from other spheres of society 
may be a resource in the transformation process by i.e. providing vital ‘bridging’ between the 
established agricultural governance networks and the deprived rural communities. However, 
the government must recognise their central role in the land reform projects. As mentioned, 
the Goodhouse case was a good example of how the land administration does not have the 
capacity to plan and implement complex commercial deals. If the state is going to keep 
promoting these partnerships with private investors they have to look at their own partaking in 
the partnerships in order to assist the farmers in a best possible way; there is a need to develop 
and effectively manage a clear implementation strategy for land reform that is binding for all 
provinces and spheres of the state (ibid: 33). Finally, land reform will only be effective and 
sustainable if embedded within a broader programme with extensive cooperation between the 
various government departments that are providing for the landless and poor in South Africa. 
In addition to the need for redistribution of land to the previously oppressed, there is an urgent 
need for housing, education, proper infrastructure, delivery of water and electricity, dealing 
with the HIV/Aids pandemic etc. in order to promote sustainable rural development for the 
millions of previously oppressed living in the rural outskirts of the country. 
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11 Appendix  
I: Rural Claims Settled – National Summary, 31. March 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
(Lahiff 2008: 18) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Province Number 
of rural 
projects 
Number of 
rural 
projects 
involving 
land 
restoration 
Number 
of claim 
forms 
Number 
of 
claims 
settled 
Households Hectares Land 
cost (R 
millions) 
Financial 
compensation 
(R millions) 
Total 
grants 
(R 
millions) 
Total 
award  
cost 
(R 
millions) 
Eastern 
Cape 
38 23 161 161 17 347 67 248 28.2 72.8 119.2 220.2 
Free State 8 6 7 7 1655 44 094 7.2 1.3 7.2 15.7 
Gauteng 6 3 1 579 1 579 2028 3444 19.4 14.2 4.3 37.9 
KwaZulu 
Natal 
62 56 90 90 1 5781 325 959 630.6 48.9 207.5 893.3 
Limpopo 60 52 181 181 22 179 178 329 586.4 1.2 105.9 693.5 
Mpumalanga 39 37 205 205 26 676 88 748 299.6 0 123.3 422.9 
Northern 
Cape 
13 13 14 14 5 969 246 679 48.8 4.7 36.6 90.1 
North West 45 41 166 646 12 630 86 781 124.2 0 58.5 182.7 
Western 
Cape 
9 2 144 144 1280 5246 4.6 25.0 2.4 32.1 
Total 280 233 2 547 3 027 105 545 1 046528 1 749.0  168.1 664.9 2 588.4 
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II: Claims settled, by province, 2006/07 
 
 
 
 
 
(Department of Land Affairs, 2006/07 Annual report to the Select Committee on Land and 
Environmental Affairs, 6.November 2007).  
 
Land Transferred by restitution and redistribution, 31. March 2007 
 
 Redistribution Restitution Total 
Hectares 2 299 000  1 897 000 4 196 000 
Percentage 54.79 45.21 100.00 
 
(DLA 2007: Presentation of the 2006/07 Annual Report to the Select committee on land and 
environmental affairs, 6.nov 2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Province Settled Rural Urban Households Beneficiaries Hectares 
Eastern Cape 42 15 27 5 648 15 893 15 389 
Free State 463 4 459 646 10 279 0 
Gauteng 15 7 8 1 352 6 494 4 002 
KwaZulu 
Natal 
267 67 200 11 717 72 748 10 087 
Limpopo 72 71 1 7 297 48 090 152 687 
Mpumalanga 334 315 19 7 159 30 346 113 238 
Northern 
Cape 
102 11 91 4 698 26 195 58 710 
North West 214 213 1 10 863 47 073 134 876 
Western Cape 1 263 3 1 260 2 691 11 992 15 
Total 2 772 706 2 066 52 071 269 110 579 004 
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III: Map over the Northern Cape Province 
 
 
 
(http://www.southafricaholiday.org.uk/images/mapdetail_northerncape.jpg)
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IV: Organisation Map, Goodhouse (SPP-files) 
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V: Map over the Western Cape Province 
 
 
 
(http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/8/8c/Map_of_the_Western 
Cape_with_municipalities_labelled.svg/500px-
Map_of_the_Western_Cape_with_municipalities_labelled.svg.p) 
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Management Committee  
VI: Organisational Map, Vuki Farm (DLA-files) 
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